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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to try to establish the extent to which the words 
good, bad, true and right can be considered lexical universals. These words have 
been chosen because they are value-judgment terms which, individually , have been 
discussed at length by philosophers. It seems to be assumed by philosohers and 
semanticists that these words reflect concepts which are shared by speakers of all 
languages. By testing whether these words are candidates for lexical universals we 
can then see the extent to which this assumption is t rue. 
On the basis of information from native speakers from 15 diverse languages, we 
can say that good and bad reflect language independent concepts. However, in 
many languages, including English, the range of meaning of bad 1s narrower than 
the range of meaning of good. By looking at five of t hese fifteen languages we can 
see that the words right and true reflect concepts which are not language 
independent. Thus by taking a cross-linguistic approach, we can shed some light 
on the work done by language philosophers in t he area of value-judgment terms. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this thesis the value-judgment terms good, bad~ right and true - and the words 
which correspond to them in other languages - are discussed. The aim of the 
thesis is to try to determine the extent to which these words can be considered 
lexical universals. If these words are lexical universals then we have some grounds 
for saying that they reflect concepts which are language independent. 
The words good, bad, ri·ght and true occur frequently in discussions of ethics and 
logic. Many philosophers, including Aristotle, have discussed these words at great 
length. Nevertheless, I would describe them as words about which much is 
assumed but little is known. This may seem a surprising statement when we 
consider the vast amount of literature that has been devoted to them individually. 
However, I hope to illustrate that something can be gained from applying a 
linguistic approach to their study. 
As I have pointed out, Aristotle has contributed to our understanding of the 
word good, although he did not speak English. Does this mean that we assume 
that there is a corresponding word for good in every language and that each of 
these words reflects the same concept , GOOD? It is clear from the writings of 
many philosophers (in that they do not address this question) that this is indeed 
what is assumed, and that it is also assumed of BAD, TRUE and RIGHT. 
Philosophers are not alone in making such assumptions. Logicians and semant icists 
base much of their work on the notion that TRUE is a concept shared by speakers 
of all languages: 
"Classical logic (whose founder was Aristotle) t ook it for granted that 
all judgments could be broken up into simple propositions, that is , 
statements in which somet hing ( a predicate) is asserted about something 
( a subject). Examples are water is wet ; grass is yellow; some Greeks are 
rich; no animal is rational. It was also assumed that such proposit ions 
were either "true " or "false "; water is wet is a true proposition; grass is 
yellow is a false one. " (Rapoport 1965:343) 
The task of this thesis t hen is to establish, as far as possible , whether the 
assumptions made about these words are correct. Do we have shared concepts 
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which are reflected in words which correspond to the English words good, bad, 
ri'ght, and true, or do these words reflect particular cultural values of specific 
language groups? In order to answer this question we must first establish whether 
these words are lexical universals, or, given that we are not dealing with all 
languages, whether they are candidates for lexical universals. Clearly it is an 
easier task to establish that a word is not a lexical universal than to establish that 
it is. 
1.1. Outline of Chapters 
In the following chapters we look at good and bad ( and, to a lesser extent, true 
and right) from several perspectives. In Chapter 2 we look at the contributions 
made by philosophers to our understanding of good and bad. In Chapter 3 we 
look at good and bad as a pair of antonyms. In Chapter 4 we discuss the notion 
of 'universal' and also discuss good and bad in relation to the concept of 
markedness. The discussion of these two words in relation to both antonymy and 
marking forms a framework from which to assess our observation that, in many 
languages, words corresponding to good have a wider range of meaning and a wider 
range of use than words corresponding to bad. In Chapter 5 restrictions of 
meaning and lexical restrictions are discussed. Restrictions of meaning occur when 
the context in which good or, more frequently, bad, is used is restricted. Lexical 
restrictions operate when words corresponding to good or bad can not be used in 
combination with a particular domain ( e.g. school or boat). In other words, a 
discussion of restrictions of meaning is concerned with the range of meaning of a 
word and a discussion of lexical resfri-ctions is concerned with the range of use of a 
word. 
The procedure for collecting the data on good and bad from other languages, and 
the data. itself, is discussed m Chapter 6. Although a more thorough 
understanding of each of the 15 languages discussed would t ell us more about the 
differences between the way these words are used in each language, for the 
purposes of this thesis, it is largely the similarities between languages that were 
sought and which are discussed. 
Chapter 7 serves as a point of contrast. While the in{ormation we have about 
good and bad suggests that they reflect concepts which are language independent , 
the information we have about true and right suggests that these words reflect 
concepts which are culture specific. Thus, from a cross-linguistic perspective, t he 
assumptions philosophers have made about good and bad appear to be accurate. 
This, however, does not appear to be the case with true and right. 
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1.2. Viewing Semantics As An Activity 
Semantics, as Wierzbicka has described it, (see Wierzbicka 1972:1) is an activity. 
The value of undertaking an activity lies both m the results achieved by 
completing the activity and the process of being involved in the activity. The 
results, in this case, will tell us if we can say whether these words are lexical 
universals and this will have implications for other related questions. For example, 
whether the concepts GOOD, BAD, RIGHT and TRUE are language independent 
concepts is dependent upon discovering whether or not they are lexical universals. 
In order to establish this, however, we must be clear about what we mean by 
lexical universal and shared concept. In terms of estaolishing lexical universals, 
presumably we have to establish . that terms corresponding to good, bad, r·£ght and 
true exist in other languages. This is more difficult than it sounds, however, and 
it is necessary to do more than just ask an informant for a word which 
corresponds to an English word. The difficulties are particularly obvious when we 
look at right and true. While it is not difficult to find a word which informants 
say correspond to these two tern1s, this does not mean that the word covers the 
same range of meaning as the English word. 
Whether or not these words are shared concepts will have a -bearing upon 
whether or not they should be used in a semantic metalanguage. Both good and 
bad have been used in the semantic metalanguage proposed by Wierzbicka ( 1972, 
· 1980), though they have not been proposed as semantic primitives. Clearly, if they 
are not lexical universals, then they can not be shared concepts, and, therefore, it 
would be inappropriate to use them as such, because, to be useful for cross-
linguistic semantic investigations, the semantic metalanguage has to be language 
independent, as far as possible. That is, the metalanguage may not be absolutely 
language independent, because there will always be pragmatic differences in the way 
words are used from language to language, but the metalanguage should be as 
independent as possible, given that natural language is being used. Even if, 
however, they are both lexical universals this does not mean that their claims to 
be used in such a metalanguage are equally valid, as we shall see in the case of 
bad. 
These, then, are possible implications of the results of the activity . In many 
ways, however, it is the process of getting to these results that is both the more 
interesting and informative aspect of serr1antics. For example, paradoxically, it is 
in undertaking a cross-linguistic survey that the meanings of these words in English 
become clearer; that the relationship between good and bad becomes clearer and 
that the possib1e meanings of the shared concepts become clearer. That is, by 
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looking at a range of languages we can see that while shared concepts GOOD and 
BAD exist, these concepts do not necessarily have exactly the same range of 
meaning as the words good and bad. 
It is also in performing the activity that it is clear that our results are , to a 
large extent, a rnatter of interpreting the data; thus to some extent one of the 
tasks of this thesis is to illustrate that the results of collecting data are based as 
much on the way you choose to analyse the information as on the information 
itself. That is, the inforrnation that we collect tells us whether a particular word 
(e.g. good) can be used to describe another word (e.g. man). We can not, 
however, accept this fact at face value. We must also discover the context in 
which it can be used. Whether or not good or bad can be used with a set of 
domains tells us the range of use of these words. However, in order to determine 
correspondence between words across languages we must also know the range of 
meaning of the word, and this is determined by the context in which it can be 
used. 
There are many approaches that can be taken in a study of value-judgment 
terms, as the topic relates to the inter-related but separate fields of linguistics, 
anthropology and philosophy. As much as possible I would like to highlight the 
importance of inter-relating these fields as it seems that the greatest understanding 
is to be gained by v1ew1ng the same question from many angles. However, in the 
interests of clarity, I will deal separately with these approaches. It is of interest, 
for example, to see how philosophers and linguists have dealt with value-judgment 
terms, in particular the word good.· : In terms of lexical universals it is necessary to 
see what has been done in this area by linguists and anthropologists , and what 
implications the establishment of lexical universals has on what we know about 
language. In the light of these two approaches we can then discuss the data and 
discuss the various conclusions that can be drawn from it. 
1.3. Using A Cross-linguistic A.pproach To Test Philosophers' Assumptions 
One theme that seems to recur in acquiring knowledge is the inter-relationship 
between insight and facts. That is, it is often possible to guess what is going on, 
even though we have limited information on which to base our hypothesis. We 
!leed to gather data, however , in order t o confirm or reject our hypothesis. It is 
in looking at the data that further insights may occur to us. It is the 
philosophers who, in my opinion, have the greatest insights to offer 1n discussing 
value-judgment terms, although they have generally relied on information from 
perhaps one or two languages (e.g. Greek, English, German). However , by looking 
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at a larger number of languages we can see to what extent their insights and 
assumptions are valid. In a similar way , Katz and Vendler try to explain Moore 's 
intuition about good from a linguistic perspective. Katz says: 
"Moore seems to have put his finger on something quite important, and , 
until it is known exactly what his intuition is an intuition of, its 
philosophical relevance remains obscure." (Katz 1964:765) 
With this in mind we can survey philosophers ' views on good. By looking at data 
from other languages, however, we can perhaps see more clearly to what extent , or 
in what respects, their intuitions are accurate, at least from a linguistic perspective, 
if not a philosophical one. 
On the other hand, while we need facts in order to test our assumptions, there is 
a danger in collecting facts but in being mistaken about what it is they represent. 
Randall and Hunn point to this problem in relation to the collection of data by 
Cecil Brown. They cast doubt, not just on 
"Brown's methods but on the very idea of using glosses to test 
unversalist ethnosemantic hypotheses. Glosses often reflect an informant 's 
satisfaction that an anthropologist has learned an approximate meaning. 
Unfortunately, even this partial understanding is often further eroded when 
an anthropologist ignores details in an attempt to communicate with 
English-speaking audiences. Mnemonic glosses should not be considered 
evidence for semantic universals hypotheses. They may be effectively used 
in the early stages of theory building, but to prove a semantic universal 
one must use transla.tions which are plausibly claimed to be semantically 
precise descriptions." (Randall and Hunn 1984:333) 
Randall and Hunn's criticisms of- Brown's work highlight the benefit of using 
native speakers as informants rather than relying too heavily on secondary sources 
for our information. Understandably , if we are to look at vast numbers of 
languages - as Brown and his colleagues have done - then one person will be 
unable to collect all of the necessary data. By relying on secondary sources , 
however , we are more likely to fall into the trap outlined by Randall and Hunn . 
By using native speakers and by using the method of looking at the use of words 
in order to establish their meaning, as has been done in t his thesis , however, we 
are able to gain a broader understanding of these words and are therefore more 
adequately able to determine whether the worcis that are being studied refl ect 
shared concept~. 
Randall and Hunn 's criticisms also implicitiy suggest that we can only come to a 
full understanding of the meaning of a word in another language by looking a t its 
use in a range of contexts rather than by asking for the nearest equivalent and 
being satisfied with that. If we want to be able to say something significant 
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about language in general , however , it is necessary to survey more than just a few 
languages - even if they are from widely differing language families - and t hus , like 
Brown, I have found it necessary to gather some information from secondary 
sources. However, ~his information has been used only t o either confirm or reject 
hypotheses which have been formulated on the basis of information gathered from 
native speakers. 
The division between looking at what has been said about these value-judgment 
terms by language philosophers and what has been done in the area of lexical 
universals, then, is not one based simply on distinguishing between different 
branches of the humanities, but on the different emphasis placed on insight and 
the collection of data. 
1.4. Language and Thought 
First , however , let us look at the relationship between language and thought ; 
between word and concept , and at the use of lexical universals in a semantic 
metalanguage. 
A discussion of the concepts GOOD and BAD allows us to explore t he 
relationship between semantic primitives and lexical universals. The words good 
and bad have both been used as part of a semantic metalanguage to explicate more 
complex concepts but have not been proposed as semant ic primitives themselves. 
Giv6n , for example, would not include any adjective as a primitive (Giv6n 
1970:835) and Wierzbicka believes they can be furt her defined by more simple 
concepts. If good and bad can be established as lexical universals and t herefore as 
representing concepts ,;,..· hich are language independent , then t here is a case for their 
use in a semantic metalanguage ( at least on one level ). If, on t he other hand, 
t hey are culture specific then the validity of assuming t hat t hese t erms are basic 
t erms that reflect concepts which all speakers have is called in to quest ion. 
Presumably all languages lexically encode concepts which reflect t heir cultural 
values and moral ideals~ such as courage , honesty, decei·t and cowardice in English. 
In explicating these t erms we would , I suggest, need to refer t o the words good 
and b(,j,d, for in our culture courage and honesty are seen as something good , so 
much so t hat the value-judgment good is encoded in the very meaning of these 
words , and decez"t and cowardice are seen as something bad. Thus the concept 
GOOD is encoded in words such as courage and honesty~ but it is also lexica lly 
encoded in t he word good. 
In a cross-linguistic survey we must be aware of the potent ial diffi culties of 
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dealing both with concepts and with words which reflect these concepts. There is 
always the possibility that a language may have a concept (for GOOD, BAD or 
other value-judg::nent terms) which . 1s not lexically encoded ( and of course 
individual speakers have concepts which can not be expressed 1n a single word ), 
but in order to discover whether these concepts exist it is necessary to first 
establish whether or not lexical items exist in a language rather than to try to 
establish in a philosophical way whether these concepts exist in a disembodied 
form. 
The importance of determining whether other languages have words for good and 
bad~ therefore, lies in the fact that what we are determining is not just whether 
these words exist in other languages, but whether the concepts GOOD and BAD 
are concepts which are shared by all languages, and whether they are sufficiently 
salient in a given culture to have become lexically encoded, or whether these words 
reflect specific attitudes of particular cultures. Thus we are dealing with the 
relationship between language and thought. Support for the idea that there is 
value in looking at language in order to understand thought is not difficult to find, 
although, as Jackendoff says: 
" [while] the idea that language mirrors thought is of great antiquity, 
current philosophical practice does not on the whole encourage us to 
explore it." ( Jackendoff 1983:3) 
Katz, however, maintains that there is: 
"a strong relation between the form and content of language and the 
form and content of conceptualization" 
and goes on to say that 
"The special task of the philosophy of language is, therefore, to explore 
this relation and make whatever inferences about the structure of 
conceptual knowledge can be n1ade on the basis of what is known about 
the structure of language." (Katz 1966:4) 
Semantics, 1n particular, 1s concerned with conceptual knowledge and, as 
Wierzbicka has put it: 
"Semantics is an activity which consists in the elucidation of the sense 
of human utterances. Its purpose is to reveal the structure of thought 
which the external form of language conceals." (Wierzbicka 1972:1) 
This view is also held by Jackendoff, who says: 
"To study 
psychology." 
semantics of natural 
(Jackendoff 1983:3) 
language is to study cognitive 
It should be clear from these statements that in order to reach an understanding 
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of the concepts we are concerned with it is necessary to look beyond the existence 
of a word to its meaning. That is, we have to establish that when someone says 
a language has a word for good or bad or right or true that it corresponds to the 
same meaning as these words in English and is not . just the nearest equivalent ( as 
Randall and Hunn have pointed out in relation to Brown's universals). 
We can also look to anthropological linguists, such as Brown and Witkowski, for 
confirmation of the value of looking at language in order to understand thought. 
In particular they are concerned with the relationship between language universals 
and thought: 
"Language universals constitute an important focus of contemporary 
linguistics since their description may shed light on the nature of the 
human language faculty ... The study of language uniformities is one 
approach to fleshing out the cognitive framework innately shared by 
humankind upon which individual languages such as Chinese, English, 
Navaho and so on, are all constructed." (Brown and Witkowski 1980:359) 
Language universals are also seen as of unquestionable importance by Joseph 
Greenberg and his colleagues: 
" ... since language is at once both an aspect of individual behavior and 
an aspect of human culture, its universals provide both the major point of 
contact with underlying psychological principles (psycholinguistics) and the 
major source of implications for human cultures 1n general 
(ethnolinguistics)." (Greenberg, Osgood and Jenkins 1966:xv) 
It must be noted however that not all linguists would advise searching for such 
things as shared concepts. Bloomfield, for example, believed that talking about: 
"'ideas' or 'concepts ' , such as 'the concept of a straight line ' ... is 
merely a traditional but useless and confusing way of talking about 
[ speech forms]; that we find in our universe ( that is: require in our 
discourse) only (1) actual objects and (2) speech forms which serve as 
conventional responses to certain features that are common to a class of 
objects." (Bloomfield 1936:94) 
Value-judgment terms, however , do not refer to 'actual objects ' and, regardless of 
whether we agree with Bloomfield's scepticism about the existence of concepts 
which refer to objects, the argu1nent can not be extended to abstract words such 
as good bad, r·Z:ght and true. It is a worthwhile endeavour, then, to look for the 
existence of words which correspond to good and bad and ri"ght and true in ot her 
languages in order to determine whether these v.1ords r~flect concepts which are 
language independent or culture specific. 
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1.5. The Widespread Occurrence of Words Corresponding to Good 
It is clear from other studies that good and bad are common to many languages; 
good, in particular, occurs frequently. For example, in a survey of seventeen 
languages with small adjectival classes (plus subsets of three other languages) , an 
adjective corresponding to good occurred in 13 of the languages and the remaining 
languages had a noun goodness. While an adjective corresponding to bad occurred 
in 14 of the languages, not all had a unique term corresponding to bad. ( Dixon 
1982:4-7). In this study, we are concerned not just with adjectives but with 
lexemes (which may or may not be adjectives) which reflect the concept of GOOD 
and the concept of BAD - assuming, that is, that these concepts exist. 
The fact that good so often occurs 1n the adjective class, no matter how small 
that class may be in a given language, can not, however, be overlooked. The 
significance of this observation becomes apparent when we compare good with right 
and true ( see Chapter 7 for a discussion of this point). For the moment, however , 
it is important to note that the fact that good does not appear as an adjective 1n 
a particular language is not sufficient evidence to say that the concept GOOD 1s 
not language independent. There is, moreover, often disagreement about whether 
all languages have a class of adjectives, and, thus, what is significant is the way in 
which we so often find a word which corresponds to good even in languages which 
do not have adjectival classes. 
In a study of cross-cultural universals of the affective lexicon it was found that: 
"The two most common modes of qualifying right across the world are 
good and b-ig ( or some close synonym)·.'' ( Osgood, May and Miron, 
1975:189) 
The qualification "or some close synonym" - bears noting, however, for we are 
looking not just for synonyms of good, which presumably would have a different 
range of use, but for words which correspond to good itself. 
Further evidence for the widespread use of t hese terms across languages can be 
found in individual studies of cultures such as the Tahitians. 
Tahitian is, in this respect, similar to English. Thus: 
We find that 
"The most general Tahitian terms for 'good ', maita'i, and 'bad', 'ino, 
have a wide range of uses. They apply to good and bad fish, good and 
bad craftsmanship, and skillful and unskillful performance. When they are 
applied as a moral evaluation, they imply a dimension of good/ evil." 
(Levy 1973:346) 
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1.6. Range of Use and Range of Meaning 
If we find a word which informants say corresponds to good, how do we know 
that we have found a word which reflects the concept GOOD? Clearly it is 
insufficient to sirnply ask if there is a word in a particular language which 
corresponds to good in English. It is necessary to establish both the range of use 
of the word and its range of meaning. The range of use of a word can be 
established by checking if it can be used over a range of semantic domains. In 
this study twenty-nine semantic domains were used to test whether a lexeme could 
be used to describe it. Thus in English we can say good man, good news, good 
weather and good food. We want to know whether a word which informants say 
corresponds to good can be used with the same set of semantic domains. In order 
to establish the range of meaning of a word it is necessary to ask whether or not , 
when good is used with a particular domain, it can only be used in a particular 
context or has a restricted meaning attached to it. For example, if, in English, we 
say that good food can be used to refer to food that is both healthy and tasty, 
and we find that in another language it can only be used when the food is 
healthy, then the range of use of good may be the same but its range of meaning 
is different when used with this particular domain. 
This method of collecting data, then, follows Wittgenstein 's suggestion to look at 
the use of the word. not its meaning: 
"For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ 
the word 'meaning ' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is it s 
use in the language. " (Wittgen~tein 197 4:20) 
It is only by looking at the way a · word is used that we can establish its meaning, 
and it is only by comparing the way in which words are used across languages 
that we can establish whether these words reflect the same concept. This is 
particularly so when we are considering the meaning of value-judgment terms about 
which, as was suggested earlier, so much is assumed. Through looking at t he way 
t hey are used, however, we can verify the assumptions made about their meanings. 
Thus. it is the use of a word that gives us clues t o it s meaning, and, therefore, it 
is necessary to investigate the use of a word before we can decide whether or not 
t hese terms reflect concepts which are language independent. 
However, as we shall see when we compare true and right with good, it is not 
always equally simple to compare words across languages on the basis of t heir use. 
That is, while we can establish the meaning of a word on the basis of use wi t hin 
a language, in some cases we must be aware of t he range of meaning we are 
comparing from language to language before we try to compare their range of use. 
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Not surprisingly, the different syntactic structures which languages utilise, and , in 
particular, the fact that comparable words do not always belong to the same part 
of speech in each language, gives rise to this difficulty. This apparent difficulty , 
however, can also illustrate the inter-relationship between syntax and semantics. 
Moreover, it can give us further clues to the meaning of these words, thus helping 
us to determine whether or not they should be viewed as shared concepts. 
It has been said that the meaning of good is dependent on the context in which 
it is used, and indeed this point warrants further discussion fsee discussion of 
Katz's views in Chapter 2). But this should not deter us from isolating these 
words and discussing them out of any particular context. That is, while we look 
at the way these value-judgment terms are used in order to understand what they 
mean, we must then see if there is something that can be said about them that is 
true no matter what context they are used in. 
"Although it is necessary to keep constantly in mind that a sentence 
can be used for different purposes and with different meanings in different 
situations, it is a legitimate psychological question to ask how people form 
and interpret the concepts that are literally expressed by the sentences 
they utter. The answer cannot provide a complete account of all that a 
psychologist would like to know about language use and acquisition, but it 
seems a necessary step toward such an account." (Miller 1978:64) 
Thjs study of value-judgment terms then . lS but a small step towards our 
understanding of how languages use words which corresoond to good, bad, right 
and true. From the knowledge that is gained about the use of these words, we 
can then decide whether these words are lexical universals, and , if they are , 
whether this indicates that these words reflect concepts which are shared by all 
speakers. In undertaking this activity, we can also speculate on the aspects of 
these words that are essential to their meaning, and , without going as far as 
proposing definitions, at least offer suggestions as to what the connecting threads 
are between , for example, good in its use in t he phrases good man, good weather 
and good kni" fe. 
1. 7. Summary of Conclusions 
Some of what I have to say about the meaning of good and bad is speculative. 
However, it is only by offering such suggesbons that we can come towards a 
greater understanding of such words. Before embarking on the main body of the 
thesis , I should outline its main conclusions. The first is that while good and bad 
are both candidates for lexical universals , there is more justification in proposing 
good as a lexical universal than bad. Secondly, the sheer difficulty of comparing 
true and ri"ght across languages, the fact that they overlap in meaning both in 
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English and in other languages, and the fact that these words do not consistently 
belong to the same part of speech from language to language ( as good and bad 
tend to), suggest that these words are more likely to reflect particular cultural 
values and are thus not lang.uage independent concepts. 
Thirdly, 1n English and a number of other languages, I suggest that there is a 
set-subset relationship between good and bad where bad corresponds to a subset of 
good. That is, the range of use and the range of meaning of bad is much more 
restricted than that of good. Good is clearly the better candidate for a lexical 
universal for this reason. On the other hand although bad is more restricted in its 
range of use and range of meaning it still reflects a concept that appears to exist 
in the languages that have been surveyed. Thus there is some evidence to suggest 
that while good and bad are not always exact opposites in English, and in many 
other languages, when we look at the core of shared meaning of these words across 
languages it appears that the concepts which they reflect are exact opposites. 
Finally, I suggest that the range of meaning of good can broadly be divided into 
two categories which I will refer to as nature and function; whereas bad covers 
only the range of meaning described as nature. It is because of this restriction in 
its range of meaning that it is both used less frequently and in fewer contexts 
than good. However, from a cross-linguistic perspective, we can find an example of 
a .language (Tagalog) where the word for good primarily covers the nature of 
things and thus in terms of concepts (rather than words) it seems that languages 
do share the concept GOOD and the concept BAD and that these antonymous 
concepts refer to the nature of whatever is being described. 
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Chapter 2 
Philosophers - Their Insights and Assumptions 
"If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good and 
that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be 
defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to 
say about it." (:~Joore 1952:70) 
In fact Moore, as well as numerous other people, have had much more to say 
about good as well as about other value-judgment terms. One could speculate on 
why so much time has been spent on these words. It seems to be a combination 
of the fact that these terms are both vague and of great importance to ethical and 
philosophical discussions. Because so many of their discussions involve these words 
philosophers are clearly aware of the problem of using these terms when they are 
so imprecise, or when they appear to mean different things to different people. 
The difficulty of course is not that they mean different things to different people 
but that they can be used by different people to refer to different things. Thus 
not only can I refer to a good book and you refer to a good day but if we refer t o 
a good man we can both refer to a different kind of person and assume that 
different characteristics are necessary before we can describe a man in this way. 
2.1. Nature and Function 
Let us look then at what has been said about good, and to some extent value-
judgment terms in general , to see if there are some recurring themes in the 
observations and insights offered. Aristotle considers the question "But what do 
we mean by the good" ( Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1925: 1096b) rather than ''But 
what do we mean by good". Assuming that these two English translations do 
justice to the Greek distinction , we can say that t he good is not necessarily exactly 
the same as good although he nevertheless covers some of the same ground that it 
1s necessary to cover in order to answer the latter question. The good seems to 
relate to goodness which I suggest is concerned with only one aspect of good the 
adjective. That is it deals with the nature of something rather than its 
function, but while every thing , every action , every person, can be said to have a 
nature, goodness seems to apply primarily to humans or things related to humans. 
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It is perhaps because the noun goodness is concerned with the nature aspect of 
the adjective good - that we premat.urely tend to jump to the conclusion that good 
is primarily a moral concept. Thus when Wiggins ~ays: 
"Surely, it has been thought, goodness in a knife is not the same 
property as goodness in food? And not even the same as goodness in a 
lyre? And the inferentional consequences of the possession of one sort of 
goodness will be very different from those of another." ( Wiggins 1971 :34) 
I think he is making a mistake in assuming goodness and good to be the same. 
Some things which are primarily functional can't really be said to have goodness, 
certainly not in the way they can be good. Thus does a knife have goodness? If it 
does jt is a fairly extended usage. It can however have a nature. This is not 
necessarily the same as its function, for although it is generally the nature of 
knives to cut well (perform a function), it may be that the nature of a knife is 
that it is made of steel or has a particular shape. Thus nature can refer to one 
of several things that are integral to being a knife. 
Aristotle sees the good as something to strive for but as something that 1s 
unattainable: 
"with regard to the Idea; even if there is son1e one good which is 
universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate or independent 
existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are 
now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might 
think it worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that are 
attainable and achievable, for having this as a sort of pattern we shall 
know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them we 
shall attain them." (Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1925:1096b, 1097a) 
TP-is may seem a far cry from discussing whether words corresponding to good can 
be used with a number of semantic domains in a number of languages. It does, 
however, suggest something about good which we will come across again. That is, 
Aristotle seems to be suggesting that the good is an extension of what is (i.e. is 
concerned with the nature of a thing). In other words though difficult to achieve 
it is related to tne way things already are, e.g. the way man already behaves, but 
it goes beyond this. One of the main differences between good and bad, as we 
shall see, is that good is concerned with things as they are or are supposed to be 
whereas bad is concerned with the way things are not supposed to be ( e.g. a good 
clock is one that tells the time accurately because clocks are supposed to tell the 
time.) 
Aristotle also raises two other points which we find discussed by other writers at 
a later time and which are essential to the discussion here. The first of these 
points is that the sense of good differs according to what we apply it to and the 
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second is that good is concerned with the function that something has. For 
example: 
"Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can 
be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in 
medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise." ( Aristotle Ethica 
N£comachea 1925:1097a) 
Good, I have suggested, encompasses the notion of the nature of something and 
the function of something. It seems that while everything has a nature not 
everything must have a function. For example, a mountain does not have a 
function. One could of course argue that in some cases the nature of something 
and its function are identical. Certainly they often overlap, as Aristotle appears 
to suggest in relation to man, and this may be one reason why the meaning of 
good seems to be so complex, but in fact the nature of something could be 
applied to other aspects rather than the function, even if the function is an 
essential part of the thing, as I suggested above in the case of knife. Nevertheless 
this does suggest that there will be a subjective element operating when we divide 
the meaning of the word good into nature and function. 
Aristotle believes that of all the things which have a function, good will 'reside' 
in this function. 
"For just as a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist , and , in general , for 
all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is 
thought to reside in the function, so it would seem to be for man, if he 
has a function." (Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1925:1097b) 
:... 
He goes on to say: 
"Now if the function of man 1s an activity of soul which follows or 
implies a rational principle, and if we say 'a so-and-so ' and 'a good so-
and-so ' have a function which is the same in kind , e.g. a lyre-player and a 
good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in 
respect of goodness being added to the name of function (for t he func t ion 
of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-piayer to do 
so well): if this is the case ... human good turns out to be activity of 
soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in 
accordance with the best and most complete. " (Aristotle Eth1,'ca 
l'/icomachea 1925:1098a) 
Thus although we saw above that Aristotle discussed good in terms of an 
extension of the way things already are ( their nature), he appears to see good as 
concerned primarily with function rather than with nature, describing nature as 
a type of function. As Aristotle has observed, nature and function are in ter-
related. However , I suggest that function should not be seen as t he primary point 
of description. Rather, it is the nature of something that will be applicable t o all 
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domains. This perspective alleviates the difficult y of t rying to ascert ain the 
function of a man, for example, and yet allows us t o see the strong connection 
between the moral aspect of the meaning of good, which applies to man but not to 
other things. Thus the moral aspect can be defined as the nature of a narrow 
domain (man). It also allows us to say that in some cases nature and function 
are inseparable , or, alternatively , that in some cases t he nature of a t hing is its 
function. 
Clearly the notions of nature and function are not new but it does seem that 
m many cases, either the functional aspect of good has been considered prior or 
that the meaning of good is seen as stemming from the notion of a moral good. 
As Beesley has pointed out: 
"Both [Plato and Aristotle] concluded that 'good' and 'bad' modify 
relative to the functions of the arguments, and this kind of analysis 
continues little modified to the present day.... A problem for Plato, 
Aristotle, and anyone else t rying t o explain all uses oi evaluatives in this 
way is that the function of man , woman, person and other such 'empty ' 
nouns is far from obvious." (Beesley 1982:214) 
However, if we think of good as referring to the nature of whatever it is 
modifying and note that the function is often more or less equivalent to its 
nature, and that some domains can not be said to have a function, t hen this is 
no longer a problem. The problem arises when we view function as primary and 
try to decide how to incorporate non-functional examples into t his functional 
approach. 
However, in the following quotation Aristotle seems to be alluding to t he nature 
of things, or things being good in themselves , as well as t he function of t hings 
and I suggest that this analysis is the one born out by the cross-linguistic dat a 
presented below. 
"We may remark , then , that every virtue or excellence bot h brings into 
good condit ion the thing of which it is t he excellence and makes the work 
of t hat t hing be done well ; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes bot h the 
eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of t he eye that we see 
well. Similarly the excellence of t he horse makes a horse both good in 
itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the 
at tack of t he enemy. Therefore if this is t rue in every case, the vir t ue of 
man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and 
which makes him do his own work well. " (Aristot le Eth£ca Nicomachea 
1925:1106a) 
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2.2. Simple Ideas 
Both Russell and Moore consider that when we ask what the meaning of good is, 
we are looking not for the sort of definition that would be appropriate 1n a 
dictionary but for the concepts or ideas that this word conjures up. This 1s an 
important distinction to draw for if we want to consider or disagree with their 
intuitions we must be aware of what their intuitions reflect. \Ve can see from 
Russell's discussion that he assumes that good and bad are concepts which everyone 
understands. He does not Eay of course that speakers of other languages 
understand them but it seems that in a study of ethics this assumption is implied. 
"Good and Bad, in the sense in which the words are here intended 
(which is, I believe, their usual sense), are ideas which everybody, or 
almost everybody possesses. These ideas are apparently an1ong those 
which form the simplest constituents of our more complex ideas, and are 
therefore incapable of being analysed or built up out of other simpler 
ideas." (Russell 1952:4) 
The connection between ideas which are simple and ideas which everybody 
understands is clearly a valid one. The difficulty we have in defining good and 
bad suggests that these words are relatively simple ideas. It seems valid to test any 
words that convey simple ideas as lexical universals in order to see if these simple 
ideas are comparable in other languages. 
Moore also believes good to be a simple idea. 
" ... this question, how ~good' is to be defined, is the most fundamental 
question in all Ethics. That which is meant by 'good' is , in fact, except 
its converse 'bad', the only simple object of thought which is peculiar to 
Ethics." (Moore 1952:69) 
Clearly if a word such as this 1s considered to be so important to a particular 
branch of intellectual enquiry, it is worthy of study from a cross-linguistic 
perspective. In this way we can verify whether bad is in all cases the converse of 
good , as Moore claims, and discuss to what extent good is "a simple object of 
thought". 
2.3. The Use of Good in Different Contexts 
When good has been discussed by language philosophers it has often been 
discussed as a moral term. It is also often made clear that it is used in many 
different contexts. As Ziff says: 
"A striking fact about the use of the word 'good' in English is that 
whether or not something is good can be and frequently is a matter of 
controversy and dispute in a way that whether or not something is yellow 
is not." (Ziff 1960:239) 
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However, because we disagree about whether or not something 1s good, it does not 
mean that we should have any difficulty in comparing whether a word 
corresponding to good in another language can be used with the same set of 
semantic domains as good in English. Thus if we accept that two speakers of 
English will not necessarily agree on what constitutes a good book then we must 
also accept that speakers of different languages will not necessarily agree about 
what characteristics would be used to describe a good book. The important thing 
is whether the same word can be used over and over again with a range of 
domains. We must however accept that there may be some differences in the 
range of meaning of a word with a particular domain. This alone does not 
indicate that we have different concepts reflected in corresponding words. If some 
core range of meaning and range of use remains then I suggest that we can claim 
that these words reflect shared concepts. If, on the other hand, there is little 
common ground, then we will be able to establish similarity of meaning but not a 
shared concept. 
Hare makes the point that the meaning of good does not change simply because 
it can be used in a variety of contexts. 
"To teach what makes a member of any class a good member of the 
class is indeed a new lesson for each class of objects; but nevertheless the 
word 'good' has a constant meaning which, once learnt can be understood 
no matter what class of objects is being discussed. We have, as I have 
already said, to make a distinction between the meaning of the word 
'good' and the criteria for its application." (Hare 1961:102) 
Thus 1n effect it is the criteria that we may dispute but we should be able to 
agree on the meaning, even if we find it difficult to isolate. 
2.4. Vagueness 
But what is the meaning of good and why is it so difficult to identify? It seems 
that t he reason that good has engendered so much discussion is that it 1s often 
referred to as being used in different senses; this results from the fact that good, 
like other value-judgment terms, has a meaning that is vague. Thus it is not just 
that when we think of good we do not think of a dictionary definition (that is we 
find it difficult to divide it into component parts) but we may t hink of different 
senses of the word. 
The fact that good can be used with a range of semantic domains, can have 
different ranges of meaning, and that it can be disputed whether or not something 
can be called good, suggests that the meaning of good must be vague. The fact 
that good is difficult to define without looking a t it in t erms of the noun it is 
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being used to describe also suggests this. However, if we VIew good as primarily 
concerned with the nature of a domain then we can see t hat it is not that there 
are innumerable senses of good but just that it can refer to countless domains and 
that its vagueness stems in part - from this fact. Before saying that good is a 
vague term~ however, we must be sure that 
excuse for not being able to define the word. 
we are not using vagueness as an 
Furt hermore, we must be sure that 
good 1s indeed vague and does not instead have more than one meaning, that is , 
that it 1s not polysemous. The reasons for suggesting that good is vague rather 
than polysemous are discussed in Chapter 3. 
There are several inter-related discussions required before we can establish t hat 
good is vague and, more importantly from the point of view of this study, that we 
can establish that the concept of GOOD is vague. Theoretically, however, until we 
establish whether the word good is vague and whether the words for good in other 
languages are vague, we can not establish whether the concept GOOD 1s vague. 
The discussions required to establish this are as follows: first we must ask what 
criteria we need to establish whether a word is vague or polysemous. Given that 
linguists have proposed criteria to distinguish these two · 'concepts ', t his would not 
seem too difficult. All that is needed is to see how good fits in with this crit eria. 
Before we discuss why good is not polysemous, it is necessary for us to look at 
good and bad as a pair of adjectives and ask whether or not they are truly 
antonyms. One of the disadvantages of looking at good in the way t hat 
philosophers have done is that it is seldom discussed in terms of it s relationship 
with bad. Bot h Moore and Russell , as we saw above, accepted or assumed that 
what could be said about good could also be said about bad even though t heir 
discussjons were concerned almost exclusively wit h the word good. Of course when 
good is discussed in its moral sense it is generally discussed 1n terms of its 
relationship to the word ev1:l. If we look to t he notion of semantic field t heories 
we find t hat often more is learned about a part icular word by looking at it in 
terms of its relationships with other words rather than looking at it in isolation. 
In the same way more can be learned about good by comparing it wit h bad. 
A parallel couid be drawn between the advantages of looking a t words which are 
inter-related in one language and looking a t words cross-linguistically. As we shall 
see , we can learn something about t he meanings of t hese words in English by 
looking at words which correspond to t hem in ot her languages. 
Before we look at the quest ion of antonymy, however , let us consider why it 1s 
said that good is vague and t hen what has been said about t he 'differen t senses' 1n 
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which good is used. Not surprisingly, we can find reference to vagueness m 
Aristotle's discussion of good. 
"And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look 
for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision 
as 2.ccords with the subject-matter and so much as is appropriate to the 
enquiry." (Aristotle Eth£ca N£comachea 1925:1098a) 
It is interesting to note how each of the things that can be said about good 
relate to each other or, one might say, offer clues about its true nature. For 
instance we could apply ZipPs principle of least effort to good, noting that a word 
that is frequently used is considered to lack concentrated meaning in order to be 
able to used in so many different contexts. This relates to Katz 's notion of t he 
syncategorematicity of good (see Katz 1964:739-766), which in turn suggests that if 
good is concerned with the nature of things then that will change from one 
domain to the next. Zipf also notes that such words are generally phonologically 
simple, short words, as both good and bad are, in English as well as . in most of 
the other languages considered. We could also apply Russell 's discussion of length 
to good and bad, and note that his observations may tell us something about why 
we use good more frequently than we use bad. 
" ... the more precision we give to a concept, the oftener it can be proved 
to be inapplicable, and the se!domer it can be proved to be applicable. 
When it is completely precise, it can never be proved to be applicable." 
(Russell 1940:106) 
Thus I suggest that bad has a more precise meaning than good. 
Ethical terms in general are considered to have vague meanings, as can be seen 
in the following quotation from Stevenson. 
"Ethical terms are more than ambiguous~ they are vague... An ethical 
term may accordingly be adapted to a broad range of uses." (Stevenson 
1944:34-35) 
Sweetser, who has suggested criteria for deciding whether or not a word 1s 
polysemous, also thinks it is more likely that abstract words will have a vague, 
rather than a polysemous meaning ( see Sweetser 1986). 
2.5. The Moral Good 
We can see then that given that good is both an abstract term anJ an et hical 
term that we would assume that its meaning is vague. We do not know t his 
however, for we find many examples of good being discussed as a word which has 
several senses. Good is often divided into a moral sense and a non-moral sense, 
which Ezra Talmor, for example, refers to. 
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"We cannot ... understand what is the most important characteristic of 
moral terms such as 'good', 'bad' etc., except by understanding the non-
moral uses of such terms. In their non-moral uses ~good' and 'bad ' 
behave exactly as other grading labels, the only difference being their 
greater generality of the criteria for their employment. If we compare the 
criteria of an · 'extra fancy ' apple with the criteria of a 'good ' apple, we 
find that while the former are clearly fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the latter are much vaguer. Moreover 'good' is used as a grading label 
for a great variety of things (good apples , good guns, good films , etc. ) 
which increases the lack of precision of the criteria for its use." (Talmor 
1984:16) 
Hare also distinguishes between a moral and a non-moral sense: 
"I shall illustrate the peculiarities of value-words by examples drawn 
from their non-moral uses, and only later ask whether these same 
peculiarities are to be found in moral contexts. The procedure ... will 
enable me .. . to show that the peculiarities of these words have nothing to 
do with morals as such, and that therefore theories which purport to 
explain them have to be applicable, not only to expressions like 'good 
man', but also to expressions like 'good chronometer \ and to realise this 
is to be preserved from a number of errors." (Hare 1961:80) 
As I have suggested, however, if good is seen as having the aspects of nature and 
function then there is no need to distinguish between a moral and non-moral 
sense, because the moral sense can be incorporated into the aspect of nature - in 
this case, specifically to the nature of man. Thus to paraphrase Beesley's 
comment that "the standard of 'moral excellence', however special it might be to 
some philosophers, is nothing exceptional grammatically", (Beesley 1982:215-216) 
one could say that the moral good, no matter how special it may be to some 
philosophers, is nothing special semantically. 
2.6. Good As an Evaluative and Descriptive Term 
Hare also suggests that good: 
"has both descriptive and evaluative force, and these have to be learnt 
by different means and independently of one another. " (Ha.re 1961:89) 
Hare sees a connection between the descriptive and evaluative force of good which 
he illustrates in the following way: 
"There are two sorts of things that we can say , for example, about 
strawberries; the first sort is usually called descriptive, t he second sort 
evaluative. Examples of t he first sort of remark are, 'This strawberry is 
sweet ' and 'This strawberry is large, red, juic:,' . Examples of the second 
sort of remark a.re 'This is a good strawberry ' and 'This strawberry is just 
as strawberries ought to be ' . The first sort of remark is often given as a 
reason for ·making the second sort of remark ; but t he first sort does not 
by itself entail the second sort , nor vice versa. " (Hare 1961:111) 
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Hare's comments are worth noting because he equates a good strawberry with a 
strawberry being the way a strawberry ought to be. This is, I suggest , an 
accurate assessment of the meaning of good and again emphasises that good is 
concerned with the nature of a thing - the nature corresponding to the way 
something is or ought to be. 
On the other hand, Ziff disagrees that good has an evaiuative sense: 
"The word 'good' is sometimes said to be an 'evaluative term' or a 
'term of evaluation'. It isn't. But the suggestion is interesting. 
'Evaluate' cannot be taken seriously in connection with 'good': this 1s 
indicated by such utterances as (99), (105) and (97)." (Ziff 1960: 242) 
Ziffs examples are as follows: 
(99) This is a very good dish. 
(105) We shal I have good weather tomorrow. 
(97) This is good news. 
Ziffs examples (105) and (97) are worth noting because the domains of weai;her 
and news are two which, cross-linguistically, were generally found to be acceptable 
with words which corresponded to both good and bad. There are some exceptwns, 
however. For example, in French one says beau temps, rather than bon temps. 
The quotations above indicate that good 1s indeed discussed in terms of which 
sense it is used 1n. Thus while I have not come across examples of writers 
suggesting that good is polysemous there are numerous examples of good being 
referred to as "in the sense of" X or Y. The importance of realising this relates to 
whether or not a shared concept GOOD exists in all languages , for if we find that 
good is a lexical universal the importance of this is diminished if we can not 
conclude that t his lexical universal reflects a shared concept across languages. It 
could of course be the case that there is one sense in which the concept of GOOD 
is shared but not in another sense ( and this is what appears co be the case). 
In order to establish this, however, we must first decide what t he different senses 
are and, as we have seen, given the different descriptions of moral and non-moral , 
evaluative and descriptive (and these examples are not exhaustive) this has not 
been agreed upon. However as Wiggins has noted, although good is discussed in 
terms of different senses, there are never an indefinit e number of senses; at most 
there are three or four. 
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2. 7. The Relationship Between the Adjective and the Noun it Modifies 
Katz believes that good differs from other words in that its meaning is dependent 
on the words with which it is combined (i.e. that it is syncategomatic). 
"The meaning of 'good' ... does not have the kind of structure that the 
meanings of most other English words have. Whereas the meaning of a 
word such as 'bachelor' , 'honest', 'hard', 'cuts\ ' liquid' , etc. is made up of 
component elements that are attributes in their own right, the meaning of 
'good' is a function that operates on other meanings, not an independent 
attribute. Apart from combination with the conceptual content of other 
words and expressions, the meaning of 'good' does not make sense. Since 
the meaning of 'good' cannot stand alone as a complete concept, we shall 
say that the meaning of ~good' is syncategorematic." (Katz 1964:761) 
Thus we must reconcile the apparent difference between saying that good is used in 
several different senses and saying that It is syncategorematic. That Is, the 
different senses of good could be said to be moral and non-moral, evaluative and 
descriptive or, from the point of view of · this study~ the sense of nature and of 
function. To say that good is syncategorematic, however, is to say that its 
meaning changes with each domain with which it is used ( e.g. a good knife cuts 
well, a good teacher teaches well). If we consider that good is concerned with the 
nature of each domain, however, then, while the reference changes, the essence of 
the meaning of good does not. 
Vendler attempts to illustrate why it is that good has these particular properties, 
properties that philosophers felt were there but had not been explained 
linguistically. One point that Vendler makes is that good is more remote from its 
subject than other adjectives such as yellow or round. He suggests that there are 
a number of ways in which adjectives can be tied to their subjects but that for 
each adjective only some of these ways are open. 
"This fact affords us a principle of classification for adjectives in general 
: . md a method of discriminating between the various kinds of use a single 
adjective !Ilay have." (Vendler 1967:173) 
The phrase good tea.cher can refer both to a person who teaches well and a 
teacher who is a good person. Vendler notes that beautiful also works in this way; 
thus a beautiful dancer could mean "either that the dancer is beautiful or that she 
(or he) dances beautifully". (Vendler 1967:176) 
"The important point is that in this last case the adjective is not tied 
to the subject by the copula, but by another verb (to dance). This verb , 
of course , is recoverable from t he noun (dancer) attributed to the same 
subject. The adjective (beautiful), therefore, is not ascribed to the subject 
(she) directly , but only with respect to a noun , or , rather, with respect to 
a verb recoverable from that noun ... Not all adjectives fit into both 
patterns. Compare: (Vendler 1967:177) 
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a. She is a blonde and beautiful dancer. 
b. She is a fast and beautiful dancer. 
c. •She is a blonde and fast aancer." 
The relevance of this to the study of good and bad is that clearly whether you 
can use good and bad with certain domains depends both on the adjective you are 
using and on the noun that the adjective is modifying. That 1s, just as some 
adjectives, such as fast and blonde, don't allow ambiguous readings whereas good 
and beautiful do, it also depends on which noun follows the adjective. Thus 
beautiful is ambiguous when combined with dancer ( as Vendler points out) but not 
with g;rl. In the same way good is ambiguous when combined with teacher and 
doctor but not with man. What we also need to ask is, is good potentially 
ambiguous when combined with words where the function that the person 
performs is remote from the nature of the person, such as computer Q£erator. 
Furthermore, we must ask how bad fares in terms of ambiguity. Its scope for 
ambiguity is, I suggest, more restricted, because its range of use and range of 
meaning are also more restricted. That is, while good can be ambiguous because it 
can refer to either the nature of the person or their function, bad refers primarily 
to their nature and is thus less likely to be ambiguous. 
One of the maJor problems that needs to be addressed 1n this thesis is articulated 
by Katz. He says: 
"Difficulties in reaching a successful formulation of the meaning of 
philosophically significant words are often attributed to the alleged 
incongruities and amorphousness of natural languages. There is another 
explanation, however, namely that such difficulties result from relying on 
one or other inadequate conception 0£. what constitutes a description of the 
meaning of a word." (Katz 1964:739) · 
Again, then, we can see the importance of looking at the meaning of a word by 
looking first at how it 1s used. For by looking at its use we can more clearly see 
the range of contexts in which it can be used and are therefore less likely to 
assume that a particular, perhaps overly contextualised, meaning of a word 1s 
pnor, as I suggest has been done when philosophers have described good in terms 
of its moral and non-moral use. 
Like Moore and Russell, Katz clearly assumes that bad 1s always the opposite of 
good, for he says that: 
"The reading for adjectival occurrences of 'bad' should be identical with 
the reading for ~good' except that, where '( + )' appears in the reading for 
'good', '(-)' appears in the reading for 'bad'." (Katz 1964:754) 
Katz considers that Vendler s explanation of Moore's intuition is inadequate. So 
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while in its attributive use good is furthest from the noun. in its predicative use it 
may be nearest the noun. 
"Furthermore, it is clear on other grounds that the ordering of 
adjectives is a semantically irrelevant syntactic feature, on a par with the 
semantically irrelevant difference in ordering between the object and 
particle in such a pair of sentences as 'He looked up the fact' and 'He 
looked the fact up ' . The evidence that has been accumulated shows that 
the only syntactic properties that are semantically relevant are those which 
determine the grammatical relations within· a sentence, i.e. subject of 
sentence, object of sentence, modification, etc. The ordering of adjectives 
in prenominal position is thus semantically irrelevant , because all the 
syntactic properties necessary to determine cases of adjective-noun 
modification are found in the source and matrix sentences where no 
ordering exists." (Katz 1964:766) 
Syntax and semantics, however, are closely inter-related and I suggest that Katz is 
mistaken when he says that the ordering of adjectives ( or any other syntactic 
difference) is semantically irrelevant. For example, Bolinger has shown that there 
is a semantic difference between the predicative and attributive use of adjectives in 
English. (see Bolinger 1967) Although the meaning of a sentence may not change 
significantly when you use the word good predicatively or attributively, I suggest 
that when used predicatively it is more likely that it will have the nature 
interpretation whereas attributively it is more likely to be ambiguous between 
function and nature ( e.g. a good teacher compared with a teacher who is good). 
The difference ( discussed again Chapter 4) is subtle and with some nouns difficult 
to detect but this difficulty does not mean that it is semantically irrelevant. 
Katz suggests that Moore's intuition can be explained by the syncategorematicity 
of good and not by its privilege of rank, as Vendler suggests. What Moore said 
was this: 
"Can we imagine 'good' existing Q.Y_ itself in time, and not merely as a 
property of some natural object? For myself, I cannot so imagine it, 
whereas with the greater number of properties of objects - those which I 
call the natural properties - their existence does seem to me to be 
independent of the existence of those objects. They are , in fact , rather 
parts of which the object is made up than mere predicates which attach 
to it. If they were all taken away , no object would be left , not even a 
bare substance; for they are in themselves substantial and give to t he 
object all the substance that it has. But this is not so with good." 
(Moore 1959:6) 
Thus while ~/loore feels he can not explain his intuition, Vendler and Katz agree 
that his intuition is right and propose alternative linguistic explanations to support 
it. I suggest that Vendler 's view of the ranking of adjectives does not go far 
enough in explaining why certain adjectives behave in a certain way - for this we 
must look more closely at their meaning. While Katz makes a valuable 
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contribution to our understanding of good by pointing to its syncategorematicity 
again I suggest that by looking more closely at the way good is used and not 
assigning it the property of an almost semantically 'empty' word we can in fact 
discover more about its meaning. 
Philosophers and linguists then have spent considerable time discussing the word 
good and, for a simple word, it seems that if we look at what has been written 
about it, it appears to be very complicated. If it were in fact excessively 
complicated or, alternatively, semantically empty, it would seem unlikely that many 
languages would have a word which corresponded to good, which large numbers of 
languages do. This point and the fact that so much time has been spent on its 
analysis suggests that it must reflect both an important concept and, as we shall 
see, a shared concept. 
Many insights to its meaning have been offered by Aristotle, who, while 
appearing to stress the importance of function, has also observed its vagueness, 
that it refers to the way things are, and to the inter-relationship between the way 
something is and its function. We have also been made aware of philosophers ' 
assumptions that good and bad are words that almost all people understand ( e.g. 
Russell), of the difficulty of defining it ( e.g. Moore) and of the fact that we can 
disagree about what it can be used to refer to. We have also seen the different 
ways m which philosophers have chosen to view the aspects of the meaning of good 
- e.g. moral and non-moral, evaluative and descriptive. 
It is now our task to look at good from a linguistic perspective, by comparing it 
with the word bad and by seeing how words which correspond to these two words 
in other languages are used. In doing this we can test the assumptions made by 
language philosophers and see to what extent the insights that they have had are 
valid. In carrying out our analysis we can attempt to determine whether there are 
corresponding words in other languages which are as salient to speakers of other 
languages as good is to speakers of English and whether these words therefore 
reflect a concept which is basic to language in general rather than to particular 
cultures. 
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Chapter 3 
Antonymy of Good and Bad 
In this section we want to explore the relationship between establishing good and 
bad as shared concepts GOOD and BAD and the antonymy of good and bad in 
English and in other languages. The need to verify whether good and bad are 
antonyn1s 1n English and whether words which correspond to these terms jn other 
languages are antonyms stems from the fact that in two languages in our survey -
Finnish and Thai - it appears that there are two words which correspond to bad 
(i.e. more than one opposite of good). This is significant because, on the basis of 
claims made about polysemy by Palmer and others, there is a possibility that good 
- O.!" at least a word which corresponds to it - is polysemous in some languages 
rather than vague. If this is the case then, even if we were to establish that a 
word corresponding to good existed in all languages our claim to be establishing a 
shared concept would be greatly weakened. 
As we will see, however, it does seem that, even in languages where there is 
more than one antonym for the word corresponding to good , it is more plausible to 
treat this word as vague rather than as polysemous. (This also has implications 
for analysing the data from Tagalog, where there appear to be two words which 
are the opposite of masama (bad).) However , in maintaining the belief that much 
more is assumed about value-judgment terms than is act ually known about them, 
it is necessary to explore the possibility that good could be polysemous. 
3.1. Polysemy and Antonymy 
Sweetser has described polysemy as follows: 
"Polyse1ny refers to a grouping of related but distinct senses of a single 
lexical item; often there 1s an observable direction to the relation between 
these sense!; , one being more central t han , or prior to , others. Such a 
situation is in sharp contrast to t he case of a lexical it em wi t h a singie 
highly abstract sense, which is simply broad enough in meaning to apply 
to many ciifferent surface referents , or which happens to have many 
different pragmatically predictable uses. " (Sweetser 1986: 1) 
What must be decided, then , is whether good has a group of related but dis tinct 
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senses or whether it has a meaning which is broad enough to apply to many 
different domains. 
It was mentioned above that whether or not good and bad were antonyms had 
some bearing on whether or not good was polysemous. We do not have to look 
far in English to see that good and bad should not always be t hought of as 
~ymmetrical opposites. For example, we can talk about our house as a good 
house, but one would wonder what exactly we were referring to if we described it 
as a bad house. We could speak of a good composer but it seems inappropriate to 
speak of a bad composer. There must be somet hing about the meaning of bad 
that causes it to sound inappropriate in these contexts but not when we speak of 
bad news or bad weather or a bad man. Thus while good can be used freely as a 
modifier of a particular domain, there are some domains where we need to imagine 
a context in which to use bad. In English, as 1n many other languages, the most 
appropriate opposite of good is often not good ( or no good) rather than bad. 
Although we seldom need to establish a context in order to use good it is often 
necessary to do so for bad. 
Before looking more closely at the proposal that bad is not always the opposit e 
of good we should consider the circumstances in which it is its opposite. Bad can 
always be the opposite of good when used in the moral sense ( alt hough not e t hat 
it is often the word evil that is used instead). This is not t he only time however. 
If we look at domains such as weather, news and habit we can see that both 
words can be used equally well. As we have seen from Aristotle 's comments, 
whether or not something · is good is often defined in t erms of whether it performs 
its function well. We should remember, however , that somet imes it is difficult to 
distinguish between the function of something and its nature, and that in this 
analysis nature is deemed to be applicable to a greater number of domains than 
function. 
Nevertheless , let us look more closely at the notion of function. The purpose of 
a knife ( at least in our culture) is to cut weil. If it cuts well (i .e. if it is sharp) 
it is a good kn£ fe; the function of a teacher 1s to teach. If he or she teaches 
well then he or she is a good teacher. Some t hings however do not have a 
function in t he way that a knife or a t eacher does - for example, news, weather , 
dream and ~ - and these words can also be modified by t he word good. It 
seems that the words which don 't refer to something that has a function t o fulfil 
are those words which are also best used with t he word bad. It follows then t hat 
words that do have a function combine less well wi t h bad. In English this is 
more apparent wit h object s which have a function rat her than wi th people who 
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have a function (e.g. bad teacher is acceptable, bad knife is less acceptable) . In 
some languages, however, it is unacceptable to use a word corresponding to bad 
with domains whi~h refer to people who have a function, as well as with domains 
which refer to objects that have a function. 
If we look at the word teacher , which, as we have noted, has a function , we 
find that , in many languages, if we say bad teacher, the meaning changes from 
'person who does not teach well' to 'teacher who is not a good person ' . That 1s, 
it changes from function to person (which has no function), or from function t o 
nature. To express the notion of a teacher who doesn 't teach well, it is rnore 
common to negate good (i.e. 'He is not a good teacher ' , rather than :He is a bad 
teacher'). Thus when we speak of a continuum along which the gradable words 
good and bad can be placed, I suggest that we should in fact be looking at two 
separate continua - one of nature and one of function. Along the nature 
continuum we have not good somewhere in between good and bad. Along the 
function continuum only good and not good are relevant - at least this is true if 
we look at languages in general. 
In English, we can say bad smell and bad taste. In this survey, however , it was 
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found that , cross-linguistically , words which correspond to bad are seldom used with 
t hese domains. It could be argued that these domains refer t o functions. 
Howev~r , it could also be said that the senses (taste and smell) are experiences 
rather than functions. Thus there are some arguments against . . v1ew1ng the 
unacceptability of bad with certain domains ( e.g. the senses) on the basis of 
function. 
That bad can be less easily used with certain semantic domains in English and 
across languages is enough to suggest that bad is not always the opposit e of good 
and that ,. therefore, the words need to be explored as a pair of antonyms. As we 
have seen, good appears to have a greater range of meaning as well as a greater 
range of use. Given these differences we should not assume t hat good and bad are 
necessarily exact opposites, either in English or in other languages. For exam ple, 
Bierwisch gives both base and schlecht as opposites of the German word gut. He 
says that: 
"'polarity ' plays an in1portant role in t he structure of adjectives [ and 
that ] some n.dje-rtives have more than one counterpart , corresponding to 
different meanings. " (Bierwisch 1967:6) 
The notion t hat more t han one opposite suggest s that a word is polysemous has 
been raised on several occasions , for example by Palmer ( also quot ed in Evens et . 
al. ) and Cruse. Palmer suggests t hat: 
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"Where a word is polysernic it will, naturally have a variety of 
synonyms each corresponding to one of its meanings. It will also have a 
set of antonyms. Thus fair may be used with (1) hair, (2) skin~ (3) 
weather, (4) sky, (5) judgment, (6) tackle. The obvious antonyms would 
seem to be (1) dark, (2) dark, (3) foul, (4) cloudy, (5) unfair, (6) foul." 
(Palmer 1976:70) 
Lr1 an article on antonyms in English, Cruse follows the same line of argument: 
"Although antonymy is frequently spoken of, for convenience ... as a 
relation between words, strictly speaking, it is a relation between senses. 
This means that a polysemous word may appear to have more than one 
antonym. For instance both sad and unhappy seern to qualify as 
antonyms of hapoy. However contexts can be found where one but not 
the other, seems appropriate as the opposite of happy. 
a. His parents' marriage was a 
happy/unhoppy/?sad one. 
b. I am happy/unhappy/?sad about 
the exam arrangements. 
c. The story has a happy/sad/?unhappy 
ending. 
It seems a reasonable inference that differences of antonym from context 
to context correspond to differences in the sense in which happy occurs. 
Similarly, one sense of kind will have unkind as its antonym; another 
sense will be paired with cruel." (Cruse 1976:28.2) 
However, while a word may have more than one antonym, it may be that the 
two different antonyms refer not to two different meanings but to different aspects 
. of its meaning ( which would presumably indicate that the 1neaning of such a word 
is vague). Bierwisch suggests, for example, that in German hoch (high) has two 
different meanrngs whose counterparts are niedrig and tief (of pitch); but that the 
counterparts of alt (old), which are neu and jung, do not correspond to two 
different meanings. (Bierwisch 1967:6) This is clearly also a possibility in languages, 
such as Thai and Finnish, where we find that there are two opposites of the words 
corresponding to good. 
In Finnish the two opposites for the word hyva (good) are paha and huono. In 
general, huono refers to function or ability. Paha is used to describe a bad 
person. It does not , however, correspond exactly to the English word evi'l as a . 
bad hab,it would be translated as huono tapa, but for the bad habits of children 
one would use paha tapa. Paha is also used with taste, smell and dream, all 
things that could not be considered evil. Note, however, that earlier I suggested 
that senses such as taste and smell were functions. In this case it seer.ns that 
paha refers to experiences, or things that we do not choose - thus, in this world 
view, while adults can choose to change their habits, children can not. The point 
is that perhaps there are some domains which can have either a function or a 
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nature, or where whether someone does something or experiences something, could 
be debated. 
In Thai d£i (good) also has ( at least) two antonyms: leew and yrere. 1n 
languages such as Thai, which have more than one word which is needed to 
account for all the domains that one word, bad, can account for in English ( and 
other languages), we need to examine the possibility that there is a case for 
arguing for the polysemy of good. However, antonymy is only a possible clue to 
polysemy and is not criterial. Moreover, it is more likely that the two words 
which correspond to bad reflect different aspects of the meaning of di i (good), 
rather than that di,i is polysemous. Nevertheless, if good is vague in English and 
in other languages, then, before we make claims about good as a lexical universal, 
we must know in what sense there is agreement about the concept of GOOD. In 
other words, to what concept do the words dii, hyvii, and good relate? 
Furthermore, we find support for suggesting that dii and hyvii are vague rather 
than polysemous from the question posed by Sweetser: 
" ... how predictable is the grouping of uses cross-linguistically? If it is 
completely universally predictable that any word used for X will also be 
used for Y ( as in the case of linguistic and metalinguistic negation) then 
we may well want to postulate an abstract meaning applicable to cases X 
and Y. If there is no cross-linguistic predictability at all ... then we may 
conclude that the two senses are separate and that their relationship is 
one of polysemy." ( Sweetser 1986:9) 
If I understand Sweetser correctly, this would mean that if good and bad apply to 
the same group of semantic domains cross-linguistically then we are more justified 
in proposing that they are vague rather than polysemous terms. Despite some 
variation which we can generally account for in terms of lexical restrictions 
( discussed m Chapter 5) this does appear to be the case when we look at good 
and bad over a number of languages. 
3.2. Cultural Differences 
If we look at the way good is used in English we may then determine that the 
meaning of good is vague. If we look at words which correspond to good in other 
_languages, however, we must first overcome some arguments in favour of polysemy 
(i.e. that in some languages there are two opposites of good). In English, good 
and bad are not always exact opposites; or perhaps we should say that there is 
some asymmetry between the two. Thus we can say that there is asymmetry 
between good food and bad food, between good woman and bad woman. lt should 
not be overlooked that some of the difficulties in using bad with a particular 
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domain, however, could be said to be cultural. For example some might argue 
that it is generally considered that men are more likely to be bad than are women. 
I suggest, however, that if this is so it is in part a result of the fact that women 
are perceived as having a function whereas men are not. 
One interesting survey suggests that cross-culturally women are perceived as good 
- although note that the study does not compare women with men, but the 
'concept' woman with a series of other 'concepts' such as horse. The survey 
investigated a series of such 'concepts' with respect to bipolar adjective scales. 
Five different language groups (Hopis, Navahos, Tewas, Zunis, Spanish-American) 
were compared with English speaking people. It was found that: 
"the same fundamental dimensions of attitude ... were ... found in the 
responses of groups from the five languages." ( quoted in Carroll 1963:15) 
This in itself is interesting in terms of this study for it illustrates yet again that 
words corresponding to good are widely used cross-linguistically. The point to be 
made here, however, is that each of these cultures associated the 'concept' of 
woman with the adje~tive good, although there were cultural differences evident 
with respect to other adjective scales. 
"WOMAN tends to be not heavy for Anglos and for Spanish Americans, 
but somewhat heavy for Navahos and Zunis ... WOMAN is soft for 
Anglos, Hopi-Tewas and Navahos, but tends to be hard for Hopis , Spanish 
.A...mericans and Zunis. WOMAN tends to be hot for all cultures except 
Navahos, who think WOMAN a bit cold. WOMAN is quite clean for all 
cultures except Navahos and Hopi-Tewas, where it is neither clean nor 
dirty. Whereas Anglos tend -=- to rate WOMAN as weak, this concept is 
strong for all other cultures .. except the Hopi-Tew as , where it is neutral. 
All cultures, however, agree--~-1n relating WOMAN as good." ( Carroll 
1963:15) 
Thus societal attitudes could be influencing the use of good and bad with some 
domains, such as woman, but I suggest in part this is to do with the function of 
women. It could perhaps be said that one of the functions of women is to be 
good. It 1s also true that one of the reasons bad was less likely !;O be used with 
many domains is that it was perceived to be irnpolite. This, however , must have 
something to do with the meaning of bad and cannot simply be dismissed as being 
culturally unacceptable in certain societies. It could be argued that the reason 
that many speakers consider it impolite to use a word corresponding to bad to 
modify certain domains (particularly domains such as mother) is that, if the 
concept BAD is defined in terms of nature, then~ in effect, we are saying that the 
essence of the person or thing 1s bad and not just that there is something in 
particular wrong with the person or thing, or that they are not adequat ely 
fulfilling their function. 
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3.3. Views on Antonymy 
One of the difficulties of discussing good and bad as antonyms is that there are 
several ways in which antonymy can be defined or discussed. .As Lj ung has 
pointed out , none of the various views of antonymy really explain what it 1s, 
rather 
"they merely state that adjectives with a certain kind of behavior 
should be called antonymous." (Ljung 197 4:77) 
Thus, in order to decide whether or not good and bad are antonyms, it is 
necessary to investigate how they behave in relation to various criteria. 
Lehrer, for example, would not exlude a pair of words as antonyms on the basis 
of asymmetry alone. (Lehrer 1985:400) Good and bad, as we have noted, do seem 
to be asymmetrical 1n many cases. Lehrer suggests that better and worse are 
examples of such asymmetry of entailment and gives the following examples: 
a. The chicken is worse than the steak 
entails 
b . The steak is better than the chicken 
However, she maintains that the reverse entailment does not hold if both the 
steak and the chicken are good, for example in the following: 
a. The steak is better than the chicken, but both are bod . 
b. •The chicken is worse than the steak, but both are good. 
On the other hand, Lehrer and Lehrer suggest that good and bad are 'perfect 
antonyms' because of their equidistance from the midinterval on an evaluative 
scale: 
"Two antonyms are perfect antonyms if they a.re the same distance from 
the midinterval; otherwise they are imperfect antonyms. Thus good and 
bad are perfect antonyms because they are equidistant from the 
midinterval on the evaluative scale. Excellent is farther from the 
midinterval than bad is (in the opposite direction), the:-efore excellent and 
bad are imperfect antonyms. " (Lehrer and Lehrer 1982:489) 
If good refers to the way things are or ought to be (nature) , however , then I 
suggest that it is more likely to be nearer the midinterval than bad. Furthermore, 
it is misleading to consider only one scale when considering whether or not two 
words are perfect antonyms. In order to be perfect antonyms it is reasonable t o 
expect that the two words would cover the same ground on the horizontal scale 
( the range of meaning scale) as well as the vertical scale. That is, bad has a 
narrower range of meaning than good and therefore could not be its 'perfect 
antonym' . 
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This is more evident when it is used with some domains than with others. For 
example, there is little difference in the range of meaning of good and bad when 
used with man, but when used with clock, bad has a much narrower range of 
meaning. Thus just to look at the distance from a midinterval point is insufficient 
grounds on which to determine whether two words are perfect antonyms. 
Another point worth discussing from Lehrer and Lehrer 's article is the use of the 
modifier absolutely. They propose that absolutely can be used with the endpoints 
of a scale. This is put forward as an illustration of the fact that good and bad 
are somewhere in the middle of the scale whereas excellent and terrible are at the 
ends of the same scale. So, one can say absolutely excellent and absolutely terrib1e 
but not absolutely good or absolutely bad. 
This point 1s again raised by Lehrer in a later article. Here, however , she 
includes modifiers ~uch as completely, perfectly, utterly as words which are 
"appropriate for words at the extreme end but not good for words that 
name a half scale or the inner part of the scale from the middle, such as 
warm and cool. Absolutely marvellous ( spotless, filthy , awful, huge, 
miniscule) are much better than absolutely good, bad, large, small dirty." 
(Lehrer 1985:420) 
However, if we use the other modifiers that Lehrer has suggested with good and 
bad then I think we find that they are acceptable. This is particularly true with 
· good. Thus we could have 'a perfectly good cup of tea ' or describe a person as 
being 'utterly bad'. I offer these examples not to suggest that good and bad are 
necessarily at.~~xtremes of the scale , but as evidence to support the view that good 
and bad can ·be seen as non-gradable words as well as gradable words. T his point 
has also been made by Wierzbicka who says t hat: 
"Evaluations like 'good ' and 'bad, are - from a semantic point of view -
absolute. " (Wierzbicka 1971:44) 
That is , like t rue and false , which Lehrer and Lehrer describe as cont radictory 
(Lehrer and Lehrer 1982:483) , good and bad are contradictory as well as gradable. 
The contradict ory use of good and bad often occurs in the moral domain but, as 
we can see from the 'perfectly good cup of tea' example, it is by no means 
restricted to it . 
The inappropriateness of v1ew1ng t he moral good as gradable has been noted by 
Rusiecki. 
"Bartsch and Vennemann (1972) point out t hat t he posi t ive degree does 
not signal just any difference in t he average, but a considerable difference. 
Yet 'an experienced driver ' is not necessarily one who considerably exceeds 
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the norm; and an interpretation of the phrase 'a good man' as meaning 
~one who considerably exceeds the moral decency norm of the community ' 
would be evidence of a pretty sour view of human nature." (Rusiecki 
1985:28-29) 
It 1s interesting to note Sapir 's comments on gradability in relation to good and 
bad which reflects, in my view , the fact that good is not always gradable. If we 
consider good and bad to be on a gradable continuum with better and best, worse 
and worst, better can be graded with reference to terms of comparison, but good is 
graded with reference to the norm. That is, while better is more than good, it can 
also be used to indicate something less than good whereas good is not subject to 
the same degree of relativization. It remains in the same place or maintains the 
same meaning; thus better can be, as Sapir says 
"'relatively better, not so bad' e.g. 'My pen is better than yours but I 
confess that both are bad'." (Sapir 1949:126) 
Another way of looking at the asymmetry of good and bad is in terms of 
gradability. If we think of good apples and bad apples I suggest that while you 
could keep showing me better and better apples it would be difficult to keep 
saying an apple was more and more bad (or worse and worse). That is it could 
be getting bad but once it had reached a certain state of rottenness there would be 
no point in saying this apple was worse than the last because it would come to 
the point where it would be no longer worth calling it an apple. This point , 
however, would not apply to people. Presumably a man could be infintely bad and 
would still rema1n a man. 
With reference to the discussion of whether good refers to the function or the 
person and to whether it is always a gradable adjective we can compare the 
phrases (1) the good doctor and (2) the best doctor. This example is evidence that 
good can have a non-gradable reading. Best can not be ambiguous but can only 
refer to the doctor's doctoring ability and not to his or her character, whereas 
good doctor coul<l be ambiguous in this respect. This is also true of good man 
and best rnan ( excluding it s use in a wedding ceremony) where best man seems to 
imply best for somet.hing, e.g. 'best man for the job:. 
When t hinking about the nature of good (and bad) - its vagueness, gradability 
and syncategorematicity - we must accept that the extent to which these things 
will be true of a phrase depends both on the meaning of good ( and bad) and the 
word which is being modified. Thus as Hare says, it depends on the class of the 
object. 
"ff I talk of 'a good egg ·, it 1s at once known to what description of 
36 
egg I am referring - namely , one that is not decomposed. Here the 
descriptive meaning predominates, because we have very fixed standards 
for assessing the goodness of eggs. On the other hand, if I say that a 
poem is a good one, very little information is given about what 
description of poem it is - for there is no accepted standard of goodness 
in poems ... In general, the more fixed and accepted the standard, the 
more information is conveyed. But it must not be thought that the 
evaluative force of the word varies at all exactly in inverse proportion to 
the descriptive. The two vary independently: where a standard is firmly 
established and is as firmly believed in, a judgment containing 'good' may 
be highly informative, without being any the less commendatory." (Hare 
1961:122) 
Urmson also makes the same point more succinctly when he says: 
"Grading words can only be used successfully for communication where 
criteria are accepted." (Urmson 1950:167) 
Good and bad, then, are vague terms which are gradable adjectives but which 
nonetheless can also be used in a non-gradable way. They are antonyms, but not 
perfect antonyms, because the range of use and the range of meaning of good are 
greater than the range of use and the range of meaning of bad. In comparing 
these terms with corresponding terms 1n other languages it can be seen that while 
in some languages there is more than one word to cover the range of use that bad 
covers in English, it also appears that the words which correspond to good in other 
languages are vague rather than polysemous. The concepts which these words 
reflect , therefore, can also be assumed to be vague. 
- ... 
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Chapter 4 
~larking and Universals 
In this chapter the relevance of the concept of marking to our analysis of good 
and bad ( and words which correspond to them in other languages) is discussed. 
We also examine the implications of proposing the worcis good and bad as lexical 
universals and the inter-relationship between establishing one member of the 
antonymous pair as unmarked and its claim to be considered a lexical universal. 
4.1. Marking 
As Greenberg points out, "the first use of the concept of marked and unmarked 
categories was in Prague school phonology". (Greenberg 1966b:63) Markedness, 
however, is also applicable to the syntactic and semantic levels of linguistic 
analysis. 
One of the criteria suggested for establishing antonymous pairs 1s marking ( e.g. 
see Giv6n 1970:817). Following this approach, in any antonymous pair one 
member will be the unmarked member and one will be the marked member. On 
the other hand, after looking at the properties of markedness which have been 
predicted of antonyms, Lehrer has concluded that: 
"markedness is not a general structural property of antonymy; rather it 
consists of a number of independent properties that are imperfectly 
correlated. However, none of these is in fact true of all antonym pairs. 
Neut,ralization of one member of the pair in question is the commonest of 
the properties. Most of the statements can at best be taken as 
implications; if one member of a pair exhibits property P, it will be the 
marked (or unmarked) member." (Lehrer 1985:421) 
Lehrer's conclusion, no doubt, gives a more accurate view of the relationship 
between markedness and antonymy 1n general. However, as the notion of 
markedness does, to some extent., apply to good and bad, it seems appropriate to 
discuss it. 
Criteria proposed for establishing the unmarked member of a pair include the 
following: (1) The implied member of an implicational relationship, (2) Greater 
.... 
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frequency of use within language, (3) Appears in a neutralized context , ( 4) Less 
complex phonologically or morphologically, ( 5) Will not be overtly marked, ( 6) 
Early child acquisition, (7) Occurs in many languages, (8) Usually first added and 
last lost in language change. (Witkowski and Brown 1983:569) 
In discussing criteria which signify the unmarked member of a pair, such as those 
given above, Greenberg suggests that, as not all areas of language (i.e. phonology , 
grammar and lexicon) fit in equally well with such criteria, it may be that if we 
are to apply markedness to all aspects of language then the definition needs son1e 
revision and simplification. 
sufficient to define markedness. 
Thus he suggests that perhaps frequency alone is 
"There are other advantages to a frequency interpretation of marked 
and unmarked in grammar and semantics by which marked means 
definitionally less frequent and unmarked means more frequent. To begin 
with there is the obvious methodological advantage that frequency 
phenomena can be explored for every language whereas the other criteria 
are more limited in this respect." ( Greenberg 1966a:67) 
It seems more likely that frequency of occurrence will be a result of a particular 
item being unmarked rather than that it is a criterion for its classification but 
nevertheless, given its usefulness cross-linguistically, it is worth noting. 
Greenberg presents evidence of greater frequency of good than bad in support of 
the idea that good is the unmarked member of the pair. He quotes word counts 
for English and Spanish and in both languages good and bueno occur over three 
times as often as bad and malo. (Greenberg 1966a:53) The greater frequency of 
use of good and bueno may result from the fact that the contexts in which bad 
and malo can be used are more restricted than the contexts in which good and 
bueno are used. The restricted contexts could in turn be a result of the narrower 
range of meaning of bad and malo. This is certainly born out by the data from 
the other languages surveyed in this study. 
In terms of marking then , we can see to what extent good and bad fit in with 
various criteria or we can follow Greenberg 's suggestion and look at something 
straightforward and comparable across languages like frequency of occurrence. T he 
problem that arises from applying good and bad to a set of criteria is that t here 
are some criteria which either do not fit ( e.g. bad is no more phonologically 
complex than good) or we nave insufficient information to know whether they do 
fit - for example, in terms of language change. However, whatever criteria we do 
adopt, what we know of good and bad does suggest that good is the unmarked 
member of the pair and that bad is marked. 
.... 
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For example, as we saw in the list above, the unmarked member of a pair tends 
to be acquired earlier by children than the marked member. One study , carried 
out on children between the ages of seven and eleven, suggests that the younger 
the child the more likely they are to use good than bad as a .modifier for a wide 
range of domains. Although children of seven would have already acquired their 
language abilities to a large extent, it is interesting to note the differences in the 
use of good and bad as they get older. 
The study, carried out as a word association task on English speaking children, 
was conducted in order to investigate the modes of qualifying used by children at 
these five age levels (seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven). (Di Vesta 1965:188) In 
each of the age groups it was found that good occurred more frequently than bad 
and applied to more domains. However, in the older age groups, chiidren used a 
wider variety of adjectives more frequently. Therefore, as children's vocabularies 
increase, good appears proportionately less frequently, but nevertheless remains the 
most frequently used adjective. (It is worth noting that good also occurred more 
frequently and applied to more domains than big.) 
Thus most available evidence suggests that good is the unmarked member of the 
pair and that bad is marked. It appears that this may not be the case for all 
languages, however. For instance, Zimmer notes that: 
"It would appear that there are languages which furnish instances of a 
:positive' meaning being expressed only by the affixal negation of a 
'negative' term. Thus in Maya, the only word for 'good' is ma'alob, 
which is derived, by means of a negative affix, from the word 
'bad'." (Zimmer 1964:78) 
This example, then, contradicts our assumption that good ( and words which 
correspond to it in other languages) is unmarked. However, Zimmer 's example 
does appear to be an exception rather than representative of a particular language 
family in that in another M~yan language, Mam, there are adjectives for both good 
and bad \vhich take "no inflection or derivation" (b'a7n - good; nach - bad). 
(England 1983:83) This point, however, can not be overlooked. 
Giv6n suggests that the reason that all positive members of an antonymous pair 
are unmarked is to do with figure/ ground relations. That is, with distinguishing 
the normal from the unusual. He illustrates this point in the following sentences: 
a. A woman with two arm5 ccme into my office and 
b. A woman with one arm came into my office and . . . 
Giv6n suggests that the first of these examples is pragmatically bizarre because it 
fails to distinguish the figure from the ground - or in other words one would 
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expect a woman corrung into an office to have two arms. (Giv6n 1978:107) If we 
apply the notion of figure/ ground relations to the discussion of good and bad, it 
can be seen that good is concerned with what is normal, or what 1s, as Aristotle 
says (see Chaµter 2), while bad is concerned with the unusual. 
However, it 1s also true to say that, if we are more likely to specify what is not 
normal, as Giv6n suggests, then the unmarked member of a pair is less "likely to 
be used more frequently than the marked member. Thus our decision to call one 
member of pair marked and the other unmarked can not be based on frequency 
alone. As Waugh notes, for example, the various attributes of markedness: 
"should not be equated with its definition; and if in fact it should 
happen, for example, that the marked term is indeed more frequent in 
given texts than the unrnarked, this should not be taken as evidence that 
the markedness values are false or uncertain, but rather that text 
frequency is due to the interaction of a variety of factors, only one of 
which is markedness. This is particularly so when dealing with lexical 
meaning in language." (Waugh 1982:302) 
One of the relationships between antonymy and marking is that it is the 
unmarked member of the pair which has more than one opposite and not the other 
way around. This point tends to be implied by those who have written about 
antonymy but has not been categorically stated. It becomes significant, however , 
when we are deciding how to analyse the Tagalog data which, at first glance, ha.s 
two words which correspond to good and one which corresponds to bad. Because 
one word masama ( bad) has two opposites ( or at least two words for good are 
given to cover the same range of use that good covers in English) does this mean 
that we want to-~.say that in Tagalog masama is the unmarked member of the 
pair, whereas in other languages it is the word corresponding to good which is 
unmarked? 
Although we do not want to decide this question only on the basis of a model of 
marking, it does seem that if we have a solution that fits in with this model , then 
this solution should be seriously considered. In this case it would mean that we 
would decide that there was one word which corresponded to good ( mabut-i ) 1n 
Tagalog, but that this word has a narrower range of meaning than the word good 
in English. Our preference for analysing the data in this way is reinforced when 
we again consider defining the concept GOOD in terms of nature, and the English 
word good primarily in terms of nature but also of function. That is, the word 
mabut£ is primarily concerned with nature. This is evidence for claiming that, 
cross-linguistically, words that correspond to good are concerned with the nature of 
the domain that is being modified. The importance of function to the defini tion 
of good can be seen as relevant to English but not to all languages. 
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Further evidence for saying that good is unmarked could come from the fact that 
the opposite of good can also be not good. Moreover, it should be remembered 
that not good is appropriate in terms of both function and nature whereas bad . lS 
less often appropriate if we are only considering function. If we say something IS 
not bad, however, it does not that it . good. Rather, it implies that mean lS 
something . less than good but than bad. So, if think of a continuum IS more we 
with good at one end, and bad at the other, we would place not good at a point 
nearer to bad than to good, but we would have to place not bad nearer to not 
good than to good. 
The same relationship between negating good and negating bad holds for the 
Russian words xorosij and ploxoj which correspond to good and bad respectively. 
When negated, these words can be placed along a continuum in the following way: 
xorosi'j - neploxoj - nexorosi'j - ploxoJ. However, according to Zimmer: 
"In the case of xorosij-ploxoj it seems fairly cl€ar that the ne-
derivative of the :postive' terms is closer to the evaluatively negative pole 
of the opposition than the ne- derivative of 'negative' terms is to the 
evaluatively positive pole of the opposition, i.e. that nexorosij is closer to 
'bad' than neploxoJ· is to 'good'." ( Zimmer 1964:65) 
Thus in Russian and English it appears that xorosi'j and good are unmarked in 
that by negating them we get their opposite. However, by negating ploxoj and 
bad we do not get a meaning that is opposite - rather it is somewhere in between 
good and bad but is nearer to bad than to good. This point further suggests the 
asymmetry between these words. As a result of this asymmetry, they should not 
be considered perfect antonyms. 
In this study, then, we are investigating the existence of words whose range of 
use and range of meaning correspond to the words good and bad in English. We 
can 1n this way suggest whether the concepts GOOD and BAD are shared or are 
culture specific. However, as Burling has pointed out, there is a danger in 
assuming that our contributions to conceptual knowledge are greater than in fact 
they are: 
'' When a linguist makes his investigation and writes his grammar, is he 
disco·.rering something about the language which is 'out there' waiting to 
be described and recorded or is he simply formulating a set of rules which 
somehow work? Similarly, when an anthropologist undertakes a semantic 
analysis, is he discovering scme 'psychological reality' which speakers are 
presumed to have or is he simply working out a set of rules which 
somehow take account of the observed phenomena? It is always 
tempting to attribute something more important to one 's work than a 
tinkering with a rough set of operational devices. It certainly sounds 
more exciting to say we are :discovering the cognitive system of the 
people' than to admit that we are just fiddling with a set of rules which 
allow us to use terms the way others do. " (Burling 1969:427) 
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Clearly, the aim of this study is to search for, as Burling calls it, God 's Truth. 
However, as there are several ways of interpreting the data ( e.g. in Tagalog) it 1s 
quite possible to more or less 'just fiddle' with, if not a set. of rules, then a set of 
observations about language use. In order to avoid doing only this, although this 
in itself, as Burling points out, has its value, the alternative ways 1n which the 
data can be interpreted should be noted. That is, we must be aware that while 
we can distinguish between semantic and lexical restrictions (lexical restrictions, as 
defined by Apresjan, are discussed in Chapter 5), for example, it is often the case 
that it 1s up to the person examining the data to decide which constraint is 
operating. Although one interpretation may fit the hypothesis better than the 
other, it is not t.o say that this accurately reflects the facts. Nevertheless, by 
being aware of alternate interpretations · it should be possible to give a more valid 
answer to whether languages have shared concepts for these value-judgment terms. 
In Chapter 3 it was noted that the range of meanmg of good was wider than the 
range of meaning of bad. Waugh describes markedness as "the a.symmetrical and 
hierarchical relationship between two poles of any opposition". (Waugh 1982:299) 
Thus the asymmetry between good and bad is predicted by Waugh's notion of 
markedness. In reference to paired grammatical categories, \Vaugh says that: 
"the marked term necessarily conveys a more narrowly specified and 
delimited conceptual item than the unmarked." (Waugh 1982:301) 
_This point is of particular relevance to the relationship between the words bad and 
good. It is this point in fact that suggests to me that it would be going too far 
to categorically say that bad should not be considered as -a candidate for a lexical 
- · 
universal. What n1ay be going on is that bad reflects a much more specific 
concept and for this reason it has a much more restricted . range of use and range 
of meaning. 
On the basis of the languages surveyed ( excluding Tagalog) we would , then, still 
want to say that bad does reflect a shared concept , BAD, but that this concept is 
narrower than the concept of GOOD and, because of this, BAD can not always be 
considered an exact opposit e of GOOD. On the other hand GOOD can, according 
to this hypothesis, always be considered as the opposite of BAD. Thus, like other 
marked and unmarked . pairs, there is asymmetry because of the narrower range of 
meaning of the markeci item. However this hypothesis comes under fire when we 
look at Tagalog. 
In Tagalog we find one word for bad and two for good. We could , however , 
argue that what we find in Tagalog is a case of greater lexical restrictions. This 
is not to say we should argue for this analysis , but it is certainly one way of 
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dealing with the problem. The more likely explanation is that, when we consider 
the way words corresponding to good and bad are used across languages, there is 
often asymmetry between the members of each antonymous pair, but, to the extent 
that the words reflect shared concepts, these concepts are symmetrical opposites. 
However, even if we decide that bad is a lexical universal, I suggest that there IS 
less justification for using bad to define all domains. We have noted that there IS 
asymmetry between words corresponding to good and bad in most languages. This 
asymmetry should be reflected In the use of these words 1n a semantic 
metalanguage. Because bad is concerned with nature rather than function it is 
inappropriate to use it in certain definitions, including those involved with emotions 
and feelings. It is best used in definitions that are concerned with things such as 
the moral domain. In terms of proposing bad as a lexical universal, however, 
Waugh does make the point that marked members of a pair tend to be less 
universal or non-universal in relation to the marked member. 
Waugh's approach to markedness, then, satisfactorily deals with the pair good 
and bad. Although she does not deal with these particular words, in general she 
sees the relationship between the unmarked and marked terms as being 
_, 
"metaphorically characterised as a subset-set relationship where the marked 
category is the subset and the unmarked category is the set." (Waugh 1982:302) 
This then can account for the fact that while good is the opposite of bad, bad is 
not always be the opposite of good. · It does not , however, account for the data 
from all languages. Thus, while the notion of asymmetry and a set-subset 
relationship applies to good and bad in English, and to their counterparts in many 
other languages, there is enough evidence to suggest that perhaps the essence of 
the meaning of the words good and bad reflect shared concepts which are in fact 
symmetrical. Theoretically, then, it would not be surprising to find languages 
where words which correspond to good a:nd bad are perfect antonyms. 
4.2. Lexical Universals 
The importance of testing whether good and bad are lexical universals stems from 
our desire to make generalizations about language in general. As we noted in 
Chapter 2, it has been implied by language philosophers that good and bad are 
words which reflect concepts that are understood by people in general, not just 
speakers of English or Greek, for example. It is the task of linguists, however , to 
test the extent to which this assumption is true. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to establish whether words which correspond to good and bad exist m 
other languages and whether they have a corresponding range of meaning and 
I 
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range of use. In order to establish whether shared concepts do exist , then, we 
must first determine whether the words which reflect these concepts are lexical 
• 1 
univ ersa1s. 
It has been noted above that we are not looking for synonyms or approximations 
to the words we are concerned with. We must, however allow for differences in 
the structure of languages even though there is clearly a strong relationship 
between syntax and semantics. For example, the fact that good occurs so often as 
an adjective suggests that there is a relationship between the property of adjectives 
and the meaning of good. T.he distinction between the semantic basis of nouns 
and adjectives (see Wierzbicka 1986:353-389) has bearing on our analysis of the 
difference, cross-linguistically, between good and true and is discussed in Chapter 7. 
For now, however, we should be aware that differences in syntax, and in particular 
differences in parts of speech, have a bearing on the analysis of our data. 
Insofar as differences in the structure of languages can not be avoided, therefore, 
these matters are taken into account. However, syntactic differences do not 
automatically rule out semantic similarities. Thus just because good may not be an 
adjective in all languages, we should not automatically assume that we do not 
have a shared concept GOOD. 
Nevertheless, as Dixon has pointed out, the same sorts of sem.antic properties 
tend to be reflected 1n adjective classes and good and bad occur frequently in 
adjective classes. 
"For languages which have the major class Adjective, the semantic 
content of the class is fairly constant from language to language. Thus 
an adjective in English will normally be translated by an adjective in the 
Australian language, Dyirbal, and vice versa." (Dixon 1982:3) 
Furthermore, it has been noted that in Romance languages adjectives will generally 
be used for lexical polarization (see Malkiel 1951:485-518) and, taking good and bad 
as our exa1nples of polarization~ this also seems to be the case in other language 
families. Thus differences in the part of speech to which a word belongs can 
suggest differences in ·the meaning of words. 
In addition to differences m the part of speech t o which a word belongs across 
languages, we should also be aware of differences in syntactic frames within a 
language. Thus . Ill English good and bad can be used attributively and 
predicatively. Bolinger has distinguished between predicative and attributive uses 
of adjectives 1n English and illustrates the differences in meaning when , for 
example, someone is described as a 'criminal lawyer' or a 'lawyer who is criminal '. 
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(Bolinger 1967:1-34) The English adjective good does not appear to be subject to 
the same degree of difference in meaning as criminal, depending on whether it is 
used predicatively or attributively. However, it seems that the nature aspect of 
the meaning of good is by far the more likely reading when it is used predicatively , 
whereas the attributive use allows for the reading of both function and nature 
(but there is a slight preference for function) of good to be impli~d. 
Thus, although it is difficult to detect any difference between a good man and a 
man who is good, because it 1s difficult to establish the function of man (see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of this), when we look at an example where there is an 
obvious function, the difference becomes clearer; e.g. (a) a good teacher vs. (b) a 
teacher who is good. Thus while (b) suggests that the teacher is a good person, 
(a) is ambiguous in that it could refer to either the teacher's function or the 
teacher as a person (but again, is more likely to refer to their function). 
Analysing the predicative use of good in this way perhaps also allows us to 
account for the following examples given by Zaitchik, the first of which he 
considers to be semantically anomalous. (Zaitchik 1974:271) (Although I don't find 
the first example totally unacceptable, I have starred it, following Zaitchik.) 
(a) •That stone is good. 
(b) That stone is good for throwing at passing camels. 
If we consider the first example to be referring to the nature of a stone then it is 
perhaps possible to understand that Zaitchik finds it difficult to reconcile a stone 
with a nature ( especially when if we replace the word stone with the word man it 
has moral connotations). When a context is given in which the stone has a 
function, as in the second example, then the sentence becomes acceptable. 
Moreover, it would seem that to say 
(c) That's a good stone. 
is more acceptable than example (a) because the attributive use allows us to refer 
to either nature or function and, as a result , we more readily infer from t he 
sentence that the stone may have a function without it needing t o be specified. 
When good is used predicatively it has a tendency to have moral overtones, or 
given the distinction I have drawn between nature and function, it could be said 
that when good is used predicatively it is less likely to be concerned wit h t he 
functional aspect of the noun. - For this reason I suggest that bad can be used 
predicatively more easily than attributively when it modifies a word which has a 
function. The fact that we have phrases which are lexicalised where the sum of 
the parts is not equal to the two parts separately seems to be a result of this. 
Thus we can say good man or good fellow , but it is odd to say a fellow who £s 
good or a chap who ,£s good. Furthermore good is more likely to occur in these 
lexicalizations than bad. 
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A more accurate reflection of the range of use of good and bad, therefore , results 
from looking at their attributive uses. However, it does seem that speakers 
generally perceive no discernible difference between 'This is a good book' and 'This 
book is good'; 'This is a good man' and 'This man is good'~ 'This is good weather ' 
and 'This weather is good' (but this, no doubt , is because there is no overt 
function involved in any of these examples). So while informants were asked t o 
translate noun phrases where good was used attributively, it was necessary to allow 
informants to make the best translation as either predicative or attributive. In 
Korean for example, good could generally be used either predicatively or 
attributively but with some domains it had to be used predicatively. 
Katz suggests that the most basic .syntactic frame is one that employs the 
predicative rather than the attributive use. 
"Fortunately there is only one type of sentence that needs to be 
considered to arrive at a set of lexical readings for the adjective 'good'. 
These are the simple predicate-adjective sentences, i.e. sentences of the 
form Art-N-is good. Any syntactically compound sentence containing an 
occurrrence of 'good' as an adjectival modifier of a noun is derived by the 
syntactic rules from a pair of sentences, one ·of which is a simple 
predicate-adjective sentence in which both 'good' and the noun it modifies 
in the compound sentence appear and the other is the compound sentence 
minus the occurrence of 'good~ modifying the noun." (Katz 1964:749) 
On the basis of the semantic considerations discussed above, however, the 
predicative use 1s considered to be more restricted in it s meaning than the 
attributive use and thus it is not , semantically , strictly accurate to say that the 
attributive use is derived from the predicative use. 
Bolinger is also sceptical about deriving attributive adjectival use from predicative 
use. As he says: 
"By itself the fact that many more adjectives are restricted to 
attributive position than to predicative position is suspicious; if anyt hing 
the reverse should be true if we want to base attribution on predication. " 
(Bolinger 1967:3) 
Furthermore, after experimenting with the format which Katz suggests , on 
practical grounds it was found to be more effective to use the attributive forms of 
good and bad. In a comparative study it is clear that many different syntactic 
structures will be found. Thus, as well as t he existence of the copula 'to be ' in 
only some languages the more complex syntactic frame made translation of the 
sentences awkward and comparison between the languages difficult. Thus while the 
predicative form might be syntacticalJy basic for English , this is not necessarily the 
case in other languages. Using the attributive form, however, gave a much neat er 
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way of comparing what was gomg on from one language to another, as well as 
allowing the fullest range of meaning in English to be expressed. However, for 
some languages (e.g. those where 'adjectives' belong to the grammatical class 
'verb') the predicative use may be easier to use, but overall, the Adj-Noun format 
was found to be the more satisfactory method. 
Greenberg uses the term 'universal' m what he calls an extended sense and 
differentiates between a number of types of universals. Thus he includes 
unrestricted universals, which are "characteristics possessed by all languages"; 
universal implication: "if a language has a certain characteristic, it also has some 
other particular characteristic, but not vice versa"; restricted equivalence: "if a 
language has a particular non-universal characteristic, Q it also has U and vice 
versa"; statistical universals: "For any language a certain characteristic ( Q) has a 
greater probability than some other (frequently its own negative)"; statistical 
correlations: "universally, if a language has a particular characteristic ( Q) it has a 
significantly greater probability of possessing some other characteristic (U) than if 
it does not possess ( Q) "; and finally, universal frequency distributions where: "a 
certain measurement, for example, redundancy in information theory ... may be 
applied to any language". ( Greenberg, Osgood · and Jenkins 1966:xix) 
Thus it is not necessary for some feature to be true of all languages to be 
classed as universal in Greenberg's extended sense. As Greenberg notes: 
"We feel that it is important to include generalizations which tend to 
hold true 
symmetry 
statistical 
convinced 
from the 
1966:xvii) 
, 
in more than a chance number of comparisons ( such as 
of sound systems) or which state t~e~dencies to approach 
limits across languages or in one language over time. We are 
that the wider use of this concept will prove to be most fruitful 
psycholinguistic viewpoint." ( Greenberg, - Osgood and Jenkins 
Thus if we find that good or bad have a slightly different range of use in some 
languages or that languages exist where these terms don 't seem to exist , it does 
not mean that we should immediately dismiss them as non-universal. Rather , we 
should investigate the extent to which they are universal , in Greenberg 's extended 
sense. However, when I refer to lexical unjversals in this study I refer to 
unrestricted universals. This does not mean that there is necessarily complete 
overla.p between the range of use and the range of meaning of these words in all 
languages, but it does mean that there is sufficient overlap to say that there is a 
shared sense in which they are used, reflecting a shared concept. 
However, if we find that these terms are common to many languages but are 
not lexical universals this still reveals something of interest about the languages 
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and cultures which have been studied. Something does not have to be true of all 
languages for it to be significant. It would however call into question the validity 
of assuming that such value-judgment terms are basic to man and that we all 
share these concepts. 
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Chapter 5 
Restriction of Meaning and Lexical Restrictions 
5.1. Restriction of Meaning 
If we look at the data from the languages surveyed in this study, the similarities 
between the range of use of words which correspond to good and to bad can be 
seen. However, we must also look at the similarities between the range of meaning 
of these words. In Chapters 3 and 4 the narrower range of meaning of words 
corresponding to bad was discussed in relation to antonymy and markedness. In 
this section we want to further discuss the differences between good and bad 1n 
terms of the restricted contexts in which, cross-linguistically, bad is often used. 
The domains that have been used are as follows: man, deed, woman, teacher, 
cook, mother, child, news, school, book, song, soil, day, weather, food, meat, rice, 
health, habit, smell, idea, taste, knife, clock, boat, dog, cow, dream, thing. 
S~mantically the word bad is acceptable with all of these domains. With some 
domains, however, some speakers would probably only use bad in certain contexts 
and/ or with a different syntactic frame. It is worth · ~oting that when bad can be 
freely used with a particular domain, because there is no semantic clash, then it 
will be used attributively. There is a correlation between the semantics of bad and 
the syntactic frame in which it is used. 
It should be noted that whiie I believe bad to be semantically acceptable with 
each of these domains, I accept that they may be questioned by sorr..e speakers. 
This 1s valid for two reasons. The first is that, as difficult as it is in such a 
study, some effort has been made to ensure that the study is not totally biased in 
favour of English, thus while bad rice or a bad clock may be questionable phrases 
in English this is not to say that there mav not be a language where these are 
much more common phrases than say the more acceptable bad man and bad 
dream. The second reason is that if we have some sort of scale of acceptability 
amongst these domains it should allow us some insights into the meaning of bad. 
I suggest that bad is less dependent than good on the domains with which it · is 
used for its meaning. There is a central essence which exists regardless of what it 
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is modifying and for this reason it 1s more difficult to use with a.s wide a range of 
domains. 
As each domain is conside!"ed we should not just note whether bad can be used 
to modify it, but think of what sort of context it would be used in and compare 
it to the context(s) in which good would be used. In this way we can decide to 
what extent bad is the opposite of good. However, for the purpose of establishing 
whether bad is a lexical universal, the main question is whether it can be used 
with a range of domains. 
5.2. Bad People 
Let us consider the way that bad modifies nouns referring to people. We can say 
bad man, bad woman, bad child, bad teacher, bad cook and bad mother. Of these 
six, three are describing functions: teacher, cook and mother. It is interesting to 
note that these three things are basically good things ( nurturing things). In 
English bad can be used with each of these domains, but for some speakers it 
would be too strong a word if all we want to say is that these people are not 
good at performing their function. 
Thus I suggest that there 1s a connotation of saying something about the person 
as such ( their character or even morals) rather than simply about their function 
when bad is used with these domains. Note also that in our culture these are 
generally functions which women perform. Certainly a mother has to be a woman, 
although if we describe someone as 'mothering' sorneone it does not have to be a 
woman, but clearly that person 1s acting in the way a mother /woman would be 
expected to act when looking after children. Teachers ( of school children - the 
terminology for those teaching tertiary students is, in any case, different) are very 
often women m our society and, while people who hold jobs as cooks are most 
often men~ the people that cook are most often women. Thus perhaps these 
words, which refer to woman-like activities, imply something about the character of 
the person as well as the function. 
If we compare these with functions which are either masculine, or neutral in 
respect of gender, the close association between function and nature seems less 
clear. Thus a good coniputer operator 1s someone good at their job, but a bad 
computer operator sounds strange; a good 2·ockey versus a bad Jockey; a good 
plumber versus a bad plumber - the negative of these suggest to me either (1) why 
are you calling them bad when all they are is not good at what they do (in other 
words it is too much, perhaps inaccurate, to say bad) or (2) it suggests, but only 
r, 
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as a last resort, that they are rn some way doing something wrong. In other 
words, in some way they are bad people. 
Thus, what I suggest is that while good can equally well refer to the function or 
the person, bad is much more likely to refer to the person. Where it can refer to 
the function - i.e. bad teacher - it is largely because there is some expectation 
about the person who performs that function, or in other words, where there is a 
close association between the person and their actions. Thus vocational jobs are 
more likely to be described by bad because bad refers to the person as much as to 
their job. 
A bad doctor, therefore, is an acceptable phrase because, regardless of the reality 
of why people become doctors or what they are thinking when they are performing 
their duties, they are in fact doing something that is considered good. Therefore, 
paradoxically, bad is best used to modify a function when that function is 
considered to be done by a good person. Think for example of a priest and his 
functions - to say mass, hear confessions, marry and baptise people - a priest 
would be unlikely to be described as a bad priest if he gave poor sermons, 
accidentally spilt the . . communion wine er always lost his place in whatever 
ceremony he was performing - he could only be described as a bad priest if he was 
a morally bad man and did not live his life in the way considered acceptable for a 
priest. Thus there are certain expectations of the way that things should be. In 
this sense good corresponds closely with the norm or an ideal. Bad is used when 
this ideal is not met. 
5.3. Lexical Restrictions 
Before taking this discussion further it is necessary to discuss the question of 
lexical restrictions. It should be noted that it is generaliy possible to use another 
word, besides good or bad with any of these domains but that none of the other 
words can be used with all of the semantic domains , and often the meaning will 
change ( as we would expect). Thus, in English, we would generally describe soil 
as poor or infertile rather than bad, but there is no semantic restriction on using 
the word bad with soil. This sort of restriction occurs in many languages and is 
called a lexical restriction ( although the example above is probably better described 
as a lexical preference). We must, then. distinguish between lexical restrictions 
and semantic restrictions as well as distinguishing between semantic restrictions and 
restrictions of meaning ( e.g. where a phrase such as good food, can refer to healthy 
and tasty food in some languages but only to healthy food in other languages). If 
we use poor or infertile with man, however, we get very different meanings both 
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from each other and from bad man. Apresjan distinguishes semantic and lexical 
restrictions as follows: 
"By a semantic selectional restriction of a word in a given sense we 
shall mean a limitation of its use that can be formulated in terms of a 
particular semantic feature or features of other words with which it is 
syntactically combined ... By a lexical selectional restriction of a word in 
a given sense we shall mean a limitation in its use which cannot be 
formulated otherwise than by listing all the words with whkh it can 
combine syntactically. It is immaterial here whether they have common 
semantic features or not." (Apresjan 1973:183-184) 
Apresjan notes further that: 
"One would expect ... that the difference between semantically non-
motivated and semantically motivated selectional restrictions may turn out 
to be relevant." ( Apresjan 1973: 183-184) 
While languages differ in the exte!lt to which they utilise lexical restrictions it will 
be interesting to note whether there are particular semantjc domains which are 
more likely to employ these restrictions. This may tell us something about those 
domains which are most likely to be combined with either good or bad. 
It should be stressed that, if there is a preference for a lexical itern, other than 
good or bad, to be used with a particular domain, but that it is still possible to 
use good or bad~ then when good or bad are used it is likely to be done only in a 
particular context. That is, it is subject to greater restrictio.P-s of n1eaning ( the 
good food example again). Thus there 1s a strong inter-relationship between 
semantic restriction ( e.g. * a happy lampshade), lexical restriction ( e.g. poor soil) 
and restriction of meaning ( e.g. good food as: opposed to delicious food in some 
languages). 
As was noted above, some languages tend to utilise lexical restrictions to a 
greater extent than others. If English 1s at one end of the continuum (few lexical 
restrictions) then Thai seems to be at the other. For example, in Thai the word 
leew ( bad) can be used with the domains man, soil, weather and dream. However 
the more likely words to be used are: 
a . khon chua 
man bod ( ev i I) 
bod man 
b. din leew 
soi I bod 
bad soi I 
c. f on rooy 
dream bod 
bod dream 
d. aokaot ya.,~ 
/ 
weather bod 
bod weather 
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When leew is used with man, dream and weather the context is marked. (Tony 
Diller personal communication) Furthermore it is rare to use the word for good 
( dii) when reporting subjective feelings. Thus to say 'I feel good' one would say: 
a. chon ruusuk sabaay 
I feel good/pleasant/comfortable 
I fee I good 
rather than: 
b. ?chan ruusuk di i 
I feel good 
I fee I good 
Several things could be said about these observations. The first thing is that we 
can simply choose to say that Thai has greater lexical restrictions operating on the 
word dii than English has on good. The second thing to note is that taste, smell 
and sound (feel or look haven't been included in the set of domains used here) 
form a set of domains with which good, and more frequently bad, are seldom used, 
perhaps suggesting that whatever the essential meaning of GOOD is, it is not 
related to these domains (in other words to find the essence of the meaning of 
GOOD we must look at the domains with which it 1s most happily used cross-
linguistically). The third possibility is this: the range of use of good in English is 
different from the range of use of di£ in Thai. Is this difference in the range of 
use sufficient, then, to suggest that Thai speakers and English speakers do not 
share the same concept GOOD? This assumption would not be justified at this 
stage, in that there remains sufficient overlap between the use of d££ and the use 
of good. We should, however, be aware of the differences. 
5.4. Bad Food 
Lexical restrictions, therefore, may tell us something about the meanings of both 
good and bad. In looking for the meanings, however, there are other things to 
take mto consideration. Consider the phrases bad meat and bad nee. Good can 
be used with these domains when what we want to indicated is: ' I like this'. 
Thus good meat can be used when what we want to say is 'I like this meat ' and 
good rice can be used when we want to say 'I like this rice '. On the other hand 
meat can not be described as bad if we don't like it (because, say , it's too tough 
or undercooked) but only if it is gomg off, is not fresh or 1s rotten. Thus bad 
meat has a particular meaning. Note also that it's more likely to be used 
predicatively than attributively and that this is one of the indications that, 
semantically, it combines less well with a particular domain. Bad rice on the 
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other hand is a less likely collocation but I think this is because rice does not go 
off in the way that meat does. On the other hand, in Mandarin, rice can be 
descibed as bad if it is uncooked nee, but not if it 1s cooked rice. In English , 
however, bad food is more likely to be used to refer to the sort of food that can 
go off, such as meat, fruit and vegetables. 
However, food can also be modified predicatively by bad in the following way: 
'The food at that restaurant was really bad'. This can not mean, however, that 
you simply did not like it. For example, if someone hates garlic and all the food 
had garlic in it they still could not say that it was bad. It could be described as 
bad if it was not properly cooked and was tasteless. In other words, if it was 
something other than the way food at a restaurant was meant to be. If food has 
garlic in it, that is an acceptable way for food to be, so it can't be described as 
bad. 
5.5. Bad News, Habits, and Dreams 
As I have suggested, words for referents that have no function, but just are or 
exist can easily be modified by bad. For example, bad news, bad dreams, bad 
weather, bad day, bad hab·it, bad health. It is true that potentially people have 
some control over habits and health, but we tend to have no control over news, 
dreams, weather and days. Moreover, these things are subject to change and can 
therefore change from good to bad or from bad to good. Thus, whereas there are 
certain expectations that people and food will be a certain way ( conform to certain 
standards) and this corresponds roughly to being good, there is no expectation that 
the things mentioned in this list will be one way or the other. Thus both good 
and bad can equally describe these domains. Furthermore, they have no function 
in the way that cooks or teachers have a function, rather they are things which 
people experience and things which can be considered to have a nature. 
5.6. Bad Songs, Books and Schools 
The words song and book are similar 1n that we may be referring to one of 
several things or several things at once when we use the word good to modify 
them. The interesting difference between good and bad here is that good tends to 
modify them in a general sense but bad in a specific way. This reflects the fact 
that good is less restricted in its range of meaning than bad. It also suggests that 
the notion of good refers to things that are complete. On the other hand, things 
can become bad in many different ways. Thus if there are many parts to a thing 
and they all work then X is said to be good ( e.g. in good health) but if any one 
of them is not working ( e.g. heart , lung) then X 1s said to be bad ( e.g. in bad 
health). Note however that some things can only be bad in one way , for example 
food can only be bad by going off. 
The other interesting and important point to note is that while things 'go bad ', 
they always 'come good'; conversely things can not 'come bad' or 'go good ' . As 
Eve Clark has pointed out: 
" ... come 1s always 
destination but KQ 
( Clark 197 4:316) 
interpreted as having a 'positive' or known 
always has its destination negatively specified." 
Clark's hypothesis indirectly supports the suggestion that good is concerned with 
the way things are and that this can best be described as nature. 
"Since ... come always has as its destination the deictic center itself, the 
hypothesis would predict that idioms with come should always indicate 
entry into some normal state. At the same time, because the destination 
of ... KQ is specified as somewhere other than at the deictic center, it 
should also follow that idioms with good should occur only to indicate 
departure from a normal state." ( Clark 197 4:316-317) 
If we look again at the domains of song and book we can see that a good song, 
for instance, could be one that we like, could have nice words, a pleasant tune, be 
innovative or have an important message, but a bad song refers mainly to t he 
words. If the music of the song is not good then. I suggest, we would refer to the 
music itself, although it is part of the song. A book is obviously full of words, 
but a book can also be said to be good from several different perspectives - well ,_ 
written , interesting, etc. - but a bad book suggests more specifically that there is 
something objectionable about the content, perhaps it is obscene or 1n some way 
inappropriate for certain people to read. 
Like book and song, a school which is good can be good for several reasons , or in 
several ways. For example the teachers are good, the pupils do well , there are 
good facilities for the pupils. A bad school tends to suggest that there 1s 
something wrong with the product of the school , either academically or in terms of 
behaviour. If something else is meant then it would be necessary to specify m 
exactly what way the school was bad. 
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5. 7. Bad Knives, Clocks and Boats 
If we look the words knife, clock and boat it can be seen that all t hree refer to 
things that have a function to perform. They don't just exist, but they exist for 
a particular purpose. In English we can have a good knife, a good clock and a 
good boat and while there are no semantic restrictions on using the phrases bad 
kn-if e, bad clock and bad boat they are less acceptable than bad dream , bad news 
and bad weather. 
It seems that the difference lies in whether the noun can be described as an 
experience (i.e. something that happens to people) or whether it is something that 
people do something with. There seems to be a relationship between intrinsically 
or morally bad and things which affect people. Perhaps it could be said that the 
difference is between things which people have · little or no control over and things 
which people utilise. Thus, as we noticed above, we can draw a parallel between 
the fact that when bad modifies nouns referring to people it suggests something 
about their character rather than their function and that it is easier to modify 
functions that are closely associated with the nature of a person rather than 
those that aren't ( e.g. compare a bad teacher with a bad cornputer operator). 
Further, while things that are intrinsically bad (in the moral sense) can be 
n1odified by good they can not be modified by bad. Thus one can't really have a 
bad 1Vaz-i or a bad murderer as these things are already assumed to be bad. One 
could presumably have a good 1Vazi ( one who wore the uniform or was a member 
of the party but did not do the things expected of Nazis) and even a good 
murderer ( although this sounds a little bizarre) if the murderer was efficient at. 
performing their task. 
5.8. Bad Dogs and Cows 
One final example which illustrates the difference between nature and function 
in the use of good and bad is to compare saying bad dog with bad cow. If we 
view cows only as farm animals who give milk or meat we can see that it sounds 
amusing to descibe a cow as bad because it suggests, for example, not tha t they 
are poor milk-producers but that they are misbehaving. Dogs on the other hand 
are often pets; one could say that human characteristics were ascribed to them and 
thus, if we treat them as pets, even if they also have function (such as a guard 
dog) we can easily describe them as bad, referring to their nature or behaviour 
but not to their ability to perform a certain function. However, because good 1s 
a vaguer term and can apply to both the nature and function of animals it is 
appropriate to refer to both a good dog and good cow. To refer to a good dog 
could apply both to its nature and function. 
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One further point that could be made about the difference between good and bad 
in English is that good has been included in many different express10ns. For 
example we use phrases such as good morning, Good night, Good grief, Good 
question and Good God. Bad has not been incorporated into the language to the 
same extent. This is partly a result of the fact that we tend to to wish people 
pleasant things rather than unpleasant things. On the other hand , as Abrahams 
has pointed out, bad can be used in Black American English to indicate that 
something is good. 
"(There) is a set of adjectives ... which may mean one thing or its very 
opposite ... Bad · itself is one of these words: in one type of usage it may 
mean the same as it does in Standard English - something to be despised. 
But more often it is used to describe something very highly valued. A 
really stylish person may therefore be described as a bad man." 
(Abrahams 1976:85) 
In this chapter, then, we have seen that there is asymmetry between the range of 
meaning of good and the range of meaning of bad. In English the range of 
meaning of bad is concerned primarily with the nature of something rather than 
its function. We have also noted that, while words corresponding to either good 
or bad in other languages may not be used with a particular dorr1ain this may be 
a result of a lexical restriction. This does not automatically indicate that the 
differences in the range of use of these words across languages reflect completely 
different concepts. 
5.9. Informants and Information 
- · 
One -·.of the difficulties in such a survey 1s that of ensuring that the information 
received from informants is not just a rough equivalent but in fact reflects the 
same concept as good and bad in English. If it does not reflect the same concept 
then we must be aware of it. The difficulties of semantic versus lexical restrictions 
makes it even more difficult to decide exactly what is going on. This problem 1s 
no doubt exacerbated by the fact that we are dealing with abstract words but it is 
clearly a problem not limited to value-judgment terms as we noted earlier with 
Randall and Hunn's criticism of Brown 's life-form universals. 
While there may be some controversy about all the claims made about data in 
this survey it is clear that to some extent we do eliminate the problem of rough 
translation by testing the use of a word in order to get t o its meaning. Randall 
and Hunn have also criticized the sorts of informants used in surveys establishing 
language universals and t hese criticisms apply to this survey. However this survey 
is sufficiently small that we can only claim to be making a step in that direction 
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and not to have established language universals but rather candidates for lexical 
universals. Randall and Hunn believe that bilingual, educated informants 
"may be used heuristically in the manner of Berlin and Kay (1969) and 
Brown(1977, 1979) to develop universalist ethnosemantic hypotheses, but 
testing such hypotheses preferably invoives both the inverviewing of 
monolingual informants having as little formal education and European 
acculturation as possible and attention to lexical usage during everyday 
conversation. It is certainly more difficult to obtain such evidence than to 
consult dictionaries, ethnographic summaries, or university students. Still 
it seen1s essential to seek such data if we are to avoid confusing universals 
with semantic convergence." (Randall and Hunn 1984:333) 
This, however, does not negate the importance of attaining the information that we 
have and of considering the theoretical implications that such data suggest. 
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Chapter 6 
Good and Bad Across Languages 
We have seen that there is asymmetry between the words good and bad in 
English, which results from good' s greater range of meaning as well as it s greater 
range of use. It can be seen that all of the things that have been said about good 
and bad in relation to markedness, antonymy and vagueness are contributing clues 
which lead us to suspect that good and bad have a set-subset relationship, where 
the range of meaning of bad is only part of the range of meaning of good. 
We should now investigate the behaviour of words which correspond to t hese 
terms in other languages. Compared with the understanding we have of good and 
bad in English, our information on corresponding terms 1s relatively sparce. 
_, 
Nevertheless, what we note is significant and , while the generalizations may , to 
some extent , be a simplification of the facts there does seem to be a correlation 
between what is going on in English and what is going on m other languages. 
This is not to say that every language works 1n the same way, but t hat the 
underlying themes of the meanings of these words recur. 
6.1. Procedure 
In order to establish whether good and bad are lexical universals , it is necessary 
to look at how words corresponding to good and bad are used in other languages. 
In this chapter we will look at the range of use of t hese words in 15 languages. 
The languages are Thai , Finnish, Spanish, Arabic, Indonesian, Turkish , Mandarin, 
Fijian , Russian, Kannada, Arrernte, Chichewa, Ewe, Korean and Tagalog. T hese 
languages were chosen because they represent a wide variety of language familes 
and a variety of geographical areas. Ideally , one would want to include languages 
from all language families in order to form a truly representat ive sample of 
languages. However, when choosing which languages to include, it was also 
necessary to consider the availability of informants who were willing t o participate 
in the study. 
Between two and six informants were used to gather the data 1n all but three 
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languages. For Chichewa. Kannada and .-'.\rrerte only one informant was used. 
These languages were included, however, because they belonged to language families 
which were not represented by other languages. Ideally, we would want more 
informants for each languagE;, however, once again, the number of informants was 
dependent upon the availability of native speakers who were willing to discuss their 
language. 
In order to establish whether good and bad are lexical universals, it was 
considered necessary to concentrate on the similarities of the use of words 
corresponding to these terms, rather than to concentrate on the differences. Thus, 
in asking informants whether one word could be used over and over again, the 
emphasis was placed on discovering whether that word could be used ( and then in 
what context) rather than on finding the most appropriate word. 
It is at this stage that we should remind ourseives of the importance of 
interpreting data and of the possibilities of looking at the data in more than one 
way. Furthermore it will be clear from looking at the data in other languages 
that son1e of my susp1c10ns about what is happening in English stem from 
observations of other languages. That is, what is covert in one language may be 
overt in another language. It was not initially assumed that this would be the case 
but eventually it became apparent that some of the more obvious things in other 
languages reflected what was going on in English. For example, I suspected that 
there was asymmetry between good and bad in English before looking at the data 
from other languages but it was only when there were clear parallels m other 
languages that this seemed to provide an explanation of what was gmng on 1n 
English. 
It should also be remembered that, just as different informants in English can 
g1 ve different responses ( though not widely differing responses), so we would expect 
that there would be some disagreements amongst speakers of other languages. It is 
interesting to note that informants of some languages are much more likely to 
disagree than informants of other languages. To some extent this can be 
attributed to greater lexical restrictions in some languages ( e.g. Thai) than others. 
But it must also be made clear that to some extent this could be a result of the 
framework wjthin which I am operating - that is, although the Adjective-Noun 
format provides us with a good framework from which to compare languages, it is 
not ideal. This is not surprising and so, as was mentioned above , I did not 
restrict myself to this format but used it as a starting point. 
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6.2. Overview of Results 
In discussing the data I shall first give a brief overview of the results of good 
and bad and then discuss each language separately. The domains that were set up 
were those considered most relevant to most cultures. After some initial false 
starts the domains that were used were those which related to the daily things 
which affect people. However, as I mentioned earlier, it seems that it would have 
been wiser to include more domains that were unacceptable because it is this that 
probably gives us the greatest insights into the meanings of these words, just as it 
is the unacceptable grammatical sentences which are of most use in illustrating 
what is going on syntactically. The difficulty of doing this, however, is that 
informants were reluctant to translate something that was not acceptable in 
English into their own language. As it was informants often asked 'Can you say 
this in English?'. Clearly, one of the problems of this study is that while you can 
say ADJ-N ( e.g. good man) as a phrase rather than a sentence it is often the case 
that people want a context. This is partly due to the nature of these words in 
that the other question which informants frequently asked was 'what do you mean 
by good /bad?' (in this context), suggesting that they wanted to translate the 
reference rather than the sense of the word. \Vhen investigating the words good 
and oad it was more important to find out whether the usage was acceptable 
rather than what the reference was. 
The domains that were used are as follows: I. man, 2. deed, 3. woman, 4. 
teacher, 5. cook, 6. mother, 7. child, 8. news, 9. school, 10. book, 11. song, 12. 
soil,-· 13. day, 14. weather, 15. food, 16. meat, 17. rice, 18. health, 19. habit, 20. 
smell, 21. idea, 22. taste, 23. knife, 24. clock, 25. boat, 26. dog, 27. cow , 28. 
dream, 29. thing. 
Just as good has a greater range of use and range of meaning 1n English than 
bad, so words which correspond to good tend to have a greater range of use and 
range of meaning in the languages surveyed. Of the languages surveyed, the ones 
which accepted good with each of the domains with no lexical restrictions and little 
restriction in meaning ( that is, the languages in which one could equally well say 
good man, good cook, gOvd food, good dog, good smell etc.) were Finnish, Spanish, 
Turkish, Fijian, Kannada. Arabic, Russian, Chichewa. There were some lexical 
restrictions in Thai, Indonesian, Mandarin, Korean and Ewe, but basically there 
was only one word which could be used repeatedly and which , on tn1s basis, 
corresponds to the word good in English and to the concept G 00 D. 
Although we can not categorically claim that a word represents a concept , 1t 1s 
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assumed tha.t if speakers of different languages use particular words in t he same 
I 
way then they share the same concept. But what does it mean to share a 
concept , either with people who speak the same language or speakers of other 
languages? Putnam (1975) , following Wit tgenstein 's · arguments, correlates the 
possession of a concept wit h an ability to use a word in a particular way. Thus 
Putnam sees a relationship between use and meaning. But note that it is a 
correlat ion that we are talking about and not an explanantion. Putnam makes the 
point, however, that a concept is complex - there is not a one-to-one relation, 
between, say , an image and a concept. This seems valid as everything we have a 
concept for is not necessarily something that we see ( e.g. good and bad). The only 
thing I would question, however, is how far we want to take the idea that a 
concept is a complex thing bound up with our ability to use this word. This may 
be true of words such as good ( even though the things we call good may vary 
from one person to the next) and certainly for words such as tiger and elm 
(Putnam's examples) even though , as Putnam points out, part of the ability to use 
the word tiger is to be able to distinguish it from other animals ( that is, the mark 
of possessing this concept is that we know a tiger from a lion) whereas he suggest s 
that for other words, such as elm~ we may be said to possess t his concept ·even 
though we may not be able to distinguish an elm tree from a beech tree. Thus 
the criteria for possessing a concept differ from word to word. 
A word like family seems to have yet different criteria. What does it mean, 
after all , to possess the concept FAMILY? Is it an image of t he people in one 's 
own family or of lots of similar small groups of people, or is it different sorts of 
groups . .depending on the culture to which you belong, or perhaps it suggests an 
idea of how a given group of people should inter-relate or depends on one 's own 
experience within a given group of people as t o what an individual's concept is. 
The possession of the concept FAMILY seems to involve more than a speaker 's 
ability t o use the word familv correctly and it does seem, therefore, that t he 
possession of any concept may involve more than one's ability t o use t he word 
which it is said to reflect. One's ability to use the word is, of course, a necessary 
part of possessing a concept. There may , however , be other t hings involved as 
well. 
Of t he languages which have some lexical rest rict ions or restriction of meaning 
with good we find that Thai , Indonesian, Mandarin, Korean and Ewe have minimal 
restrict ions which will be discussed below and which do not negate t he fac t tha t 
they have words which reflect the concept GOOD. On the ot her hand, on the 
basis of 'range of use '~ Tagalog appears to have more t han one word for good 
( mabuti and maganda ). Thus a lengt hy discussion of these words is required. We 
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could, for exan;iple, say that' it was a result of severe lexical restrictions and thus 
that Tagalog also has one word which corresponds to the concept GOOD , reflected 
in the English word good, or we could say that the Tagalog example ( and I 
presume there are other languages like Tagalog) disproves our hypothesis. What 1s 
interesting 1s that the domains with which mabuti can not be used in Tagalog 
correspond to the domains with which bad can not be used ( or are least likely to 
be used with) in other languages, thus suggesting that the core concept of GOOD 
and BAD which is shared by languages, is the same. That is, that the set-subset 
relationship does not hold when we look at what is common across languages. 
However, it does hold for most languages, including English. 
Overall, then, it was found that, . with the exception of Tagalog, languages did 
have one word which corresponded to good in English. On the other hand, the 
languages which had just one word which corresponded to bad, with little or no 
lexical restriction or restriction of meaning were fewer. They were: Turkish, 
Spanish, Mandarin, Arabic, Korean ( thus Korean presented slightly more difficulty 
with good than with bad). The languages with only one word but with some 
lexical restrictions were: Indonesian, Mandarin, Ewe, Spanish, Fijian, Russian, 
Chichewa and Tagalog. Two languages, Finnish and Thai, have more than one 
word for bad and therefore will be discussed at length. Finnish has two words 
which it is necessary to use in order to account for the range of use of bad in 
English. Thai has two that are frequently used but there are also others that are 
sometimes preferred ( or required) over these two. 
One . interesting point to raise is the status of words that are preferred over 
others but are not required. It was not always possible to get the most preferred 
word as well as to find out whether good or bad could be used, but this would be 
another interesting line of enquiry. The other point that should be remembered, 
and will be discussed as we look at the data, is the strong preference for not good 
(or , more accurately , negating the word good, so, for example in English we would 
often say no good rather than not good) over bad in many instances. This I think 
lends weight to the suggestion that bad isn't necessarily a stronger word but it 
differs in quality as well as intensity. 
64 
6.3. Thai 
Thai is an interesting language on a number of counts. One reason that it is 
interesting is that there were discrepancies between what was said by differen t 
informants (five informants: four female, one male). One thing which may be 
worth taking into consideration with some languages is whether the informant is 
male or female. In some languages this may influence the responses simpiy because 
those with more conservative speech patterns may insist on adhering to lexical 
restrictions rather than distinguishing between lexical and semantic restrictions. 
Thus it is possible that women, who tend to have more conservative speech 
patterns, would only accept the most polite lexical item. This could account to a 
small extent for some informants' hesitation in using words which correspond to 
bad rather than not good. For example, the male informant and one female 
informant accepted the use of leew ( bad) much more freely than did the other 
three female informants. Of these two, the male informant accepted it as a word 
he himself would use, while the female informant accepted it because she felt other 
people used it. 
While I have said that there is one word (dii), which corresponds to good, it is 
not the only word that is used in Thai. Another word, for example, is keel), 
which applies only to skill or ability to do something. In a pilot study for this 
survey I used as one example in the set of domains good f£sherman which was 
discarded because a number of informants from different languages didn't like it, 
but as I have since realised, it is from examples such as these that we learn most 
about the meanings of these words. _ In Thai, I was given the word keea rather 
than dii to describe fisherman and cook - clearly both refer to a function or skill. 
For the words mother and teacher, which also refer to a function or skill. I was , 
however, given dii rather than keel) . Why is this? I suggest it is because the 
function of teacher or mother is more closely related to the person ( their 
character or nature) than the function of fisherman or cook is related to the 
person. 
This suggests that just as bad 1s least well used with words which refer to a 
function or to a function fairly removed from the person 's qualities as a person, 
so the essence of GOOD which is the concept shared across languages , is also 
removed from the functional aspect of things. Thus, as I have suggested when 
philosophers say that the meaning of good is concerned with doing something well , 
from a linguistic viewpoint this isn t strictly accurate. The aspect of GOOD which 
1s most basic, therefore is not the moral aspect ( although it is tempting to relate 
it to this) but the non-functional aspect - that is, the things that you have no 
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control over and can not do anything with - .so in other words it is to do with 
the nature of something. Now , if we say that GOOD is concerned with being as 
something should be, it is easy to see why this is confused with function - which 
could be defined as doing as it should do rather than being as it should be. It can 
also be seen why good is often considered to stem from the notion of morality. 
For while the moral good, it is true, is concerned with being as something should 
be, it is only concerned with man, whereas nature also applies to non-human 
things. 
In the pilot study I also looked at Vietnamese. Vietnamese is similar to Tagalog 
in that there is more than one word for good - in fact there appear to be several. 
But even so, we can extract just one of them as the most basic (tt3t) and consider 
the others iargely as lexical restrictions. The aim is to look at the domains in 
which tot fits well and see how this compares with other languages. While there 
are a lot of lexical restrictions in Vietnamese we find that d>t does modify those 
domains which are non-functional - so, it modifies soil, news, health, weather and 
man. Unexpectedly, it also modifies clock, canoe and school. This can be 
accounted for by noting that tot also means beautiful and this is describing the 
external aspect of these things. In this respect Vietnamese is similar to Tagalog as 
Tagalog divides mabuti and ·maganda along the lines of good and beautifu) - thus 
if you describe a school in Tagalog as maganda you are saying that it has a good 
appearance. There are clearly some difficulties in this analysis, therefore, which 
can not simply be swept aside. However, it is nevertheless necessary to make 
generalizations and then try to account for the exceptions we find. If we can not 
account for the exceptions satisfactorily then we must change our hypothesis. 
In Thai, one informant (female) found dii to be acceptable with each of the 
following domains: food, meat, soil, news, school, idea, book, health , weather, 
dream, boat, clock. mother, friend, man, child , teacher, habit , cook. However, for 
food d£i is used in the sense of healthy rather than m the sense of delicious, and 
for meat di£ refers to the fact that the meat is good for cooking and is not tough; 
good sail was perfectly acceptable and referred to the soil being good for crops. 
Thus while d1·i could be used with food and with soil - that is, there was no 
sen1antic or lexical restriction on its use - there was a restrict ion in the range of 
meaning that d£i had when used with food but not with soil. 
There were other domains where di£ could be used but where it required further 
contextualization before it was appropriate. Thus while a knife could be described 
as di£ for most informants it was better to use the word kom, which means sharp. 
One informant however, felt that as di·£ was the more general word , it could refer 
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to both the quality and the sharpness of, the knife. If- a knife is described as dii 
then it usually refers to the metal which the knife is made from rather than its 
ability to cut well. On the one hand we could analyse this by saying that there 
was a restriction of meaning when d£i was used with knife, but on the other hand 
we could also point out that the restriction is in the direction of non-functionality 
- that is it refers to the quality of the knife. More common than restriction of 
I 
meaning, however, 1s lexical restriction. In the following examples dii could be 
used but the alternatives are strongly preferred. Thus for music~ one says pro?, 
for taste, one says aroy (which means delicious) and for smell the word horn is 
used. 
The opposite of d,i£ can always be ma£ d£i ( not good) no matter what the 
domain. What we are interested in, however, is which word for bad can be used 
(leew or yrere) with which domain. This will also tell us something about the 
sense in which dii is used. That is, di·i, like good in English, is a much vaguer 
term than either of the words for bad, but that doesn't mean that there won't be 
a particular interpretation on dii, depending on the domain with which it is used. 
The way that we can ascertain what this interpretation is, is to look at whether 
leew or yrere is used as its opposite. It is also worth noting that there is another 
word corresponding to bad (chua); chua, however, is mainly concerned with the 
moral sense of bad. From a cross-linguistic perspective, then, this suggests that 
the concept BAD does not stem from the moral domain. That is, while the moral 
don1ain refers to the nature of people 1 and thus words corresponding to bad are 
used with this domain, it is not necessarily the case that it will be the preferred 
word with this domain in a particular language. 
However it is also true to say that as di£ is vague it- may refer to good generally 
and not to one particular aspect of good. One informant described leew as 
referring to something bad in nature or quality, bad as a whole and concerning 
morality, whereas yrere refers to bad in some particular aspect . From the data it 
can be seen that this 'particular aspect' is often related to function. 
Another word that is used for bad is raay. This refers to something out of a 
person 's control, such as bad dream or bad news. Now, this is interesting because 
this is the area that I consider to be an essential part of bad (so this needs 
further thought). What I suggest is that the Thai word leew 1s the one that 
corresponds to the shared, cross-linguistic concept of BAD , for it refers to the 
nature of something. Note that this includes morali ty but morality is not its 
defining feature. But note that I could also argue that this illust rat.es that in fact 
we do not have a shared concept because one word in English ( and other 
languages) covers the range of meaning of at least three words in Thai. 
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The words that are most likely to be w~ed wi th leew • are as follows (note that 
we could in many cases set up contexts where both leew and yrere are possible): 
dog, man, child, teacher ( with the interpretation that the teacher is a bad person). 
Two informants ( one female, one male) allowed the following possibilities: food, 
meat, soil jdea, book , taste, weather , mother, man , child, teacher, habit. Different 
informants found different domains acceptable. \.\1hat seems sensible, therefore, is 
to give the information that the informant who allowed ieew most often gave and 
note the examples that were still unacceptable: 
1. a) phuchci dii 
man good 
good man 
b) ohucha i I eew 
man bad 
bad man 
2. a) kwaam-tary-cai di i 
wi 11 good 
good wi I I 
b) kwoam-tal)-Cai mai di i 
wi 11 neg good 
not good w i I I 
c)•kwaam-tal)-Cai leew 
wi 11 bad 
i 11-wi 11 
3 . a) phuuj i IJ di i 
woman good 
good woman 
b) phut:j i 9 leew 
wcman bad 
bad women 
4. a) khruu di i 
teacher good 
gcod teacher 
b) khruu mai di i 
teacher neg good 
not good teacher 
c) khruu l eew 
teacher bad 
bad teacher 
Note that in example ( 4) both mai dii and leew were said t o refer to the 
teacher 's character and not t o how well they taught . 
5 . a) khon khrua f ii mii di i 
person cook sk i I I good 
person who i s good at cook i ng 
b) khon kh ruo f i i mi i I eew 
person cook sk i I I bad 
person who is bad at cook i ng 
6 . a ) m az.~ d i i 
mother good 
good mother 
b) m~ leew 
mother bed 
bod mother 
7. o) dek di j 
children good 
good childr~n 
b) dek l eew 
chi Id ren bod 
bod children 
8. o) khaow di i 
news good 
good news 
b)?khoaw leew 
news bod 
bod news 
9. c) rol)rien dii 
school good 
good school 
b)?ro'Jrien 
school 
leew 
bad 
t.ad school 
c) ro')r i en ylJl.c£ 
school bad 
bad school 
10.a) na9sew di i 
book good 
good cook 
b)?nal)sew leew 
book bad 
bod book 
c)?na1Jsew ya&.a. 
book bad 
bod book 
11 . a) phlee9 phro? 
song good 
good song 
b) ph I eel) di i 
song good 
good song 
c) phleeQ mai pro? 
song neg good 
not good song 
d) phlee9 mai di i 
song neg good 
not good song 
e)•phlee9 leew 
song bod 
bod song 
f)•phleen yae.ar. 
song bod 
bad song 
12.o) din di i 
soil good 
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:.. 
good soi I 
b) din I eew 
soi I bod 
bod soi I 
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Note that for example ( 11) d£,i tends to refer to the meaning of the words of the 
song, whereas pro? is more general in that it refers to both the words and the 
music. This is clearly a case of lexical restiction. But it is interesting to note that 
while we talk about dii as being a vague term that refers to things generally , 
there are examples where it is in fact more restricted in its meaning than another 
word will be. 
In example (5) (good cook), if you use just dii this will only refer to the person 
and not thei_r cooking. Further, to say leew is considered impolite and therefore 
not used often, although there are no semantic restrictions on its use. Thus we 
could say that in addition to everything else, we must take cultural restrictions 
into account. From a pragmatic point of view this is true, however from a 
semantic point of view I doubt that this can be the whole picture. That is , there 
would be no cultural restriction if there wasn't something about the meaning of 
the word that caused people to feel it was impolite. It is the meaning of words 
that give them their taboo quality, even though it may be difficult to say exactly 
what it is about the meaning of the word that makes it impolite. In this case, 
however, we can say that the reason is because, semantically , leew refers to the 
nature of things. To u~e leew, therefore, indicates that the essence or nature of 
the domain is bad. 
13. a) won di i 
day good 
good day 
b)•won leew 
day bod 
bad day 
c) won y~lJa. 
day bad 
bed day 
14 . a) aagaat . dii 
weather good 
good weather 
b) oogaat I eew 
weather bad 
bad weather 
c) aagoo.t y 
weather bod 
bad weather 
15.a) oahaon di i 
food good 
good food 
b)•oohoan 
food 
bod food 
c) aohaon 
food 
bod food 
leew 
bod 
y c?£,.il,. 
bad 
16.a) nia dii 
meat good 
good meat 
b) n i a ma i d i i 
meat neg good 
not good meat 
c)?nio leew 
meat bad 
bad meat 
d)?nio yaue 
meet bod 
bod meat 
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In example (15) aahaan d££ means only healthy food , not good food in a more 
general sense and in (16) n-ia di£ means fresh meat , not good· meat generally. 
There appears t o be a correlation between the restriction of meaning of dii and the 
unacceptability of leew. 
·whenever you can use d££ , but it only has a specific 
meaning, e.g. healthy food, fresh meat , then leew is not used as it s opposite. 
17.a) khao dii 
rice good 
good rice 
b) khao mai di i 
rice neg good 
not good rice 
c)?khao leew 
rice bad 
bad rice 
d)?khao y&i?le. 
rice bad 
bad rice 
18.a) sukkopch di i 
heo I t h good 
good health 
b) sukkapah moi di i 
h~olth not good 
not good health 
c ) ?sukkapoh I eew 
hea Ith bod 
bad hea I th 
d) sukkapoh ya&.at. 
health bad 
bad hea lt h 
19 . a) n i soi di i 
habit good 
good habit 
b) nisei leew 
hot;>it bod 
bod hob it 
C) n i SO i yat~ 
habit bod 
bod habit 
20. o) k I in di i 
sm~ I I good 
good sme I I 
b) • k I i n I eew 
~me I I bod 
bod sme I I 
c) kl in yt,,?L 
sme I I bod 
cad sme I I 
In example (20) there is a more common word to describe a good smell l of 
perfume or food) which is horn. So, once again, when dii does not refer to the 
most general use, you can not use leew as the opposite. This also leads me to 
suspect , in relation to the set-subset argument about good-bad, that if we are going 
to say that there is a shared concept of both GOOD and BAD then that concept 
occurs in the overlapping part of the set. This is related to the line of argument 
that while bad is not always an opposite of good, good is always an opposite of 
bad, and in Thai while leew is not always the opposite of dii, dii is always the 
opposite of leew. 
What then of the word yrere? This certainly requires further investigation. 
However, I tend to discount yrere as the word representing the concept BAD on 
the grounds that it is concerned with function. · w~ could draw an analogy with 
phonological analyses here. When choosing an allophone to represent a phoneme 
we choose the allophone which occurs in the least restricted environment. This 
often corresponds to the allophone which occurs most frequently , but it is not 
necessary that it does , just as the unmarked member of an antonymous pair 1s 
likely to occur most frequently, but does not necessarily do so. Therefore, perhaps 
yrere occurs more frequently simply because many thi!lgs can have a function as 
well as a nature and often it is the function that is most obvious to us , but m 
fact , it occurs 1n the most restricted environment. 
21.a) rot di i 
taste good 
good taste 
b)•rot leew 
taste bed 
bad taste 
c) rot ylU/L 
taste bad 
bod taste 
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22.o) khaomkhit di i 
i dea . good 
good idea 
b) khaamkhit leew 
i dea bad 
bad idea 
c) khaamkhit y&aE. 
idea bad 
bad idea 
Note that in example (22) it is possible to use both leew and yrere but , as we 
would expect, they do not have exactly the same meaning. Khaamkhit Leew 
means that you have an idea about a bad thing, such as a crime, whereas . yrere 
doesn 't mean that you think in a bad way. In other words, we could say, in 
support of our hypothesis, that khaamkhit leew refers to the nature of the idea 
being bad. 
In t he following examples we can see that in Thai , when an object has a 
particular function, then leew is less likely to be used. 
23.a) mi it kom 
knife sharp 
sharp knife 
b)miit dii 
knife good 
good knife 
c) mi it mai kom 
knife neg sharp 
not sharp knife 
d) ?mi it yar.-zie. 
knife bod 
bad knife 
e ) ?m i i t I e ew 
kn i fe bod 
bod knife 
24 . o) na I i kao di i 
clock good 
good clock 
b) no I i koa moi 
clock neg 
d i i 
good 
not good c1ock 
c) no I i kcc ytl.lJL 
c l ock bod 
bod clock 
d)?nol i koo l eew 
c l ock :>ad 
bod c l ock 
In example 24 (b), rr.ai dii can refer t o t he quali ty of t he clock and how well it 
works, whereas in 24 (c) yrere usually refers only to how well it does ( or doesn ' t ) 
work , i.e. its function. It would be interesting if we could find an example of a 
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lexical restriction operating on d-ii but not on its, opposite. We have examples 
where dii is used and there is a lexical restriction on the opposite e.g. ,dream -
raay, as well as examples where only ma£ di£ can be used and not leew or yrere. 
25.o) ruo di i 
boot good 
good boot 
b) ruo moi di i 
boat neg good 
not good boot 
c)•ruo yar.~ 
boot bod 
bod boot 
d)•ruo leew 
boot bod 
bod boot 
Looking at the Thai data, then, we can see that leew can be used with many 
but not all of the domains. It is already clear that sometimes it is heavily 
contextualised and that it refers primarily to the nature of something as opposed 
to its function. Thus in terms of our division of range of use and range of 
meaning we could say that leew has a fairly wide range of use but a narrow range 
of meaning. On the one hand, we could argue that because leew can be used with 
a wide range of do1nains, it is the word that corresponds to bad in English. 'A'hen 
we look at its range of meaning, however, we could ask how we could propose it 
as the one word for bad because bad in English has less need to be contextuaUsed. 
However, if the essence of the meaning of BAD is the nature of things, then, I 
suggest, the contextualisation of leew in Thai always operates in this direction. 
We can, therefore, propose it as the word reflecting: the shared concept of BAD. 
Let us look at the contexts in which these words are used. For bad man both 
lcew and yrere can be used. If a man is described as phuchai leew this refers to 
the moral sense (for example a man who beat is wife would be phuchai leew). On 
the other hand phucha£ yrere refers to something specific about the man, such as 
that he is lazy, or to something specific that he has done ( e.g. hit another car 
while he is driving). Thus, with the domain man, yrere does not refer just to 
function. As the example of laziness indicates, it can also refer to his nature. 
In this case, then, the meaning of yrere can not be said to be totally associated 
with only one aspect ( e.g. either function or nature), but is associated with both. 
On the other hand, leew refers more specifically the nature of the rnan and tends 
to encompass the moral domain. 
The example of teacher has been noted before but can be mentioned again. 
Khruu di£ can be used in a general way to refer to a good teacher, although 
_, 
khruu keen refers more specifically to the 
I 
person ~s , ability to teach. Khruu leew 
refers to the character of the person ( their nature) whereas yrere refers to their 
I 
ability to teach ( aithough there can be some overlap here with the meaning of 
·teew). · ·· ·A bad mother would most commonly be referred to as mrere yrere, which 
would refer to her ability to do the job of being a mother. Mrere leew is less 
often used because it is very impolite, but it does refer to the character of the 
person. Moreover, it is because it refers to the character of the person that it is 
impolite. 
The expression for good news, is kha.aw di"i and its most general opposite is 
khaaw raay. If you say khaaw leew it will only be in a very marked context , for 
example the papers are presenting distorted news, slander or lies. A good school is 
roorien d£1:, the opposite roJJrien yrere means that the school produces bad 
students. Once again it is marked if you use leew - this would refer to a school 
that encourages antisocial behaviour or violence. For a bad book, mai d-i£ would 
be the unmarked opposite of di£. To use yrere you could only be referring to the 
style of writing, not the content. Nags·ew leew (bad book), on the other hand, 
would be obscene or unsuitable for children. Like bad book, a bad song (pleeQ 
leew) could be used 1n a particular context, say , for example, if you felt the 
sentiment expressed by a particular song was wrong. We can note, therefore, that 
leew is most likely to be used when it is associated with the nature of people. 
The opposite of good soil ( din di£) 1s din leew and this refers to the quality ( or 
nature) of the soil. To refer to bad food as aahaan leew is very marked indeed -
for example it v.rould mean that antiobiotics have: been given to the animals and 
now it has gotten into the food - but again this refers to the nature of food. 
We have seen that leew can not be used with every domain. Does this mean 
that every domain does not have a nature? In a sense this may be true in that 
we don't always think about the nature of everything. Clearly, often it is the 
function that is more relevant. Some informants found the use of leew with the 
domains of day and weather to be unacceptable whereas others found it to be less 
acceptable than another lexen1e but not impossible. To a certain extent it depends 
on whether an informant can think of a context in which leew could be used. 
It might , therefore, seem that I am forcing things to say that leew corresponds to 
bad. In one way this is true, but the purpose of doing this is not to say that 
leew is equivalent to bad, but to try to extract the essence of the concept BAD 
which is shared by all cultures. We can see the importance of various ways of 
analysing the data when we do this. Our alternative would be to simply look only 
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for the ideal opposites and when we came, up with four or five different words, 
draw the conclusion that no shared concept existed because, in order to account for 
I 
all the domains that bad accounts for 1n English, we need to use four or five 
different words in Thai. It is true that no one word reflects the same concept as 
the English word bad does but this does not mean that there is not a shared 
concept BAD. Thus I think to leave the analysis at this point would be a 
mistake because it would not really reflect what was going on. 
6.4. Finnish 
We have drawn a distinction between the nature of something and its function 
with respect to Thai and English. How does this hold for another language which 
also has two words for bad? In Finnish ( two female informants) there is one word 
for good, hyva, which can be used with all of the domains listed. To illustrate the 
range of use of hyva and its two opposites, huono and paha we have the following 
examples: 
1. a) hyvo mies 
good man 
good man 
b) poho mies 
bad man 
bad man 
2. a) hyvo teko 
good deed 
good deed 
b) paha teko 
bod deed 
bad deed 
3. a) hyvo nainen 
good woman 
good woman 
4 . 
b) poha nainen 
bad woman 
bod woman 
a) hyva opettaja 
good teacher 
good teacher 
b) huono opettaja 
bod teacher 
bod teacher 
In example ( 3b) we could also say huono nai nen, but this has the specific 
meaning of whore or cheap woman, whereas paha na-inen has meaning similar t o 
evil woman. Th us again we can draw the distinction between function and 
nature, where huono refers to function and paha to nature. In example ( 4b) we 
see the same distinction. Here huono is used in the same way as ycece in Thai 
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and paha corresponds to leew. Thus a huono opettaJa 1s a teacher who doesn t 
teach well whereas a paha opettaJa is a bad or evil person. 
H uo,:io is seen., as ref erring largely to .. inanimate . .things . while paha refers mainly to 
character and therefore to people. 
5 . a) hyvo kokki 
good cook 
good cook 
b) huono kokki 
bad cook 
bad cook 
6. a) hyvo aiti 
good mother 
good mother 
b) huono aiti 
bad mother 
bad mother 
Again, in example (6b), if paha were to be used, it would refer to the person 's 
character, whereas huono refers to the person 's function. 
7. a) hyvo lapsi 
8 . 
9. 
good chi Id 
good chi Id 
b) paha 
bod 
lapsi 
chi Id 
bad chi id 
a) hyvot uutiset 
good news 
good news 
b) huonot uutiset 
baa news 
bad news 
o) hyvo koulu 
good school 
good school 
b) huono koulu 
bad school 
bad school 
10.o) hyvo k i r j a 
good book 
good book 
b) huono k i r j a 
bod book 
bad book 
In example ( 1 Ob), paha k£r1·a was considered to be unacceptable. In example 
(7b) the expression for bad child is paha lapsi , thus suggesting that the meaning 
of paha could not be similar to evil as the expression is used much like naughty 
ch,ild in English and is not considered to be a serious thing to say to a child. 
Moreover, there is a separate lexeme, ilkea, which means evil. Although bad news 
77 
(8b) is generally translated as huonot uutiset, pa.ha can be used when the news 
refers to something that is evil, such as murder, rather than just to something that 
is bad for the individual ( e.g. losing their keys). Again, then, we can see the 
connection between paha and the nature · of things: .:--.~ ·· ·.,, , L• 
What is interesting 1s that paha could not be used with book. I would have 
guessed that there were some contexts in which book could be used with paha. 
Two points can be made about this. The first is that we can not expect exactly 
the same range of use of words from one language to another. At least, the fact 
that there is not complete correspondence will not mean that our hypothesis is 
wrong. The second is that speakers of each language may not view the same 
thing in the same way. That is, while on the one hand it is feasible to look at 
soil as having a nature ( or quality), it is also feasible to look at it as having a 
purpose or function - that is, for growing things. So it is not necessarily proof 
that we are wrong when we find such apparent contradictions. Furthermore, it is 
not necessarily the case that the translation equivalents of soil will have the same 
meaning as the word soil itself ( e.g. it may be closer to earth or ground). 
11.a) hyva laulu 
good song 
good song 
b) huono laulu 
bad song 
bod song 
c) poho loulu 
bod song 
bod song 
In example ( 11), if paha ~s used instead of h-uono, it can only refer to the words 
of the song. 
~2.o) hyvo moopero 
good soi I 
good soi I 
b) huono moopero 
bod soil 
bod soil 
It was mentioned above~ that 1n English bad soil was a less acceptable express10n 
than poor soil. In this regard we could say that neither Finnish nor English look 
at soil primarily 1n terms of its quality. 
13.o) hyvo poivc 
good day 
good day 
b) huono poiva 
bod day 
bod day 
c) poho po1vo 
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bad day 
bod day 
14 . a) hyvo i Imo 
good weather 
good weather 
b) huono i Imo 
bad weather 
bod weather 
c) paho i Imo 
bod weather 
bad weather 
Paha and huono can both be used in examples (13) and (14). In example (13) , 
one informant considered that paha was less common than huono, but that it had 
much the same meaning. The other informant suggested that only huono would be 
used. In example (14) one informant suggested that paha was used in spoken 
language but in not in written language. Both informants said that paha -ilma 
suggests really bad weather and that it attributes the characteristics of a person to 
the weather. 
15 . a) hyvo ruoko 
good food 
good food 
b) huono ruoka 
bod food 
bod food 
16 . a) hyvo I i ho 
good meat 
good meat 
~) huono Ii ha 
bad meat 
bad meat 
17 . o) hyva terveys 
good hea Ith 
good hea Ith 
b) huono terveys 
bad hea Ith 
bad health 
18.a) hyva tapa 
good habit 
good habit 
b) paho topa 
bad habit 
bod habit 
c) huono tapa 
bad habit 
bod habit 
For tapa (health) both paha and huono can be used. Paha tapa refers more to 
the habits of children or youngsters whereas huono tapa refers more t o older 
people. 
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19.a) hyvc:i tuoksu 
good sme I I 
good sme I I 
b) paha tuoksu 
bod sme 11 
bod sme I I 
20.a) hyva moku 
good taste 
good taste 
b) paha moku 
bad taste 
bad taste 
In example (20) huono could also be used. In this case it would refer to 
someone's taste in clothes or people etc., whereas paha maku refers to the taste of 
food, which is therefore more like an experience. This fits in with the function 
and nature dichotomy. However, it also raises the point about things which you 
experience and, generally, have no control over, and things which you choose. (In 
this category I would also compare the habits of children with the habits of adults 
who, it could be said, have more control over their habits than children do.) In 
Thai, this group of 'no-control' things usually takes a separate lexical item (raay), 
whereas this is one group that the English word bad combines well with, as does 
paha 1n Finnish. Thus it 1nust be said again that all these words don't have the 
same range of meaning. However, it should be remembered that the context is not 
necessarily constant because the nouns are not necessarily identical in meaning. 
This is also true, but to a lesser extent, of words which correspond to good. 
However, it is masked, somewhat, by the greater similarity in the range of use of 
- -
words which correspond to good. What we -could perhaps say here is that while 
Wittgenstein 's approach of looking at the use to determine the meaning 1s 
extremely useful and does offer many insights, it does not in itself give us the 
complete picture when we are looking at cross-linguistic data. In fact it can be 
misleading. On the other hand, perhaps we should just look more carefully at 
what we mean by ~use' in that the context m which a word is used is part of its 
'use ' but if we only look at its ability to combine with other words it does not 
clearly reflect its full use. 
21. a) hyvo idea 
good idea 
<;ood idea 
b) huono idea 
bad idea 
bad idea 
22.a) hyva veitsi 
good knife 
good knife 
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b) huono veitsi 
bod knife 
bod knife 
Neither idea nor veitsi (knife) can be used with paha. I would expect, on the 
basis of my hypothesis , that paha could be used with idea but that huono is the 
most natural term to use with veitsi (knife) because a knife is primarily considered 
to have a function. In the following two examples we also find that huono is 
used with functional objects. 
23.o) hyva ke 11 o 
good clock 
good clock 
b) huono ke I lo 
bod clock 
bod clock 
24.o) hyva vene 
good boot 
good boot 
b) huono vene 
bad boot 
bod boat 
Both paha and huono were given as the most common word for bad to be used 
with koira (dog) by different informants but informants also agreed that the other 
word could be used. 
25.o) hyvo ko i ro 
good dog 
good dog 
b) huono ko i ra 
bod dog --
bad dog 
c) paho koi ro 
bod dog 
bod dog 
26.o) .. lehma hyvo 
good cow 
good cow 
b) huono lehma 
bad cow 
bod cow 
27.a) hyvo uni 
good dream 
good dream 
b) paha uni 
bad cireom 
bad dream 
28.o) hyva osio 
good thing 
good thing 
b) huono osio 
bad thing 
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bad thing 
c) paha asia 
bad thing 
bad thing 
A dog that is described as huono is one that is not fulfilling its function, ( e.g. 
as a hunting dog or a guard dog) or just sits around doing nothing, whereas a dog 
that is described as paha 1s one that barks and bites - that is, who has a bad 
nature. In example (28) asia (thing) can be described as both huono and paha. 
For example, if somebody had an accident, that would be a bad thing (paha). If 
somebody burnt a cake they were making, that would be described as huono. 
Although the most comn1on opposite of hyvii lehmi:i (good cow) is fruono lehmi:i, 
paha can be used to mean that the cow is bad tempered. In other words, if paha 
is used, then human characteristics are attributed to the cow (just as we are doing 
when we say bad cow in English). This, then, also refers to the nature rather 
than the function of the cow. 
In general, then, the two Finnish words huono and paha seem to correspond to 
the notions of function and nature respectively. 
6.5. Languages Like English 
Most of the languages dealt with in this study do in fact use words which 
correspond to good and bad in much the same way as English does. That the use 
of these terms corresponds leads us to believe that the meanings of the words ( and 
hence the concepts they reflect) also corresp~nd. This suggests, then, that the 
concepts GOOD and BAD are common to ·many languages, although in most of 
these languages, words cor!"esponding to good reflect a more general concept than 
words corresponding to bad. It 1s only when we find languages where a word 
corresponding to bad has a wider range of use than a word corresponding to good 
that we can suggest that the language independent concepts are exact antonyms. 
Although the number of languages 1n this study is not large , the sample 
represents a wide variety of language families. Because of this , we can say 
something about the way good and bad are used in language in general. Let us 
now look at some languages that are very similar to English. Note, however , that 
they are not all genetically related to English. Furthermore, despite t he 
similarities, there are some differences in the range of use and the range of 
meaning of these terms. I suggest that we can draw an analogy here between 
concepts like GOOD and BAD and Berlin and Kay's colour terms. What Berlin 
and Kay tested for, and found, was that the stereotypical representation of a 
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colour (say of red) was widely agreed upon from language to language but that the 
borderline cases varied from language to language ( and perhaps from speaker t o 
speaker). 
One of the reasons we find discrepancies in relation to concepts of value-judgment 
terms 1s cultural. Thus the jmportance of, or attitude towards, things such as 
dreams varies from culture to culture. While two different languages may describe 
a dream as bad, for example, what bad refers to may differ. In one culture it may 
indicate that something bad is going to happen while in another it may just be 
that it was an unpleasant experience. 
6.5.1. Spanish 
Two male informants were used to collect the following information. If we look 
at the range of use of bueno and malo, there are very few differences between 
Spanish and English. Given that both languages are Inda-European and that the 
cultural differences may not be as wide as between English and some other 
cultures, this is perhaps not surprising. One informant found the use of bueno and 
ma/o with each of the domains, except knife, equally acceptable. The other 
informant felt that although both words could be used with each of the domains, 
except knife, both bueno and malo were more acceptable with the domains 
concerning poeple and animals than with the domains referring to things which 
have a function, unless further contextualization was given. 
Thus, in Spanish greater contextualization _ is needed when either bueno or malo 
are used to describe function. In some cases, all that is needed is to use the NP 
in a sentence, e.g. Es un cuchillo bueno (This is a good knife). The words 
corresponding to good and bad in Spanish, therefore, both have a narrower range of 
meaning than good and bad in English. In both cases this range corresponds to 
nature rather than function. 
1. a) hombre bueno 
man good 
good man 
b) hombre malo 
man bad 
bod man 
2. a) buena gente 
good wi i I 
good wi i I 
b) mato gente 
bod wi 11 
i I I wi 11 
3. a) mujer buena 
woman good 
good woman 
b) mujer molo 
woman bod 
bod woman 
4 . a) profesor bueno 
t eoche r good 
good teacher 
b) profesor molo 
teacher bod 
bod teacher 
5 . a) buena 
good 
good 
comido 
cook 
cook 
6 . 
7. 
b) mola comido 
bad cook 
bad cook 
a) bueno mod~e 
good mother 
good mother 
b) mala madre 
bad mother 
bad mother 
a) ... bueno nrno 
chi Id good 
good chi Id 
b) . - malo nrno 
chi Id bad 
bad child 
8. a) buenas noticias 
good news 
good news 
b) males noticias 
bod news 
bad news 
9. a ) colegio bueno 
schoo I good 
good school 
b) colegio ma l o 
schoo I bod 
bad schoo l 
10 . a) I ibro bueno 
book good 
good book 
b) I i bro malo 
book bod 
bad book 
11 . a) d ( a bueno 
day good 
good day 
b) d 10 molo 
day bod 
bod day 
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12.o) tiempo bueno 
weather good 
good weather 
b) tiempo molo 
weather bod 
bod weather 
13.o) comido buena 
food good 
good food 
b) comido ma!a 
food bad 
bod food 
14.o) corne bueno 
meat good 
good meat 
b) corne male 
meat bad 
bad meat 
15.o) solud bueno 
hea Ith good 
good heo I th 
b) salud male 
health bad 
bod hea I th 
16.a) hob it o bueno 
habit good 
good habit 
b) hob i to malo 
habit bod 
bad habit 
17.o) olor bueno 
smel I good 
good sme·11 
b) olor malo 
sme l I bad 
bod sme I I 
18.o) sabor bueno 
taste good 
good taste 
b) saber molo 
to::ite bad 
bod taste 
19.o) idea buena 
idea good 
good idea 
b) idea mole 
idea bod 
bod idea 
20.o)?cuchi I lo bueno 
knife good 
good knife 
b)?cuchi I lo molo 
knife bod 
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bod knife 
In example (20) we find that knife is not normally described attributively as good 
or bad. It would be more usual to say something like 'The knife is not cutting 
very well' (El cuchillo no esta cortando muy bien), thus emphasising the function 
of the knife. Of the two informants, one felt that 20(b) was less acceptable than 
20(a), and the other felt that neither was worse than the other. Furthermore, one 
informant felt that the phrase would be acceptable if it was in a sentence such as 
'I'm looking for a good knife'. 
21.a) reloj bueno 
clock good 
good clock 
b) reloj molo 
clock bod 
bod clock 
22.a) bote bueno 
boot good 
good boat 
b) bote molo 
boot bod 
bod boat 
Both informants felt that bueno and m.alo could be used in examples (21) and 
(22), but one informant felt that it was not as acceptable as other domains. In 
English we noted that there was a difference between saying bad dog and bad cow. 
In Spanish, the informant who was less happy with bad boat and bad clock felt 
that bad dog and bad cow were equally acceptable. The informant who accepted 
bad clock and bad boat feit that oniy a farmer, or someone very familiar with 
cows, would say either vaca buena or vaca mala. Again, however, bueno was not 
considered more acceptable than malo. . Familiarity with an object should , I 
suggest, be taken into consideration when discussing the function-nature 
dichotomy. It may be that familiarity with something will mean that a person 
sees more of the nature of a thing, whereas others see the function. This rr,.ay 
be speculative, and of dubious significance, but it could account in some way for 
individual differences that may occur from speaker to speaker when asked about 
the acceptabiljty of these noun phrases. 
23.a) perro bueno 
dog good 
good dog 
b) perro molo 
dog bad 
bad dog 
24.a) vaca bueno 
cow good 
good cow 
b) voca mala 
cow bod 
bod cow 
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On the basis of the examples above, then, it would seem that bueno and malo 
are nearer to being perfect antonyms than are good and bad in English. 
6.5.2. Arabic 
Let us now look at the Arabic data (three male informants). One word for good 
(jay1:d) and one word for bad ( sayid) can be used with most of the domains in 
Arabic. However, Arabic also has, if not a lot of lexical restrictions, then a lot of 
lexical preferences, which I have not spent a lot of time collecting simply because 
it went beyond the aims of my thesis to do so. However, what was clear, was 
that there were some words which applied specifically to the behaviour of people. 
It does seem that in many languages speakers perceive good as having a sense 
which applies primarily to people and perhaps feel that the use of good has spread 
from this use. As I have tried to illustrate, however, from a serr1antic viewpoint, 
this does not appear to be the case. Rather, the description, nature, . 1S 
appropriate to people and can be associated with the moral domain but 1s not 
limited by it. Furthermore, it is worth noting that jayi'd does not refer to the 
moral good. That is, the most general word corresponding to good is not 
conce:ned with the moral domain and is not the first word chosen to be used with 
man - though of course it can be. 
1 . a) rojul mostoqim 
man good 
good man 
b) rajul joyid 
- -
man good 
good man 
c) rojul qazer 
man dirty 
bod man 
d) rojul sc;yid 
man bod 
bod man 
In terms of lexical preferences, it was noted by one informant that rajul say£d 
was better than rajul jay£d, because, if the man is already bad, there is nothing 
wrong with using a word with bad connotations. However, if a man is really 
good , then a speaker would usually look for a more compelementary, generous 
word, than sayid - thus, 1n this domain, there are stronger lexical preferences in 
acting on good than bad. Exarr1ple (le) would not normally be used unless you 
really hated the man or wanted to say that he was evil. 
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One of the lexical preferences ID Arabic, which is also common . ID other 
languages, such as Indonesian , is to use the word which corresponds to beauti Jul 
for many domains. In Arabic the word is jameel (masc.) or jameelat (fern.). 
This is not surprising as there has been a long association throughout history 
between goodness and beauty. (see Lakoff and Scherr 1984) Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of this study, it is only the one word which can be used with all domains 
which is being considered , and, it is worth noting, this word never seems to be the 
equivalent of beaut£ful. That is , while things that can be described as beautiful 
can therefore be described as good, it does not follow that things that can be 
described as good can therefore be described as beaut£ful. Moreover, it seems that, 
just as the emphasis on function does not occur in all languages, so the emphasis 
on beauty does not occur in all languages. However, while words which correspond 
to beaut£ful are sometimes lexicalised and used to modify certain domains in · this 
way , it does not appear that languages separately lexicalise a word for the 
functional good. Both jayi·d and say£a were considered to be acceptable with he 
following domains. 
2. a) okhbor jayidoh 
news good 
good news 
b) akhbar soyi?at 
news bod 
bod riews 
3. a) madrassat jayidah 
school good 
good school 
b) modrassat 
school 
bad school 
sayi?at 
bod 
4. a) kitob jayid 
book good 
good book 
b) kitob sayid 
book bad 
bod book 
5. a) taqs joyid 
weother good 
good weather 
b) taqs sayid 
weather bud 
bad weathe r 
6 . a) team jayid 
food good 
good food 
b) t oom 
food 
soy id 
bod 
bad food 
7 . a) adat jayidot 
habit good 
good habit 
b) odot sayi?ot 
hob · t good 
good habit 
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We can see from Arabic that, as well as lexical restrictions, semantic restrictions , 
and restrictions of meaning, it 1s also possible to have lexical preferences. The 
restriction that 1s most important is semantic restriction, and while lexical 
preferences are perhaps the least important of these, we can see that each of these 
limitations on the use of these words can be used to tell us something about the 
range of use and range of meaning of GOOD and BAD and the extent to which 
they can be considered shared concepts. 
6.5.3. Indonesian 
In Indonesian (six informants: five male, one female) the word for beautiful 
( bagus) can often be used instead of the word for good ( bai k). However, as we 
can see from the examples below ba£k can always be used. Therefore, we can say 
that there is one word which corresponds to the English word good in Indonesian 
which has a similar range of meaning and range of use. 
It is also true that there is one word for bad (jelek) which can be used with all 
of the domains ( except smell and taste - neither baik nor jelek can be used with 
these domains). There is another word which can be used with many of the 
domains, however, which means something similar t o rotten ( buruk). 
If we look up these words in an Indonesian-English dictionary , we find that buruk 
is defined as old , rotten, bad, foul; jelek is defined as !!filY, bad, evil. The 
examples of the use of buruk in the sense of bad are given as: 'He does bad 
things ' and 'He has a bad narne '. For jelek , the example given 1s: 'He always 
has bad thoughts ' . It thus seems difficult to distinguish the meanings of these two 
words. However , on the basis of use , informants agreed that ;"elek could be used 
with each of the dornains , while buruk could not. With many of the domains, 
however , both ;"elek and buruk couid be used , and , in some cases ( e.g. mimpi -
dream) , buruk was preferred. Thus, although there is clearly some overlap in their 
meaning, only one word (jelek) has been proposed as the word corresponding to 
bad. 
There was some disagreement about whether buruk could be used with particular 
domains. Most informants agreed, however , that buruk could be used with the 
following domains: deed, news habit, dog, cow, dream. Those tha t could not be 
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used with buruk are: teacher, cook , mother, child, school, book, song , soil, day 
weather, food, meat, rice , health, idea, knife , clock , boat. 
One informant (female) disagreed slightly with some of the above. She suggested 
that t-idak baik ( not good) would generally be used instead of jelek and buruk. 
The use of jelek, rather than buruk, was preferred with dog and cow. Both buruk 
and jelek, it was suggested , could be used with deed, news, habit and dream. 
Buruk could be used with man, but it was considered to be very impolite and to 
refer mainly to a person's physical attributes. Jelek, on the other hand, was said 
to refer both to behaviour and to physical attributes. It was also suggested that 
buruk could not be used with the domain of food. 
1 . a) orang boik 
man good 
good man 
b) orang jelek 
man bod 
bod man 
c) orang buruk 
man bod 
bod man 
2 . o) guru boik 
teacher good 
good teacher 
b) guru 
teacher 
jelek 
bod 
bod teacher 
c)?guru buruk 
teacher bod 
bod teacher 
Both guru jelek and guru buruk refer to the teacher as a bad person; buruk is 
less acceptable but could be used depending on context. To say the t eacher wasn't 
teaching well you would use guru yang tidak bai'k. 
3 . a) perbuoton 
deed 
baik 
good 
4 . 
good deed 
b) perbuoton 
deed 
bod de~d 
c) perbuoton 
deed 
bad deed 
a) be r it a 
news 
good news 
jelek 
bad 
buruk 
bod 
boik 
good 
b) be r i ta jelek 
news bod 
bod news 
c) be r it a buruk 
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news bod 
bad news 
Three informants thought that 4(b) and ( c) would be used to refer to the same 
thing. One informant (female), however, felt that for bad news which concerned 
people generally ( e.g. a war), it was more common to use buruk, while either 
buruk or Jelek could be used for news which concerned an individual. 
5. a) tonoh boik 
~oi I good 
good soi I 
b) tonoh jelek 
soi I bod 
bod soi I 
c)•tonoh buruk 
soi I bad 
bad soi I 
6. a) CUOCO boik 
7. 
weather good 
good weather 
b) CUOCO jelek 
weather bod 
bad weather 
c)•cuoca buruk 
weather bad 
bod weather 
a' , kebi\lsoan 
habit 
good habit 
b) kebiasaan 
habit 
bod habit 
c)?kebiasaan 
habit 
bad habit 
baik 
good 
jelek 
bad 
buruk 
bod - -· 
In example 7 ( c), buruk was considered to be unacceptable by two informants, and 
acceptable by the other four. 
8. a) m imp i ba i k 
dr"cm good 
good drecm 
b) mimpi jelek 
dream bod 
bod dream 
c) mi mpi buruk 
dream bod 
bad dream 
Ail informants considered that 8(c) was more common than 8(b). 
In Indonesian, then , we have an example where more than one word is used with 
the same set of domains that bad can be used with in English. However, although 
both words are used, only one of them, jelek, is used with all of the domains. 
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6.5.4. Turkish 
Turkish (five informants: four male, one female ) is like English in its use of 
words which correspond to good and bad as the following examples illustrat e: 
1 . a) j y i adam 
good man 
good man 
b) kotu adom 
bod man 
bad man 
2. a) iyi ogretmen 
good teacher 
good teacher 
b) kotu ogretmen 
bad teacher 
bad teacher 
3. a) i y i haber 
good news (sg.) 
good news 
b) kotu haber 
bad news (sg.) 
bod news 
4. a) iyi s!hhat 
good hea Ith 
good hea Ith 
b) koti.i s!hhot 
bod hea Ith 
bad hea I th 
5. ' 0) i y i f i k i r 
good idea 
good idea 
b) kotu f i k i r 
bad idea 
bad idea 
6 . a) i y i soot 
good watch 
good watch 
b) kotu soot 
bod watch 
bad watch 
7 . a) i y i ruyo 
good dream 
good dream 
b) koti.i .. , uyo 
bod dream 
bod dream 
8 . a ) i y i b i 9ak 
good kn i fe 
good kn i fe 
b) kotu b i cok , 
bod kn i fe 
bod kn i fe 
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Although both iyi and koti.i. can be used with saat (watch) and bi<;ak (knife), this 
can oniy refer to the quality of the object. Thus again we see that, cross-
linguistically, the concepts which these words reflect tend to be concerned with the 
notion of nature rather than function. Furthermore, it seems that, in terms of 
these notions, the range of meaning of ,:yi and koti.i. are similar. 
6.5.5. Mandarin 
Mandarin (two informants: one male, one female) is also very similar to English, 
as the following examples illustrate. However, the words for good and bad are 
stative verbs , rather than adjectives. 
1 . a) hao ren 
good man 
good man 
b) huai ren 
bod man 
bod man 
2. a) hoo mama 
good mother 
good mother 
b) huoi mama 
bad mother 
bad mother 
3. a) hoo xiooxi 
good news 
good news 
b) huoi xiaoxi 
bod news 
bod news 
4 . a) hao shu 
good book 
good book 
b) huai shu 
bod book 
bod book 
5. o) hoo tu 
good soi I 
good soi I 
b) huoi tu 
bod soi I 
bad soi I 
6. a) hao tionqi 
good weather 
good weather 
b) huoi tionqi 
bod weather 
bod weather 
However, 1n Mandarin, hao and huai are not used with health. Instead, one one 
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wouid say something like: 'She is very healthy ' . Thus the range of use of hao and 
huai is narrower than that of good and bad. 
7. o)•hoo jion-kon 
good health 
good health 
b)•huoi 
bod 
j i on-kon 
heo Ith 
bod heo I th 
6.5.6. Fijian 
Fijian also has one basic word for good and one for bad. These are vinaka and 
caa respectively. There are a few lexical restrictions and restrictions in meaning 
which apply when these words are used with certain domains. Thus perhaps we 
would not want to say that the range of meaning of vinaka and good, for 
example, corresponds exactly, but we are still able to see that the similarities are 
great enough so that we can say that these words reflect a shared concept GOOD. 
I have not discussed every restriction of meaning in Fijian but am aware that they 
do exist. From the examples below it can be seen that the range of use of these 
words is very much like English. 
1 . o) tomato vinoko 
2 . 
person good 
good man 
b) tomato coo 
person bad 
bod man 
o) cakacako vinako 
deed good 
good deed 
b) cakocoko coo 
deed bad 
bod deed 
3. o) moroma vinako 
woman good 
good woman 
b) maroma caa 
woman bad 
bod woman 
4. o) qasenivul i vinoka 
teacher good 
good teacher 
b) qosenivul i 
teacher 
bod teacher 
5. a) douvokasoqo 
cook 
good cook 
coo 
bod 
vinako 
good 
b) E sego ni motai no vokosoqo 
not expert cook 
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not a good cook 
6. a) tukutuku vinoko 
news good 
good news 
b) tukutuku rorowo 
news sod 
bod news 
c) tukutuku coo 
news bad 
bod news 
It can be seen that, once again, v-inaka (good) has the most general usage and 
meaning. In example (5), to say the opposite of good cook one must say that 
someone is not an expert at cooking. In example ( 6) to use the most general 
sense of bad news one must use a different lexical item - rarawa (sad). Caa is 
restricted in its meaning and can only be used when one refers to something like a 
bereavment. 
7. a) qele vinoko 
soi I good 
good soi I 
b) sego ni qele 
n~g soi I 
infertile soil 
8. a) bulabula vinaka 
health good 
good health 
b)•bulabula coo 
hea I th bad 
bad hea I th 
bulabulo 
fertile 
c) sego ni bulabula vinako 
good neg health 
not good hea Ith 
Caa ( bad) is not used with the domains of soil and heal th. Instead one must 
say that the soil is not fertile and that the (person's) health is not good. Again 
with soil we can note that good sO'd can be fertile soil but that infertile soil must 
be specified and t hat bad can not be used to cover this term. There are many 
domains in Fijian, however , where both vinaka and caa are used. 
9. a) droki vinoka 
weather good 
good weather 
b) draki coo 
10.a) 
b) 
weather bod 
bod weather 
ko Ii vinoka 
dog good 
good dog 
ko Ii coo 
dog bad 
bad dog 
11.a) tadra vinaka 
dream good 
good dream 
b) todra coo 
dream bod 
bod dream 
6.5. 7. Russian 
Russian lS another language where 
with a wide number of domains. 
1 . a) "' .. ee lovek xoros1J 
good man 
good man 
b) ploxoj ~elovek 
bod man 
bod man 
2. a) ~ . . uc i te I· xoros1J 
good teacher (masc.) 
good teocner 
b) ploxoj uc i te I• 
bad teacher 
bod teacher 
3 . o) xorosij izvestija 
good news 
good news 
b) ploxoj izvestija 
bod news 
bod news 
4 . a) xorosee zdorovie 
good heo-+ th 
good heo I th · 
b) ploxoe 
bod 
zaorovie 
hea Ith 
5 . o ) 
bod hea I th 
"' .. 
xoros I J zapox 
good sme I I 
good sme I I 
b) p I oxoj zapax 
bod sme I I 
bod sme I I 
6. o) ..,, . . .., xoros I J noz 
good knife 
good knife 
b) ploxo j noi 
bod knife 
bad knife 
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good ( xoros£J) and bad (pl oxoJ) can be used 
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6.5.8. Kannada 
The Dravidian language Kannada ( or Cannarese) ( one female informant) is also a 
language which generally has one word for good (olleya ) and one for bad (ketta, 
but with a few lexical restrictions operating on which domains they can be used 
with. 
, . a) of I eyo manushya 
good man 
good man 
b) ketto manushya 
bod man 
bod man 
2. a) of I eyo keloso 
good deed 
good deed 
b) ketta kelasa 
bed deed 
bed deed 
3. a) of I eyo gurugolu 
good teacher 
good teacher 
b) ketto gurugolu 
bad teacher 
bod teacher 
4 . a) of I eya suddi 
good news 
good news 
b) ketto suddi 
bad news 
bod news 
5 . a) of I eya sha l e 
good school 
good school 
b) ketta sha l e 
bad school 
bod school 
6 . a ) ol l eya pustoka 
good book 
good book 
b) ketta 
bad 
pustaka 
' book 
bad book 
7 . a) ol leya have 
good weather 
good weather 
b) ket ta nave 
bad weather 
bad weather 
8. a) ol leyo arogya 
good health 
good health 
b)?ketta arogya 
bad heo I th 
bod heo I th 
9 . a) ol leyo hovyoso 
good hob it 
good habit 
b) ketta 
bad 
hovyoso 
habit 
bod habit 
10.o) ol leyo ycchor.e 
good idea 
good idoo 
b) ketto yochone 
bod i deo 
bod idea 
1 1 . o) o I I eye nay i 
good dog 
good dog 
b) ketto noyi 
bad dog 
t>ad dog 
12.a) ol leyo konasu 
good dr~am 
good dream 
b) ketto konosu 
bad dream 
bad dream 
13. a) o I I eya ka th i 
good knife 
good kn i fe 
b) mondu kathi 
b l unt knife 
b l unt knife 
c)•ketta kath i· 
bad kn i fe 
bad knife 
14 . a) ol leya gad i yor 
good clock 
good clock 
b)•ketta 
bad 
gadiyor 
c l ock 
bad clock 
15.a) ol leyo don i 
good boat 
good boat 
b)•ketta don i 
bod boot 
bad boat 
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Aside from t he rest rict ion on bad health , t he domains which can not be used 
with ketta (bad) are those which are primarily considered important for their 
function - knife boat and clock . 
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6.5.9. Arrernte 
In Arrernte ( one female informant) , an Aboriginal language spoken in Central 
Australia, there are a number of domains which could not be used with either 
mwarre (good), or akwerne ( bad) .1 This could of course be for cultural reasons. 
Those which were unacceptable with either were deed, school, book, weather , rice, 
health, clock, boat , cow. However, this still leaves us with a large number of 
domains with which both good and bad could be used. For example: 
1 . a) artwe mwarre 
man good 
good man 
b) artwe akwerne 
man bad 
bad man 
2 . a) iteme mwarre 
cook good 
good cook 
b) iteme akwerne 
cook bad 
bad cook 
3. o) ahelhe mwarre 
soi I good 
good soi I 
b) ahelhe akwerne 
soi I bad 
bad soi I 
4. a) iterrintye mwarre 
ideo good 
good idea 
b) iterrintye -: akwerne 
idea bod 
bod idea 
5. a) al tyerre mwarre 
dream good 
good dream 
b) altyerre akwerne 
dream bod 
bod dream 
6 . a) arne mwarre 
thing good 
good thing 
b) arne akwerne 
bad thing 
bad thing 
Although both good cook and bad cook were acceptable in Arrernte, we find t hat 
while good teacher is acceptable, bad teacher is not. Thus , one again, we see that 
1This information was collected for me by Lea Brown. 
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words corresponding to bad are less likely to be used when there is a function 
involved. 
7 . a) akaltye mwarre 
teacher good 
good teacher 
b)•akaltye akwerne 
teacher bad 
bad teacher 
Furthermore, although we could attribute the fact that words such as clock, boat 
and cow could not be used with either mwarre or akwerne to cultural reasons, it 
could also be said that this supports the view that, cross-linguistically, the shared 
concept of both GOOD and BAD is concerned with nature rather than function. 
It is significant that there are a relatively large number of languages which don't 
allow bad with health. One reason why this may be so is, unlike other domains, 
you can't do anything with health - whether it's good or bad you just have it. 
Furthermore, with all of the other domains, they can be put 1n the syntactic frame 
'A good X to ... ' or 'A good X for ... ' ( this is in English of course). Thus you 
could say 'He's a good man to have around' or 'He's a good man for the job'; 'It's 
good weather to go sailing in' or 'It's good weather for sailing'; 'It's a good knife 
_, 
for chopping vegetables' or 'It's a good book to read'; even 'That's a good habit to 
acquire'. On the other hand, one can 't say ' It's good health to have' or 'It's good 
health for excercising'. .One can of course say 'She has good health for someone 
her age' but this is different because one is not therefore doing anything with the 
health. \Vhile I am not sure of its significance, it may be that this has something 
to do with the-- fact that health can be used less frequently with words which 
correspond to bad than other other domains. 
6.5.10. Chichewa 
In Chichewa. a Bantu language spoken m Malawi ( one female informant), we find 
that -bwino (good) and -ipa (bad) (with a prefix which agrees with the class of the 
noun being modified) can both be used with a wide range of semantic domains. 
1. a) munthu wabwino 
human good 
good man 
b) munthu woipa 
human bad 
bad man 
2. a) mphunzitsi wobwino 
teacher good 
good teacher 
b) mphunzitsi woipa 
teacher bad 
bod teacher 
3 . a) may i wabw i no 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
mother good 
goo(i mother 
b) moyi woipo 
mother bad 
bad mother 
a) nkhoni yobwino 
news good 
good news 
b) nkhoni yoipo 
news bod 
bod news 
a) sukulu yabwino 
school good 
good school 
b) sukuiu yoipa 
school bad 
bod school 
a) bukhu labwino 
book good 
good book 
b) bukhu loipo 
book bod 
bod book 
a) nyimbo yobwino 
song good 
good song 
b) nyimbo yoipa 
song bad 
bod song 
a) nyengo yabwi no 
weather good 
good weather 
b) nyengo yoipa 
weather bod 
bod weather 
a ) ntho ka yabw i no 
so i I good 
good soi I 
b) nthaka yo i pa 
so i I bad 
bad so i I 
10 . a) chokudya chabw i no 
food good 
good food 
b) chakudya c hoipa 
food bad 
bod food 
100 
The importance of t he concept of the nature of som et h ing 1s again seen when we 
10'1 
look at the phr~e for bad health (mayo woipa) , in Chichewa. Movo (health) can 
be described as wabwino (good) or wot"pa ( bad) but the phrase moyo wat·pa has 
suggestions or connotations of bad character as well as bad health. Thus in this 
I 
example we have a different range of meaning for bad when combined with health 
between Chichewa and English. The difference, however, highlights the central 
meaning of the concept BAD across languages. 
Although -1pa 
. 
expression is: 
11 . a) lyi ndi 
This i s 
This is a 
b) I y i ndi 
This is 
This is a 
c) Iyi si 
This neg 
(bad) can be used with 
'This is NOT an X!'. 
wotchi 
watch 
good ·,vatch . 
wotchi 
watch 
bod watch. 
wotchi! 
watch 
yabwino 
good 
yoipa 
bad 
the domains listed, sometimes the preferred 
This is not a watch! (because it's so bad) 
This fits in nicely with the semantic analysis of good proposed by Wierzbicka, 
who defines good as follows: 
"One can say about X, what we would want to be able to say about 
any X." (Wierzbicka 1972:84) 
Thus example (Ile) suggests that if the watch is not what we want a watch to be 
then we won't even call it a watch. However, the syntactic frame 'This is NOT 
an X!' can not be used for all domains. Furthermore~ it should be noted that this 
frame is also ~sed rterally, i.e. 'This is NOT a watch, it's a radio ' . One could 
say 'He's not a · man, because he behaves like an animal ' using this frame, but it's 
not considered common. However, one could not say the following: 
12.o)*Ine si - munthu 
I neg- human 
I' m not a person (because I'm so bod) 
Saying that something is 'NOT an X', however, also fits m with Geach 's 
discussion of bad. He savs: 
"vVe can not safely predicate of a bad A what we predicate of an A, 
anymore than we can predicate of a forged banknote or a putative father 
what we would predicate of a banknote or a father. vVe actually call 
forged money 'bad'; and we cannot infer e.g. that because food supports 
life. bad food supports life. For 'good' the point is not so clear at first 
sight. since whatever holds true of an A as such holds true of a good 
A." (Geach 1957:33) 
So in Chichewa, by denying that an object is what it purports to be, the 
implication is that it is something bad. Clearly as well as not holding for the 
r 
102 
statement 'I am not a person ', 1t may hold for objects but can not hold for all 
semantic domains. For example, Geach 's explanation could not apply to weather 
or dreams, as whatever holds for weather does not also hold for good weather, and 
whatever holds for dream does not also hold for good dream. 
This clearly offers a clue to the meanings of good and bad. The nature of some 
things is meant to be a certain way. For example knives are supposed to be able 
to cut things. If it does this we call it a good kni'fe. If it doesn't do this - i.e. 
if it is not 'complete' or is not fulfilling its function, then it is odd to describe it 
as bad e.g. bad kn£fe. However the nature of some things is not to be either one 
way or another , e.g. weather is as likely to be sunny as it 1s to be cloudy and as 
likely to be hot as it is to be cold; dreams are as likely to be pleasant as they are 
to be unpleasant and news is as likely to be good as it is to be bad. Thus, for 
the things that aren't supposed to be a certain way by their very nature, it is as 
acceptable to use bad as a description as it is to use good, but for those things 
that are supposed to be a certain way ( e.g. boats are supposed to be able to stay 
afloat on water, cows are supposed to give milk, clocks are supposed to tell the 
time), it . lS more likely that bad won't be used. This fits 1n with the 
nature-function dichotomy. There may, however, be some discrepancies in the 
argument because not all examples can be accounted for. Furthermore we must be 
aware that each culture doesn't view certain domains in the same way. Asian 
cultures such as Korean and Thai, for example, do not use knives primarily as an 
eating utensil. Therefore, part of the explanation for why bad is not allowed with 
certain domains in particular languages may be due to the way cultures perceive 
these things rather than that their concept of BAD differs from ours. It is not 
easy to establish these things, however , at least not in the sort of survey which 
has been undertaken here. 
6.5.11. Ewe 
In Ewe, a West African language spoken in Ghana (two informants: one male, 
one female) the word for good is nyui'e and the word for bad is baqa. Here we 
find a number of lexical restrictions as well as certain preferences for using not 
good over bad. Again, however , I would suggest that there are sufficient 
similarities in the range of use of these words with the English words good an~ 
bad to say that there is a shared ~oncept GOOD and BAD. Another point to 
note is that in some cultures the differences between the language as it is taught 
in schools and the language as it is spoken is greater than in other cultures. This 
may have some bearing on the responses. Further, in Ewe, although you can often 
use the ADJ-N construction there are times when it is not appropriate. One 
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informant felt that an ADJ-N construction was not used when what was being 
described involved an action, such as cooking or teaching. However it seems that 
it may also be used to distinguish between function and nature, the ADJ-N 
construction being more appropriate when we are referring to the nature of · 
something rather than the function. 
Again, not all restrictions of meaning are discussed, although those that appear 
to be particularly important are mentioned. 
1. a) nutsu nyuie 
man good 
good man 
b) nutsu boqo 
man bod 
bod man 
2 . a) nu nyuie 
deed good 
good deed 
b) nu baqa 
deed bad 
bad deed 
3. a) ny,nu nyuie 
woman good 
good woman 
b) ny.J nu baqa 
'Noman bad 
bad woman 
4 . a) nufiaia 
teacher 
nyuie 
good 
good teacher 
b)?nufialo boqo 
teacher -· bad 
bad teacher 
In example ( 4) it would be better to say 'Me fiana nu nyu1e o' - 'She doesn 't 
teach well ' . 
5. a) £>evi nyuie 
chi Id good 
good child 
b) Devi buqa 
chi Id bad 
bod chi Id 
The most common way of saying bad ch£ld, however , is to use the word gbegble 
(spoiled). 
6. a) nyo nyuie 
news good 
good news 
b) nya baqa 
news bad 
bad news 
7. a) suku nyuie 
school good 
good school 
b) ~uku baqa 
school bad 
bod school 
8. a) agbal nyuie 
book good 
good book 
9. 
b) agba I baqa 
book bad 
bad book 
a) eha vivi 
song sweet 
good song 
b)•eha nyuie 
song good 
good song 
c) eha me - vivi o 
song neg. sweet 
not good song 
d)•eha boqa 
song bad 
bod song 
104 
In example (8), although bada can be used, it was considered better to say agbal 
men yo 2, 'the book is not good'. In example ( 9) the lexical restriction acts on 
both the positive and negative pole of the description. This appears to be less 
common than to have a lexical restriction for only the negative pole. 
10 . a) ~keke nyuie 
day good 
good day . 
b)•')keke boqa 
day bod 
bad day 
11.o) m:> i u nyuie 
r i ce good 
good rice 
b) m:>I u baqo 
rice bod 
bod rice 
In example (10) baqa was unacceptable and the most appropriate opposite of 
r;keke nyuie was considered to be r;keke a men yo o ( not a good day ). In example 
(11) baqa is acceptable in that there is no semantic or lexical restriction on its 
use. However , there is a restriction of meaning when it is used. That is m:> l u 
ba<f.a can only be used to refer to rice of poor quality ( e.g. if it hasn 't been 
properly refined , if there are small stones mixed in with the rice ) . If it was 
unwholesome or spoiled however then you must use gbegble. However both these 
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ideas are encoded if you say that the nee is not good - rn:, lu a menyo o. The 
same distinction between poor quality and spoiled ( or perhaps in this case, broken 
or unable to be used properly) applies when you are describing a boat. Thus once 
have the most general range of meaning . . . bad does not always agam 
12.a) t:>dzi.9u nyuie 
boat good 
good boat 
b) t:>dz ill u bade 
boat bad 
poor qui ity boot 
c) t:>dzil9u gbegble 
boot spoiled 
~poi I ed boat 
13.a) avu nyuie 
dog good 
good dog 
b) avu boqa 
dog bod 
bad dog 
14.a) droe nyuie 
dream good 
good dream 
b) droe boqa 
dream bad 
bad dream 
One further point should be made about range of meaning. While good, in the 
languages surveyed, has a wider range of meaning than bad, this doesn't necessarily 
mean that in all languages the word corresponding to good in English has the same 
range of meaning as good in English when combined with a particular domain. So 
in our earlier example of good food m English it was noted that it could refer to 
food that was both tasty and healthy. In Ewe, good food refers only to healthy 
food. 
6.5.12. Korean 
In Korean (five informants: four male, one female) there is one word for good 
( coun) and one for bad ( nappiLn). These can be used with most the semantic 
domains tested. One difference between Korean and other languages in this study 
however is that these words can be used both predicatively and attributively . 
There is a different form if these words are used predicatively ( cotha and nappuda 
respectively). Generally it a matter of choice whether used t hey . IS are 
attributively or predicatively , just as in . English we can choose to say 'This 1s a 
good man ' or 'This man 1s good '. One informant suggested -that it was more 
subjective to use the attributive form· another suggested it was more informal. In 
several domains, however (health , boat , clock ) 1t 1s obligatory to use the 
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predicative form. This is true for both good and bad. These are the same 
domains which, cross-linguistically , do not combine well with bad. We may ask , 
however, what this tells us about the range of meaning of coun in Korean, as 
opposed to good in English. It suggests that the range of meaning is slightly 
narrower (at least on the basis of these domains), and perhaps that it is more of a 
true antonym of nappun than good is of bad. That is perhaps the range of 
meaning centres mainly on the nature of something rather than the function. 
Some examples of the use of coun and nappun in Korean follow: 
1. o) V " coun nomja 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
7. 
good man 
good man 
b) nappun namja 
bad man 
bad man 
a) .,, .,, hael)dOI) coun 
good deed 
good deed 
b) " hael)dOIJ nappun 
bod deed 
bad deed 
a) ., .., sonsae'Jnim coun 
good teacher 
good teacher 
b) .,, sonsae')nim noppun 
bad teacher 
bad teacher 
a) V V soshik coun 
good news 
good news 
- · 
b) nappun . sosh i k 
bad news 
bad news 
o) 
.,, ., 
coi.:n hokkyo 
good school 
good school 
b) .., hokkyo noppun 
bad school 
bad school 
a) w w chaek coun 
good book 
good book 
b) ., choek noppun 
bod book 
bod book 
o) • y huk coun 
good ~o i I 
good soi I 
b) 
.,, 
nappun huk 
bad soi I 
bad soi I 
8. a) ..; .. coun nolssi 
good weather 
good weather 
b) noppun nolssi 
bod weather 
bod weather 
I 
9. a) kongcn-i cotho 
health good 
good health 
' .. ..; b)•coun 
good 
kongar) 
heo Ith 
good heo I th 
c) kongor;- i 
health 
bod heo I th 
" noppudo 
bod 
d)•noppun kongo9 
bad health 
bod health 
10.o) shigye go 
this clock - NOM 
This is a good clock 
b)?shigye go 
clock - NOM 
good clock 
) "' ., c •coun shigye 
good clock 
good clock 
cotho 
good 
d) shigye nun 
this clock TOP 
This 1s a bed clock 
., 
e )? shigye 
clock 
go noppudo 
NOM bad 
bod clock 
f) • nopp~n · sh i gye 
bod clock 
bod clock 
cotho 
good 
"" noppudo 
bod 
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One informant said that although 10 (a) and (d ) are both contrastive, they 
indicate a different sort of contrast. 10 (a) means that this clock is good (not 
that one); 10 ( d) means tha t this clock is bad (but I'm not sure about that one). 
10 (b) is acceptable if you qualify it by giving more information, otherwise, it is 
like saying 'a clock is good' in English. 10 (e) is acceptable if, for example, the 
listener can iden t ify which specific clock the speaker is referring t o. 
Korean 1s a good example of a language where different responses were given by 
different informants. The observations of three informants ( two male and one 
female ) are discussed in order t o illustrate the fact tha t there are some areas of 
t his study which are not clear cu t . The fact tha t there is one word for good and 
one for bad, however , was not disputed but the disagreements suggest that the 
ranges of meaning of these words are difficul t to capture. 
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Informant 1 gave the word coun for good and nappit.n for bad. These are the 
attributive forms of the words. Thus in almost all the examples it was acceptable 
to say coun X or nappun X. The exceptions were with the domains for child, 
health and clock. The word for child had a lexical restriction, so that instead of 
coun the word chakhan was used (also attributively). In the case of health and 
clock, good couldn't be used attributively at all. Its predicative use was acceptable 
with health but not clock (see examples (9) and (10) above). 
The second informant said that using cotha (the predicative form) sounded more 
formal than using coun, but that in some cases it was unacceptable to use the 
attributive form. In uerms of the range of meaning which cotha and nappuda 
have, this informant suggested the following points. Food can be described as good 
if it is both tasty and healthy, and it can also be used if you want to indicate 
that you like the food. The rnost common opposite of good food is not good food 
( anjoun umshi"k ). The phrase umshik-£ nappuda (bad food) can be used but this 
IS more restricted in the context that it can be used in. The food may, for 
example, be very greasy or bad for your health, or too salty. It is more common 
to say something like 'This food is salty, so is bad for you' rather than to say 
'This food is bad', but it is possible to use bad with food without any specific 
context. Thus there is no semantic restriction on its use. For the domain meat, 
good, bad and not good are not generally used, although there appears to be no 
semantic restriction on their use. Here we have a case where both good and bad 
refer to more specific contexts than other lexical items, thus it can be seen that 
while these are the basic words, they are not always the most general words 
available when used with a particular domain. If you do use good with meat then 
it refers to good quality meat, for example, which is used for special occas10ns. It 
IS less acceptable to say bad meat ( nappun kog£) as one would normally say 
spoiled or rotten meat. Interestingly, while not good can be used with meat 
(anJ·oun kog-i), it does not refer to the quality of the meat (as coun kogi does , but 
to the fact that the meat is not fresh. Thus even though not good tends t o be 
used more often than bad as the exact opposite of good, there are examples where 
it is not the exact opposite because it refers to a different aspect of evaluation. 
In Korean, one can say good m.usic, and this could mean 'I like this music ' or 
'This music is generally liked by people ' . Not good is used less often with music. 
It could be used in a context where the m-:.isic was keepjng people awake or 
generally disturbing others. Generally, however , it would be preferable to say noisv 
or strange music. One informant felt that bad mus£c (*nappun umak ) was 
unacceptable. It can t refer to the melody or to the quality of the music but can 
refer to the content - that is if words went with the music. Thus one can say 
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bad song and it could only refer to the words of the song. This suggests that 
often the idea of a 'bad nature' is bound up with things to do with people. Thus 
while it is people that write both the words and the music, it is only words that 
are capable of expressing something bad. Music, on the other hand, can evoke 
certain feelings and images but can not be said to be morally offensive. 
In addition to noting the domains which have some sort of restriction - be it 
lexical or semantic - operating on them, it is also revealing to list the domains 
which informants found to be particularly appropriate to use with good and bad. 
In this case the domains which were considered most appropriate were news, idea, 
habit and weather. These are the same domains which were suggested earlier as 
being neither inherently good nor inherently bad; or that are not supposed to be a 
certain way. That is~ news is news whether it is good or bad, but a school is (in 
a sense) only a school when it produces children able to read and write and live in 
societv. 
Like informant one, the second informant gave another lexical item to be used 
with child instead of coun - chakhan agi. This means beautiful or innocent child 
and also refers to good in the sense of inner goodness or purity. Thus coun agi 1s 
less often used by most Korean speakers although the meanings of the two words 
with this domain are, according to this informant, similar. Bad child can be used 
and this refers more to the child being naughty than to anything evil about the 
child. This is sirnilar to the use of paha with child in Finnish. 
A third informant said that Korean speakers rarely say good food. They usually 
say tasty or delicious food. However, the morphemes of the word for delicious are 
glossed as taste + good. Although this informant sometimes used anjoun ( not 
good) instead of napp·un (bad), he also said that any time you can use anjoun you 
can use nappun. He agreed with the second informant that good music could be 
subjective but that bad music could never be used~ for instance~ to refer to 
someone like Beethoven, even if you personally don't like Beethoven 's music. It 
can only refer to the words. A bad song can only mean there are obscene words 
in the song just as a bad book refers to the content of the book. 
To call a knife a good knife , one could only be referring to the shape of the 
knife - thus m this case it has a more restricted range of meaning than in English. 
Note also that it is not referring to the knife 's function. Also a good boat ( coun 
pae) refers to its shape as well as its facilities and its ability to run well. A 
watch or clock could be described as good as long as it goes well. One would 
rarely say bad watch unless one was always having to repair it. A bad mother is 
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seldom used; it . refers not to the woman 's capabilities as a mother but to t he fac t 
that she is a 'loose woman ' - anjoiLn ( not good) also means this. As with other 
languages, to say that a teacher is not good usually means that he or she doesn 't 
teach well ( and is thus the opposite of good teacher), but to say the teacher is bad 
refers to the person 's character rather than their function. 
Thus one can see from these examples that there are slight disagreements 
amongst informants. However the main area of disagreement comes in how much 
contextualization is needed before coiLn and nappiLn can be used and generally not 
in whether they can be used. All informants agreed, for example, that there was a 
lexical restriction operating on child. While there are greater restrictions of 
meaning on coiLn and napp·un than · on good and bad, as well as some lexical 
restrictions and the need for different constructions (predicative rather than 
attributive) to be used with certain domains, it is still the case that Korean has 
one basic word for good and one for bad that can be used over and over and while 
there may be slight differences 1n the range of meaning of these words, they 
essentially reflect language independent concepts GOOD and BAD. 
6.6. Tagalog 
In Tagalog ( four informants: two male, two female) one word, masama, can be 
used with a range of semantic domains. However, four words were give·n to cover 
the range of domains covered by good in English. These words are (1) mabait, (2 ) 
maganda, (3) mabuti and (4) magalang. In Tagalog-English dict ionaries, we find 
that these _words mean (1) Yirtuous, kind, friendly, (2) beautiful, (3) good , (4) 
courteous. ·respectful, well-mannered. Although only mabuti is said to correspond 
to the word good, both mabuti" and maganda (beautiful) were needed to account 
for the same range of domains as good. (In other words all domains could be 
accounted for without using either mabait or magalang.) 
There are , then, two words which are used as the opposite of masama (bad). 
However , it seems more plausible to suggest that mabut-i has a more rest rict ed 
range of meaning than good in English, rather than to suggest t hat there are two 
words in Tagalog which correspond to good. 
Although there is only one word corresponding to bad, as 1n other languages , t he 
more usual opposite of good is not good (h-indi" mabuti or hindi maganda ) or 
another lexical item (but not just one other lexical item, so that has no t been 
discussed here). Let us look first at the domains with which mabut-i can be used. 
1. a) mabuting loloki 
good man 
good man 
b) mosomang lalaki 
bod man 
bod man 
2 . a) mabuting titser/guro 
good teacher 
good teacher 
b) hindi mabuting 
neg good 
not good teacher 
c) masamang titser 
bod teacher 
bad teacher 
titser/guro 
teacher 
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To say that a teacher is good at his or her job (i.e. performs his or her 
function well) however, magalang is used. Mabut ,£ng t£tser refers to the fact that 
the teacher is a good person. Masamang t£tser refer to the fact that the teacher is 
a bad person. Thus 1n Tagalog, it seems that there may be a three way 
distinction to be made: good in nature ( mabuti) , good m function ( magalang) , 
and beautiful ( maganda). The interesting thing, however , 1s that all domains can 
be accounted for without using the word magalang (well-mannered, respectful) and 
on this basis I have excluded it from the discussion. 
3. a) mabuting ina 
4 . 
good mother 
good mother 
b)•mosomong 
bad 
bad mother 
a) mobut i ng 
good 
-good news 
b) masomong 
bod 
bod news 
ina 
mother 
ba I i to 
news 
bo I i to 
news 
5 . o) mobuting 
good 
poorclon 
school 
good school 
b) mosomong poorolan 
bod school 
bod school 
6 . o)?mobuting panahon 
good weather 
good weather 
b) masomong ponohon 
bad weather 
bad weather 
7 . o)•mobuting lupo 
good soi I 
good so i I 
b)•mosomang lupo 
bad soil 
bad soi I 
8. a) mobuting kalagoyan 
good health 
good health 
b) masamang kalogoyan 
bod hea I th 
bod health 
9. a) mabuting 
good 
ugal i 
habit 
good habit 
b) hindi mabuting 
neg good 
not good habit 
10.o) mabuting anak 
good chi Id 
good chi Id 
b) masomong 
bad 
bad chi Id 
onak 
chi Id 
ugal i 
habit 
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In example ( 10b) , a child would have to be really bad before masama could be 
used. 
There are a large number of domains where m.abut£ is not used (e.g example 7) , 
or at least where maganda is preferred ( e.g. example 6). 
11 .o) mogondong 
good 
panoginip 
dream 
good dream 
b) mosomang 
bod . 
bocL dream 
12.o) mogondong 
good 
good book 
ponoginip 
dream 
Ii bro 
book 
b) hindi mogondang I ibro 
neg good book 
not good book 
c)•masomong 
bod 
bad book 
Ii bro 
book 
13.a) mogondong owit 
beaut if u I song 
good song 
b) pongit awit 
ugly song 
bod song 
c)•mcsomong ow i t 
b.:id song 
bod song 
14.o) mogondong orow 
good day 
good day 
b)•mosomong arow 
bod day 
bod day 
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The fact that pangit ( ugly) 1s considered to be the opposite of maganda 
( beaut£ful) also suggests that if we want to nominate one word for good then it 
would not be maganda. We would expect the opposite of masama ( bad) to be 
the word for good. And this appears to be mabuti. In this case, however , we 
have to ask what it 1s about the meaning of ma.buti that makes it unacceptable 
with the domains book, song, soil, food, meat, smell, taste, knife, clock, boat , and 
cow , and at best questionable with the domains dav, weather, dream. 
It can be seen that, of these domains, there are a number which can not be used 
with bad in other languages and sometimes not with good. That is, the domain of 
food often has lexical restrictions and words such as delicious or tasty are used 
instead of good - this is also the case in Tagalog. One generally describes food as 
delicious (masarap) and meat as fresh (sariwa). The senses of smell and taste are 
also frequently found with lexical restrictions for both good and bad and, as we 
have noted, objects that are primarily functional are seldom combined with bad, 
because bad tends to refer primarily to the nature of something and not its 
function. This suggests that mabuti also refers primarily to nature rather than 
function. The competing lexeme, maganda, means. beautiful , and thus it seems 
that those domains which lend themsleves to this sort of description. such as song, 
dream and weather, are commonly used with rnaganda rather than ma.buti. Thus 
it is po.s_sible to argue that there is only one word for good in Tagalog and that 
that word is rnabut£. 
Masama 1s unacceptable with the following domains: mother, book, song, soil, 
day , meat , taste ( except taste in clothes etc.), knife, cloc~, and boat. Thus these 
follow closely those domains with which mabut£ can not be used. Thus it seems 
t hat mabut£ and masama are antonyms. It should be noted, however, that while 
masama can be used with the other domains, it is often the case that h£nd£ 
·mabut,i or another lexical item is preferred. That is , there are lexical preferences 
as well as lexical restrictions. For instance, the word mabait can also be used to 
describe the behaviour of people. Thus one can say maba£t na bata (good boy) as 
well as mabuting bata. There is a also a particular lexical item which encodes 
good smell, which is mabango ( therefore there would be no need to use mabuti 
here). 
Although maganda means beaut£ful, its meanmg 1s not restricted just to t his and 
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it . this fact that makes analysing the data difficult. IS For example, one informant 
suggested that you could say: 
15.a) Magando ang relo 
beautiful watch 
good watch 
b) Hindi magando ong relo 
neg beautiful watch 
not good watch 
c) Pongit ong relo 
ugly watch 
ugly watch 
In example (15a) maganda can refer to the fact that either the watch is beautiful 
to look at or to the fact that it works well or to both these things. Hindi 
maganda can also refer to both these things. Pangit, however, only refers to the 
appearance of the watch. On the other hand a school could also be described with 
the words maganda and pangit. In this case the informant felt that maganda 
referred only to the physical appearance of the school and that pangit could refer 
both to its physical appearance and also to the students and teachers in the 
school. 
In Tagalog, then, although tere are two words needed to account for all of the 
semantic domains, it seems that it can be said that only one, mabuti, reflects the 
concept GOOD. Although only one word, masama, was proposed as the word 
corresponding to bad, its range of use is limited. Thus both mabuti and masama 
cover a similar range of meaning. 
6. 7. Conclusion 
It can be seen from this chapter that, while we do have a number of consistent 
threads running throughout the data, the languages we have looked at are far from 
identical. While we can speculate on the extent to which good and bad can be 
considered lexical universals , the extent to which we have shared concepts GOOD 
and BAD, and the core meanings of these concepts, it can be seen that the 
addition of further information from other languages may well alter the perspective 
that has been taken here. As these words do seem to be lexical universals , 
however and as they are difficult to define, it is worth bearing in mind that they 
may well be semantic primitives. 
Thus , given the variations in the language families from which these examples are 
taken, it does seem that the similarities between the way these languages use 
words corresponding to good and bad are sufficient enough to allow us to propose 
that we do have shared concepts of GOOD and BAD. However while the 
115 
concepts of GOOD and BAD may be perfect antonyms, it seems that m English 
and many other languages , good has a wider range of meaning than bad which can 
be established by looking at its wider range of use. 
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Chapter 7 
True and Right 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the value-judgment terms true and 
n:ght with what has been said about the value-judgment term good. The 
assumption, made by language philosophers, that good reflects a concept that is 
shared by all people, appears to be born out by the data discussed in Chapter 6. 
However, the assumption that true also reflects a concept shared by all people is 
not born out by thE: data. True seems to be a concept which reflects specific 
cultural views. Like Hsu's point that "the concept of personality is an expression 
of the western ideal of individualisrn" (Hsu 1985:24), rather than a concept which 
is applicable to all people, so true seems to be a concept that is relevant primarily 
to western ways of thinking. 
From the five languages used in this sample (Thai, Korean, Indonesian, Finnish 
and Tagalog), we find that four of them do have two words which correspond 
roughly to true and r'i'ght. In Indonesian, however, one word is used which 
corresponds roughly to these two English words. Even within the four languages 
which do have two words, however, there is some evidence to suggest that, while 
the concepts which these words reflect are similar to the concepts which the 
English words reflect , they are not the same. Furthermore, although the languages 
which are discussed here do have words which are at least similar to true, there 
are also some languages which do not have a word for true. For example, in The 
Australian language, Dyirba.l, the word r;urjun is used to refer to speaking 
truthfully in the sense of fulfillin.g a promise ( e.g. you told us truly that you 'd 
come tomorrow ). It does not refer to facts, however , as true does. (Bob Dixon, 
personal communication) Unlike good and bad, then, true and r·i'ght should not be 
considered as candidates for lexical universals. 
It has been claimed by Frajzyngier that 
"truth is- the grammaticalized meaning of indicative sentences ... [ and 
that] truth is the unmarked meaning of a very large category of sentences 
in many languages. " (Frajzyngier 1985:244) 
Such a claim seems to assume that truth is a conceptual universal. The task here 
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is to ascertain the extent to which the adjectives true and right are candidates for 
lexical universals rather than to ascertain whether the noun truth reflects a 
conceptual universal. The difference between adjectives and nouns, however , 
becomes important when we look at languages where true occurs primarily as a 
noun and not as an adjective. In this section then, as well as illustrating the use 
of these words in English, we will compare the way good so · often occurs in 
languages as an adjective with the way that words corresponding to true occur 
frequently as nouns as well as adjectives. We can then look at the use of similar 
words in Finnish~ Tagalog, Thai, Korean and Indonesian. 
7 .1. The Use of True and Right in English 
In this section we discuss the use of the value-judgment terms true and r£ght in 
English. We also look at words that are related to these words, such are genuine, 
real and correct. These related words are not value-judgment terms, but they 
nevertheless help us to isolate the notions with which true and right are concerned. 
Hayakawa, for examples, notes that "right is largely interchangeable with correct , 
but often adds a hint of moral approval". (Hayakawa 1969:4) Thus ri"ght is a 
value-judgment term, while correct is not. 
We can find examples in English where the three value-judgment terms (good, 
right and true) can all be substituted for one another in the same syntatic frame. 
The meaning of the sentence does vary but unless we also give examples of 
sentences where one lexeme can not be substituted for another it is difficult to 
pinpoint . the exact nature of the differences 1D meaning. For example: 
1 . a) What he said was good. 
b) Whot he said was true. 
c) What he said was right. 
I suggest that to say something that is true is necessarily thought of as a good 
thing in some respect, but to say something good it does not necessarily have to 
be t rue. There 1s a slight problem here, because we could say 'good for whom? ' 
e.g. If someone tells another person that their mother is dead, this may be true, 
but it certainly isn't a good thing to happen~ nor is it necessarily a good thing to 
say ( at that particular time or to that particular person). 
However, it is a cultural rather than an absolute thing t o think of saymg what is 
true as a good thing, or at least to think that saying what is not t rue is a bad 
thing. For example: 
"The Anem [ of New Britain ] tell what Europeans call lies to selected 
groups for particular purposes; knowing not only that they are lying, but 
also that the people to whom they are lying know the fact of their lying 
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and the underlying motives. To a European, a lie 1s a lie; to the Anem, 
statements are made in context." (see Lutz 1985:73) 
The meaning of good is vaguer, or broader, than that of true. For example, 
what he said might have been funny and therefore good, but to say something 
funny or to make a joke it does not have to be true. In other words, so called, 
truth-conditions do not apply to all forms of speech acts, but only to statements. 
For example one could ask a question that was good because it highlighted a 
problem that had not been seen before but this could not be true or false just as 
jokes can not be true or false. 
While true is used when we are referring to what 1s said, right is used when we 
are referring to what is done; that is, with actions. However as saying something 
is a type of doing something, right can also be used to refer to what is said. 
However, as we shall see, this is not the only difference. In English, true tends to 
be concerned with facts and beliefs, while right tends to be concerned with 
opinions and rules - social, moral and legal. Thus we can speak of true facts but 
not r'£ght facts, right opini·ons but not true opinions. If this is the case then we 
can see why true is related to speech and right is related to actions. That is, if 
true is related to reality (facts) then we can only say what reality is. In doing 
something it becomes reality, if you like, but to speak of doing true things 
suggests that we 're constantly monitoring everything we do. 
. These words are not always able to be used in exactly the same syntactic frame. 
One obvious point is that right can only be used with the definite article whereas 
true can be used with either the definite or indefinite article. Furthermore, right 
can not take a comparative form, as both good and, to a lesser extent, true can. 
That is, true can take the comparative in a negative sentence. The superlative 
seems to be acceptable in a particular context, 1.e. in positive sentences about 
novels , indicating perhaps that they are 'true to life'. For example Rusiecki gives 
1he following example taken from a survey of English Usage by the University 
College, London: "This was one of the truest novels I'd ever read". (Rusiecki 
1985:138) Similarly, a quote from The New York Times on the inside cover of a 
1956 edition of Ernest Hemingway 's novel For Whom The Bell Tolls says: "This 
is the best book Ernest Hemingway has written, the fullest, the deepest , the 
truest". 
The fact that right can only be used with a definite article suggests that there is 
only one right answer but several possible true or good answers. Given that right 
is concerned with opinions and true with facts, this certainly seems odd, and it is 
such apparent contradictions that are perhaps responsible for some overlap in the 
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meaning of the words. Nevertheless, I think we can speculate on why this is so 
and, therefore, move nearer to understanding the meaning of these words. The 
difference between good and right is pointed out in the following discussion of these 
terms: 
"No one with the least familiarity with their uses could hold that 'right' 
and 'good', for example, n1ean the same in any of their contexts. To 
begin with, there are important differences in their grammatical behaviour. 
We talk of a 'a good X' but of 'the right X'; and in general we think it 
quite natural to speak of there being a large number of good X's, but odd 
(in most contexts) to speak of their being a large number of right X's -
though of course we may speak of a large number of X ' s that a.re quite 
all right. It is not, therefore, surprising that 'right' has in modern 
English no comparative and superlatjve, whereas 'good' has. There are 
also many nouns which 'good' can qualify, and 'right' cannot , and vice 
versa. Thus we can speak of 'good art', but not of 'right art', and of 
'good batting\ but not of 'right batting'; and on the other hand, we can 
say 'You didn't play the right note', but 'good' could not be substituted." 
( Hare 1961: 151-152) 
As noted above, true can take the comparative 1n a negative sentence, thus we 
can say (2a) but not (2b). 
2. a) A truer word was never spoken. 
b)•A righter word was never spoken. 
The fact that we say a true story or the true story, suggests that just as we can 
have a number of good Xs, we can have a number of true Xs. This seems 
counter intuitive at first, but I think it can be shown that it is the case because, 
just as people may differ about the qualities that go to make a good X, so true is 
related, - not to individual opinion, as good and ri"ght can be, but certainly to 
different beliefs, which also have as strong a subjective element as op1n10ns. 
Beliefs, however, tend to be held by groups of people, whereas opinions are held by 
individuals. The connection between true and beliefs is also made by Ross and by 
Russell, as the following quotations indicate: 
"But beljefs have the characteristics ... of being true or false, of resting 
on knowledge or of being the product of wishes, hopes and fears." (Ross 
1952:172) 
"'Truth', we have agreed, 1s a property primarily of beliefs." (Russell 
1940:236) 
We have already said that ri"ght is related to op1n1ons and true to facts. I 
suggest that beliefs are 1n fact related to reality. Facts and beliefs can therefore be 
grouped together, but we could say that beliefs are related to a different sort of 
reality. For example, in terms of religion , different groups of people believe 
different things; these beliefs are very strong and form part of the way they view 
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reality. Support for the view that true 1s concerned with beliefs comes from 
expressions such as true beliefs but not right beliefs or even good beliefs. 
The reason that it strikes me, initially, as counter intuitive to say that we have 
only one 'right ' but several alternative 'trues ' is that true is related to truth , and 
while we can debate whether something is right or wrong on the basis of our 
opinions e.g. whether it is right to have nuclear power stations, and can accept 
that two people differ about whether they think it 's right or wrong on the basis of 
how they feel about this subject, we would not debate whether or not something 
was true on the basis of how we felt , rather we would go and find out. 
Furthermore, when deciding on what is n:ght and allowing for different opinions, 
we can often see two sides to the argument and thus can understand why other 
people see it the other way. However, if person A believes in God and person B 
does not , while it is simple enough for the two people to tolerate and even accept 
the other person's position, it is nearly impossible to really understand how they 
can hold something to be true ( and real) that you do not. For this reason I think 
we can debate what is right but not what is true. At the same time, however , 
what is true for one person isn't necessarily true for another. 
If we go back to examples l(a), (b), and (c) it can be seen that if we change 
the syntactic frame we have more difficulty in using each of the words we are 
interested in, and, further, that we can interpret the grammatically acceptable 
sentence differently. 
3. a)•He said the good thing. 
b) - He said the right thing. 
c)?He said the true thing. 
Example 3(a) would be acceptable if the good thing was changed to a good 
thing suggesting, in this example , that there is more than one good thing that 
could be said. Of course, good thing can be used with the definite article in t he 
following example: 
3. d) The good thing about John is that he's never late . 
Example (3c) is at best dubious because true can only be used attribut ively when 
it means something like real or genume ( thus clearly illustrating t he rela tionship 
between true and reality). This will be discussed below. Perhaps the mos t 
interesting example is (3b), because, although it is a perfectly acceptable English 
sentence, it doesn t necessarily mean the same thing as example (le). 
1 . c) What he said was right. 
In example (le) true could be substituted for right and it would be difficult t o 
distinguish their meamng. However , in ( 3b) to say the ri·ght th-ing is more likely 
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to be interpreted as saying the appropriate thing for the occasion than saying what 
is true. Thus someone who always 'says the right thing' may have the reputation 
of flattering other people, rather than saying what is true. For example, by telling 
someone how nice they look, one could be saying the right thing but not 
necessarily being totally honest. 
If we change the definite article to indefinite 1n example (3) we have the 
following: 
4 . a) He said a good thing. 
b)•He said a right thing. 
c)?He said a true thing. 
We find, for the reasons put forward earlier, that (b) and ( c) are less than 
acceptable; (b) is ungrammatical because right can not be used with an indefinite 
article, and ( c) is dubious because true is only used attributively when it has the 
restricted, but related, meaning of real. 
Someone who always 'says the right thing', it was noted, did not always tell the 
truth, thus lending weight to the idea that right is concerned with rules or 
appropriate behaviour. In contrast, if someone is said to always 'do the right 
thing' then we would accept that this is exactly what he does. In other words 
there is a difference between saying the right thing and doing the right thing. To 
say the right thing may refer to what 1s appropriate rather than what is morally 
right. In the following examples it can be seen that neither good nor true are 
acceptable, but the grounds on which they are unacceptable differ. 
5 . a)•He did the good thing. 
b }-· He did the right thing. 
c)•He did the true thing. 
Note that if we change the article from definite to indefinite good is acceptable in 
the sentence, presumably because, just as there is more than one good thirrg that 
could be said, there is more than one good thing that could be done. True, 
however, remains unacceptable. 
6 . a) He dld a good thing . 
b)•He did a true thing. 
If we change the syntactic frame we see that while good and r{ght can be used 
wi th actions , true can not because true is concerned with real£ty and be. It . IS 
bel£e f s that this is the case. 
7. a) What he did was good. 
b) What he did was right. 
c)•Whot he did was true. 
True 1s used only when referring to what has been said, as rn the examples 
above , and in t he following example. 
8. a) He told us a good story. 
b) He told us a true story. 
122 
If we use a definite article in these sentences the emphasis changes from being on 
either the adjective or noun to being only on the adjective. 
9 . a) He told us the good story. 
b) He told us the true story. 
ln other words, in example (9a) it is only the adjective that is being contrasted 
(either good or bad; either true or false) whereas in (8) it could be the adjective 
(either good or bad) or the noun ( story or song - except that you sing songs and 
tell stories). Example (9a) may suggest, for example, that of the stories the 
listeners know , they all agree that there is one that is particularly good in relation 
to the others. Example (9b) suggests that either it is the true story of something 
that the listeners have some knowledge about, e.g. He told us the true story of 
Florence Nightingale, or it is the truth about something that has happened which 
has previously been kept secret, e.g. He told us the true story of his birth. In 
both (a) and (b) there lS the assumption that the listeners had some prior 
knowledge . another, while example (8) there such 1n one way or 1n lS no 
assum.ption. 
In examples (8) and (9) true was used attributively. There appears to be no 
change in meaning if it is used predicatively in this context but, while (9c) sounds 
perfectly acceptable, ( 8c) sounds a little less so. 
8 . c)?A story he told us was true. 
9 . c) )he story he told us was true. 
Example (8c) would be more acceptable if it read: 
8 . d) One of the stories he told us was true. 
Aside from the fact that stories are told and therefore refer to what bas been 
said, it appears that it is possible to use true attributively with story when the 
meaning of true is very close to genuine or real and it is when it has this meaning 
that true can be used attributively (remember however that one still can not speak 
of true actions because actions are already real). 
10. a) He's a true friend . 
b) He's a real friend . 
c) He's o geed friend . 
Note that right can not be used in this way. 
10 . d)•He's a right friend. 
There are further constraints on the use of true. 
11. a) He was the right man for the job. 
b)•He was the true man for the job. 
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Example (llb) is unacceptable even though we can say: 
12 . a) He was a true man. 
The reason for this seems to be because if we are saying that, when used 
attributively, the meaning of true is si1nilar to that of real then son1ething is 
either real or not. It does not depend on its purpose. But things may be r£ght 
for a particular purpose just as they can be good for a particular purpose. This 
also seems to be the reason why we can debate such things as whether or not it is 
right to have nuclear power stations, for it may depend on what purpose they 
have whether someone sees them as right or wrong. 
lt can be seen, then, that true can only refer to what has been said when it is 
used predicatively. It can also have a meaning similar to real and in this case it 
can be used attributively and does not have to refer only to what has been said 
(but it can not refer to actions). This is clearly because real does not have to 
refer only to what has been said. 
We can also note that while something can be morally right or morally good, we 
can not say that something is morally true. Further, while we can say that 
something 1s good for X or ri"ght for X we can not say something is true for X 
( note that this is different from being true of ,X). 
One word that we often think of as a synonym for r£ght in English 1s correct. 
13. a) He gave the right answer. 
b) He gave the correct answer. 
Correct could be substituted for right 1n most of the examples given so far with 
little or no change in their meaning. However , as we noted earlier , correct does 
not have a moral aspect to its rnean1ng. This can be seen m the following 
example. 
the same. 
While correct can be substituted for right the meaning is not always 
18. a) What he did was right. 
b) What he did was correct. 
"Example (18 b) suggests that according to certain rules he did the right thing, 
but it might not have been objectively right , or morally right; it might not have 
been t he best thing to do. For example, if a cafe displays a sign saying that only 
properly attired customers will be served then it may be the correct thing to turn 
away a weather-beaten, unkempt tramp but it may not be morally right. 
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Given the complexity of the relationship between the meanings of good, true and 
right it has been necessary to try to avoid usmg examples with definite and 
indefinite articles when asking informants for words which correspond to these 
value-judgment terms. It has also been necessary to avoid the attributive use of 
these terms so that the distinction is made between their use to describe what has 
been said and what has been done rather than their similarity to terms such as 
real and correct. Thus informants were asked to translate sentences in the 
following syntactic frames: 'What he said was X' and 'What he did was X'. Using 
these frames it was possible to establish whether words which informants said 
corresponded to true and right were used with speech or actions or both. 
7 .2. Adjectives and Nouns 
One of the difficulties of comparing true and right across languages is that they 
do not always occur as adjectives. This contrasts with the way that good 
generally occurs as an adjective, even in languages with a very small adjective 
class. 
Let us look briefly at what has been said about the differences between nouns 
and adjectives. We noted earlier that there was a relationship between the noun 
goodness and the adjective good. What does this difference in the part of speech 
indicate? vVierzbicka has said that: 
" .. .if one 'quality concept' acquires two designations, one nominal and 
one adjectival, it is not because the part-of-speech status doesn 't matter, 
semantically, but because the concept in question spljts into two. related, 
- but not identical concepts, one of which is semantically more suited to 
· being designated by a noun than by an adjective." (Wierzbicka 1986:355) 
When we look at goodness and good , for example , it seems plausible that the 
notion of nature applies to both the noun and the adjective but that for 
goodness , nature is limited to things closely associa ted with people. Wierzbicka 
also makes the point that, in terms of human characteristics, an adjective indicates 
a description rather than something permanent and important and that: 
"a description i1nplies the presence of a number of characteristics, all on 
the same level of importance." (Wierzbicka 1986:358) 
The notion of a description, which includes a number of characteristics , also 
applies to words such as good and true and r£ght. Good, for example, can refer to 
both nature and function in English, and words which correspond to good m 
other languages can refer to beauty as well as nature. Several characteristics are 
also associated with true and with right. As we have seen, true is concerned both 
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with facts and beliefs and right is concerned with op1n10ns and rules. Where 
languages employ a noun truth rather than an adjective true, then, we assume 
there is some difference in the concept which the word reflects in that it does no t 
reflect a set of features. 
In addition to the existence of words corresponding to good, in the languages 
surveyed in Chapter 6, we can find examples from secondary sources which fur t her 
support the claim that words reflecting a shared concept GOOD have widespread 
distribution throughout the world's languages and that they generally occur as 
adjectives. We have already noted Dixon 's point that the semantic content of 
adjectives is "fairly constant from language to language". He says, for example, 
that: 
"Languages that have 
considerable similarity in 
adjectives." (Dixon 1982:3) 
only 
the 
a limited class of 
concepts that are 
adjectives show 
expressed though 
GOOD is one concept which is generally expressed through adjectives. But what do 
we do when there doesn't appear to be an adjective which reflects this concept and 
what do we do about languages which do not draw a clear distinction between 
either nouns and adjectives or verbs and adjectives? Little was said about the fact 
that in some of the languages surveyed in Chapter 6 the words for good and bad 
were stative verbs, butr as we saw in Chinese, for example, there was no difficulty 
in comparing the attributive use of good from English into Chinese. In fact , as 
Lyons has pointed out, there are greater similarities between adjectives and stative 
ver-bs than between stative and action verbs: 
"In general treatments of the 'parts of speech ', 'adjectives ' are frequently 
said to denote 'qualities ', and 'verbs ' are classified... as eit her 'stative ' or 
'action ' (according to whether they denote a 'state ' or an 'act ion ') . From 
this point of view , it is clear that 'adjectives ' and 'stative verbs ' are more 
similar than are 'stative ' and 'action verbs ' ." (Lyons 1966:221 ) 
Wierzbicka deals with the problem posed by languages which do not have clear 
adjective classes as follows: 
"The difference m the semantic st ructure between 
'adjectives can be expected to be reflected somewhere in 
behaviour of the two hypothetical classes, so that the 
meaning will be reflected in some aspects of the grammatical 
r.ot in the grammatical form. " (Wierzbicka 1986:381) 
'nouns' and 
the syntact ic 
difference In 
behaviour , if 
This is born out by the data. That IS , although differences m the part of speech 
are important and reflect differences In the meanings of words , if t he syn tactic 
behaviour is similar then there is some basis for saying that these words reflect 
shared concepts. However if adjectives form a large class m a particular language. 
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and that language expresses a word which 1s expressed by an adjective in some 
languages, as a noun, then presumably there is a semantic reason for this. We 
would therefore hesitate to say that words which varied in the part of speech to 
which they belong reflected exactly the same concept if there are no grammatical 
grounds for this difference. 
To illustrate the widespread distribution of words which correspond to good and 
bad throughout the world's languages let us look at some examples from language 
families which were not included in the survey in Chapter 6. It wasn't always 
clear from the sources what part of speech these words belong to, but where this 
information is known, it provides supporting evidence for the fact that good 
generally occurs as an adjective. 
In Tagalog and Indonesian there are separate lexical items which correspond to 
beautiful which are used with a number of domains in the way that good can be 
used in English. In some languages, while there is only one word corresponding to 
good, this has aspects of nature and beauty rather than nature and function as 
good does in English. For example, Boas notes of the American Indian language, 
Takelma, that: 
"A considerable number of adjectives are primitive in form, i.e. not 
capable of being derived from simpler nominal or verbal stems. Such are 
... dii - good, beautiful." (Boas 1922:259) 
On the other hand the 'word' corresponding to bad in Takelma is a suffix - ts!. 
Here, then, we have an example of words which correspond to good and bad being 
syn tactically asymmetrical. 
Another Mayan language (in addition to Mam, which we looked at earlier) which 
has a word corresponding to good is Jacaltec. According to Day c'ul (good) is a 
stative verb. (Day 1973~77) Carib , a language spoken by South American Indians 
in Guiana, is said to have a small adjective class which includes words which 
correspond to good (yu?pa) and bad (ya?wa:rne). (Hoff 1968:260) 
On the other hand, Xhosa has an adjective corresponding to bad, but not to 
good. 
"Xhosa has 'pretty /beautiful' and 'bad/ugly' ... but the adjective class 
has no term glossed simply 'good'." (Dixon 1982:7) 
However, Xhosa does have a derived adjective (lung-ile), derived from the verb 
lunga which corresponds to good, right, ready. (McLaren 1963) Another source 
defines lungile as an adjective meaning good quality - both material and moral. 
(Stewart 1969) 
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Hausa also has an adjective for bad: mugu (masc.L mugunya (fem.) and miyagu 
(pl.). According to Taylor, in Hausa: 
"Adjectives proper are either simple or compound. 
are comparatively few." (Taylor 1959:47) 
Simple Adjectives 
In Hausa, bad is a simple adjective. However, adjectives can also be formed in 
several different ways. Thus the noun goodness (kyau) becomes the adjective good 
(da kyau). Thus the fact that good does not occur as an adjective is not, of 
itself, sufficient to say that there is no shared concept GOOD. The fact remains, 
however, that words corresponding to good occur overwhelmingly 1n the adjective 
class, even when this class is very small. But when there are no adjectives, or 1n 
the rare case when one of the few adjectives is not good there is still evidence to 
suggest that there is some lexicalization of a shared concept GOOD which centres 
on the meaning of nature. 
Weln1ers notes that: 
"In alrnost all Niger-Congo languages which have a class of adjectives, 
the class is rather small, and many concepts expressed by adjectives in 
European languages are expressed by other kinds of constructions using 
nouns or verbs or both." (Welmers 1973:250) 
In Yoruba, for example, 
"qualificative attributives ... are reduplicated forms derived from verbs 
or also used as verbs. This, however, is only one aspect of the use of 
reduplicated forms, and such forms cannot simply be called adjectives." 
(Welmers 1973:257) 
The word corresponding to good (daadaa) is reduplicated in this way. We would 
not , however , want to say that there was no word in Yoruba which reflected the 
concept GOOD. 
Another Niger-Congo language, Igbo, has both good and bad as adject1ves. Some 
Bantu languages, says Welmers , do not have adjectives but as we see in the Bantu 
language, LoNkundo, there are words for goodness and badness - b l ' tsi and bobe 
respectively. 
"These nouns take the noun prefix of the head noun m the 
construction if th at noun is in class 2 or 6 (for both of which the prefix 
is /La- / ). They nevertheless remain independent nouns, with which they 
must be in an associative construction , but they enter into a form of 
concord with the head noun. Thus: 
bonto bo 
bona ba 
yomba yo 
/ 
b~l~tsi good people 
/ bobe bad children 
; . b~l.~ts, a good thing (abstract) 
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it 1s clear and highly important that the final words in the phrases cited 
above are nouns, and not adjectives as the English translations might 
suggest. The formula for all of them is 'a thing associated with a 
quality', and the words expressing quality are nouns." ( Welmers 1973:27 4) 
Thus although b.Jl:5ts£ differs from good in that one is a noun and the other is 
an adjective, semantically they are similar to the extent that they can both be 
used to express a quality. And further, as Wierzbicka suggests, the behaviour of 
the noun and the adjective is similar, thus suggesting similarity of meaning. 
We have seen then from these few American Indian and African languages that 
firstly, words corresponding to good are generally adjectives, secondly, that although 
it i~ sometimes a noun, there are arguments in favour of saying that these nouns 
reflect the concept GOOD. 
A distinction should be drawn between languages which have small or no 
adjective classes ( and which do not therefore include good and true) and those 
languages which have a large number of adjectives but where good is an adjective 
and true is a noun. 
Unlike GOOD, which seems to be a language independent concept, TRUE seems 
to be culture specific. Thus while the English word true has similarities with 
words 1n other languages, it is difficult to find correspondences that have exactly 
the same range of meaning or a stable, core meaning. The fact that true and 
r£ght overlap 1n Engiish itself suggests that true is not a clearly delimit ed concept. 
If we look at evidence from American Indian languages we find interesting 
similarities and differences there too. Commenting on words for real, true and 
genuine in American Indian languages late last century , Gatschet has said: 
"The terms for 'true' or 'genuine ' in most of the idioms mentioned are 
simultaneously adjectives and adverbs and curiously enough, with a slight 
change in pronunciation or suffixation they also mean 'man ' or 'Indian ' . 
The two words chiefly used by [ the Algonquians ], leni... and inini ... 
both stand for 'man ' and 'genuine ' with their various synonyms ... Of the 
Delaware dialects ... lenno ... is 'man, 'male ', 'Indian' and lenni 'genuine·, 
'pure ', ' real' 'original ' . 
In Mohawk ... the term owe, 'true' corresponds to leni and inini of 
Algonquian dialects, but it also includes permanence, stability , perpetuity, 
immutability and is used adverbially as well. 
[The Kiowa] ... do not use a special word to express 'real ', 'principal ' 
or ' true but they append a suffix -hi ... for the purpose. 
the Selish dialect ... in British Columbia, expresses the idea of ' real ' or 
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'genuine ' by the suffix - o"e and the Kwakiutl of British Columbia, by 
-kyao. These terms show no affinity , however , with the word for 'man ' or 
'Indian ' ." (Gatschet 1899:159-161) 
The diversity illustrated here is paralleled when we compare true and r·ight in 
English with true and right in other languages. That is, as we noted in t he 
previous section, there are different aspects to the meanings of these words - some 
of which occur in other languages. The grouping of these aspects ciiffer, however , 
and, as in these American Indian languages, the part of speech to which they 
belong also differ. Thus although there is similarity in the ideas expressed , we do 
not find sufficient overlap to say that these words reflect a shared concept. 
7 .3. True and Right in Other Languages 
The languages used to collect information on words corresponding to true and 
r£ght are Finnish, Tagalog, Thai, Korean and Indonesian. These languages were 
chosen after a pilot study which tested the existence of words similar to true and 
right in 10 of the 15 languages studied in Chapter 6. Finnish, Tagalog and Thai 
were chosen, in part, because they were the languages which exhibited the greatest 
differences from other languages in respect of good and bad. Thai and Korean 
were chosen as examples of languages where true was used as a noun rather than 
an adjective. Indonesian was chosen because it was the only example of a 
language where the same word could be used to correspond roughly to true and 
right. These languages were also chosen on the basis of the availability of 
informants. and their willingness to spend time discussing their language. Two 
informants were used from each language, except Indonesian, where : three 
informants were used. 
To gather information on words corresponding to true and r-ight in Finnish, 
Tagalog , Thai , Korean and Indonesian , informants were first asked to translate four 
sentences from English which tested whether a word corresponding t o true could 
only be used with what was said and whether a word corresponding to r·ight could 
be used both with what was said and what was done. The English sen tences used 
were the following. 
1 . What he said was true. 
2. ?What he did was true. 
3 . \Yhot he said was right . 
4. What he did was right. 
ln Finnish, the adjective totta corresponds to true and the adject ive oi.kei n 
corresponds to r·i"ght. Like the English word true , totta could only be used with 
what was said, and , like the English word right , oi.kein could be used with what 
was said and what was done. 
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, . Mi to han sanoi ol i totta. 
What he said was true. 
2. ?Mi ta hon teki ol i totta. 
What he did was true . 
3 . Mi to hon sanoi ol i oikein. 
What he said was right. 
4. Mi ta hon teki oi I oikein . 
What he did was right. 
In Tagalog the word corresponding to true 1s totoo and the word corresponding 
to r-ight is tarna. Thus: 
1. Ang sinabi niya ang totoo. 
What he said was true. 
2.• Ang ginowo niya ong totoo. 
What he d:d was true . 
3. Ang sinabi niya any tomo. 
What he said was right. 
4. Ang ginawo niya any tama. 
What he did was right. 
Korean follows the same pattern. The word for true 1s sashil , which 1s a noun, 
and the word for right is oltha, which is a stative verb. 
1 . ku-ga molhon kos-un soshir-i-ot-to. 
What he said was true . 
2. •ku-go hon ir-un sa~hiri-i-ot-ta. 
What he did was true. 
3. ku-go molhon kos-un or-at-ta. 
What he said was right. 
4. ku-ga hon ir-un or-at-to. 
What he did woe right. 
In addition to the fact that sashil is a noun, which suggests some difference in the 
range of meaning between true and sashil, there is a difference in the range of 
meaning of oltha and right. That is, in English, the meaning of n:ght includes the 
aspects of morally right and of correct. In Korean, however , olta (or-at-ta) only 
has a moral sense in these sentences. To indicate the meaning of correct 1n 
example (3) one would have to use the word correct (mas-at-ta) . Furthermore, 1n 
example ( 4) mas-at-ta would be unacceptable - indicating that one can not do 
something correct but only say something correct. 
Thai also distinguishes between saying what is true ( cilJ) and doing what 1s right 
( thuuk) , which can be seen in the following examples: 
1 . s i lJ th ii kho·N phuut pen c il) 
Whet he said was true. 
2 . ?si0 thi i khaw thorn pen ciQ 
What he did was true. 
3 . khow phuut thuuk. 
What he soid was right. 
4 . khcw t ham t huuk. 
What he did was right . 
In example ( 3) , thuuk (right ) must refer to the sense of correct, rather than 
morally right. 
Thus, in each of these languages a distinc t ion 1s drawn between saying what 1s 
true and doing what is right. 
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In Indonesian, we find that one word, benar, can be used in all four sentences. 
Thus: 
1 . Apo yang telah dia kotakon odalah benor. 
What he said was true. 
2. Apa yon telah dio lokukon odoloh benor. 
What he did was true. 
3. Apo yang teloh dia katokon odoloh benar. 
What he said was right . 
4 . Apo yang teloh dia lakukon odoloh benor . 
What he did was right . 
Benar is used to say something true and to do something true, to say something 
right and to do something right. Different informants gave different sentence 
constructions, but all said that benar would be used in each sentence. For 
example: 
1a. Apo yang dikatokannyo odolah benor. 
What he said was true/r ight. 
2a. Apo yang di lakukonnyo adaloh benar. 
What he did was true/right . 
and 
1b. Benar, apo yang teloh dio katokan. 
What he said was true/right. 
2b . Benar, apa yang telah dio lakukan. 
What he did was true/right. 
The word betul can also be used 1n examples (1) and (3), but this means that 
what was said was correct. 
On the basis of this evidence alone, we would not want to say that true and 
right reflect language independent concepts. In addition to testing whether these 
languages have words, corresponding to true , which can only be used with what 1s 
said, we can also test whether a word which is said to correspond to true is 
concerned with facts and whether a word which is said to correspond to right 1s 
concerned with opinions. 
In order to test whether totta, totoo, sashi"L, CZ 1) and benar are concerned with 
facts and whether oikein , tama, olta , thuuk and benar are concerned with opinions, 
the following sentences were used. 
1 . It is right to give money to the poor . 
2. I t is not right to hit children . 
3 . It i s not right to smoke cigarettes. 
4. I t is right to obey your parents . 
5. It is not right to te I I Ii es . 
Each of these sentences is concerned with op1n10n rather than fact, and, except for 
sentence (3), there is a moral element involved. If we substitute true for right in 
each of these sentences, they become unacceptable. 
1 . •It is true to give money to the poor . 
2. •It is not true to hit children. 
3 . •It IS not true to smoke c i garettes . 
4 . •It is not true to obey your parents. 
5 . •It is not true to t e I I Ii es . 
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What we want to see, then, 1s whether the words corresponding to right in 
Finnish, Tagalog, Korean, Thai and Indonesian are acceptable in these sentences, 
and whether the words corresponding to tru.e are unacceptable. 
In Finnish we find that oikein (right) would be used in all of these sentences 
whereas totta (true) would be unacceptable. In Finnish, then, there is a correlation 
between aikein and opinions and not between totta and opinions. 
In Tagalog, tarna ( r·ight) is used in each of the sentences, but totoo ( tru.e) is 
unacceptable. In sentence (3), however, it would be better to say masama (bad), 
than to negate tama because smoking cigarettes does not harm other people. This 
suggests that tama is concerned primarily with a moral element and has a 
narrower range of meaning than right does in English. 
In Korean, olta (right) is used in each of these sentences and sashil ( tru.e) is 
unacceptable. In Thai thu.uk ( rt"ght) is used, but ci') can not be used. In 
Finnish, Tagalog, Korean and Thai, therefore, the word corresponding to true can 
not be used for opinions. 
Indonesian informants, however, gave less consistent information. Three 
informants gave benar (true/r£ght), betul (correct), bai'k (good), and tepat (exact, 
appropr-iate) as possible substitutes for r£ght in sentences 1-5. For sentence (1) (It 
is right to g1ve money to the poor.), informant 1 said benar should be used and 
that betul (correct) sounded od9; informant 2 said benar and ba£k (good) were 
acceptable, but that the best word was tepat ( appropr£ate); informant 3 suggested 
only tepat. 
For sentence 2 (It is not right to hit children), each of the informants said that 
benar was the right word to use, but informant 2 said that ba£k (good) could also 
be used. For sentence 3 (It is not right to smoke cigarettes), only informant 3 
accepted benar; informants 1 and 2 said that ba£k would be used and not benar 
because the sentence is concerned with a oerson's health and not a moral issue. In 
. 
this sense, the Tagalog word tama is similar to benar. 
For sentence 4 (It is right to obey your parents) informants 1 and 2 said that 
both ba£k (good), and benar (true/r£ght) were acceptable, but that betul (correct ) 
was unacceptable. Informant 3, on the other hand, said that betul was the 
appropriate word. 
For sentence 5 (It is not right to tell lies), all three informants said that benar 
was acceptable· informants 1 and 2 said that ba£k was also acceptable. This 
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sentence has the strongest moral implication and thus it seems that benar is best 
used in such situations. 
It can be seen, then, that there is some disagreement about using benar and 
betul , and that in certain cases there is a tendency to use baik as well as benar. 
However, for sentences 6-10, which are concerned with facts , baik was never 
suggested instead of benar, although betul could also be used (because it means 
correct). 
6. It is true that the sun comes up in the morning. 
7 . I t is true that J. F . Kennedy died in 1963. 
8. I t is true that people die i f they never eat any food. 
9 . 1 t i s true that in summer i t is hotter t:ian in winter. 
10 . 1 t is true that fish Ii ve in wot er. 
If we substitute r·ight for tr"..Le in these sentences, they would not be completely 
acceptable. The reason that they are partially acceptable is because, in English, 
right can also be used to mean correct , and on this reading they are not totally 
wrong. However, if we changed the sentences to 'It is right to say X', they would 
be acceptable. 
6. ?It is right that the sun comes up in the morning. 
7 . ?It IS right that J. F. Kennedy died in 1963 . 
8. ?It is right that people die if they never eat any food. 
9. ?It is right that in summer it is hotter than in winter. 
10.?It is right that fish Ii ve in water. 
In this second set of sentences we find that the Finnish word totta 1s like true, 
in that totta would be used in each of them but oikein would not. 
In Tagalog totoo true would be used, but not tama ( unless it was used m the 
sense of correct). 
In Korean sash£l (true) would be used whereas the acceptability of olta would be 
doubtful. Like English, however, if the word for correct (mat-ta ) was used, it 
would be acceptable. Furthermore, sashil is a noun, rather than an adjective, 
suggesting that it reflect a slightly different concept from true. 
In Thai, c1.1J 1s also a noun. It can be used 1n each of these sentences. Thuuk , 
on the other hand, could not. 
In Indonesian informants disagreed between the acceptability of benar and betul. 
One informant said that betul was acceptable for each of the sentences, and that 
benar was unacceptable. A second informant said that benar was acceotable for 
each of them and a third thought that benar and betul were acceptable for 
sentences (6) and (9) and that betul was acceptable for (7), (8) and (10). It 
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seems that the discrepancy here results from wanting to say that these things are 
facts and therefore, what is being said is correct. However, the fact that benar 
was considered unacceptable at all suggests that this word does not relate to facts 
in the way that true does in English. 
There does seem to be similarity of meaning between words corresponding to true 
and right across languages, therefore, but the similarity is insufficient to persuade 
us that either true or right are language universals. They therefore appear to 
reflect language specific rather than language independent concepts. 
One can see from these examples that true and right can not be compared as 
easily from one language to another as good and bad and further that although 
there are similarities between words in other languages that could be said to 
correspond to these English words, in fact their range of use and meaning is 
sufficiently different that we would say that these words reflect concepts which are 
culture specific. Before we can say that words reflect a shared concept we must 
establish whether they have the same (or nearly the same) range of meaning by 
looking at the way they are used. 
The point of looking at true and right has been to compare them with good. All 
three are value-judgment terms , worthy of discussion by linguists and philosophers. 
Of these three, however , it can be seen that good is by far the most basic, the 
most simple, because it is a word which reflects a concept that is shared by many 
other languages. The concepts reflected by the words true and right in English, 
do not seem to be shared exactly b'y other languages, although there are clearly 
aspects of the meaning of these words that are found in other languages. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
The task of this thesis has been to establish the extent to which the value-
judgment terms good , bad, right and true can be considered lexical universals. We 
can conclude from this study that both good and bad are candidates for lexical 
universals. This suggests that these words reflect concepts which are language 
independent. However, true and right can not be considered as lexical universals. 
Rather, they reflect concepts which are culture specific. 
ln the process of establishing that good and bad were possible lexical universals , 
it was noted that good, in English, had a wider range of use and range of meaning 
than bad. This was thought to result from the fact that the meaning of good was 
concerned with the notions of nature and function, while the meaning of bad was 
concerned primarily with nature. This distinction is also made in many other 
languages. 
languages. 
The notion of function , however. is not necessarily relevant to all 
The range of use of good and bad - established by testing whet her each word 
~ . 
could be used in conjunction with a set of different semantic domains - was · not 
identical across languages. vVords corresponding to good, however , exhibited less 
variation in their range of use than did words corresponding to bad. Lexical 
rest rictions accounted for some differences 1n the range of use of these words. 
However, following Wittgenstein 's suggestion to look at the use of a word in order 
to establish its meaning, we noted that the differences in the range of use of words 
corresponding to good and bad, suggested differences in t he range of meaning. 
Differences in the range of meaning were aiso est ablished by looking at t ne 
context in which a word ( e.g. bad) could be used with a particular domain . Some 
difference in the range of use and the range of meaning, however , does not 
automatically indicate that languages do not share the concepts GOOD and BAD. 
We saw, for example, that , . lil general , t he domains with which words 
corresponding to bad could be used were those with referents which had no 
function. Thus, despite the differences , t here was a core range of use and range 
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of meaning (related to the nature of the domain being modified) which existed. 
Thus the information from this study suggests that there are language independent 
concepts GOOD and BAD. Furthermore, while m many languages, including 
English, good has a wider range of meaning than bad, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the shared concepts, which these words reflect , are perfect antonyms. 
We looked at five languages to see the extent to which true and r£ght, which are 
also value-judgment terms, could be considered lexical universals. Although four of 
these languages had words which were similar to true and ri"ght , it was noted that 
one language, Indonesian , had only one word which corresponded roughly to these 
two English words. Furthermore, although we had no examples in the study of 
languages where no word corresponding to true existed, it was noted that such 
languages existed ( e.g. the Australian language, Dyirbal). 
Of the four languages which did have words similar to true and right, in two of 
them we found that the words corresponding to true were nouns rather than 
adjectives. Semantically, there is a difference between what is expressed by nouns 
and adjectives. Therefore, there are some grounds for suggesting that the concepts 
which these words reflect differ. 
We have looked at four value-judgment terms which have, individually, been the 
subject of considerable discussion by language philosophers. It was suggested 1n 
the introduction that many assumptions have been made about the meanings of 
these words by philosophers, logicians and semanticists. By taking a cross-linguistc 
approach to the study of these words, I suggest that some light has been shed_ on 
their meaning and , more specifically , their use across languages. 
Clearly, the approach taken here is only a beginning. A more thorough 
understanding of these words would result from a more detailed study of individual 
languages. Furthermore: although an attempt has been made to include a variety 
of languages in this study: before we can categorically state that good and bad are 
lexical universals we would want to include more languages in our study. Despite 
the limitations of this thesis, however, we have been able to test, and 1n some 
cases verify the assumptions made about these words by philosophers. Therefore, 
we have been able to illustrate the value of a linguistic approach to the study of 
philosophical problems. 
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